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A SINO-SOVIET
CULTURAL FRONTIER

*THE ILI KAZAKH
AUTONOMOUS CHOU*

George Moseley

Harvard East Asian Monographs

A SINO-SOVIET CULTURAL FRONTIER: THE ILI KAZAKH
AUTONOMOUS CHOU

by
George Moseley

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PREFACE

This study is an attempt to assess the impact of Chinese Communist rule on one of China's national minority peoples, the Kazakhs. I have tried to illuminate Sino-Soviet relations as well as the national minority policy of the Chinese Communist Party, for by the winter of 1963-1964, when the basic research for the present monograph was undertaken, events in the Kazakh area of Sinkiang had made it an issue in the relations between the two states. To some extent, Soviet source materials on the area have provided a check against Chinese Communist sources, but it must be emphasized that my analysis has been based almost wholly upon official publications of the Peking government and is, therefore, subject to distortion.

While writing this monograph I was a Fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation and was in residence at the East Asian Research Center, Harvard University. The Center provided me with every facility and with supplementary financial support. Dr. Mark Mancall, with whom I spent many fruitful hours, criticized the manuscript in detail. It was also read and commented upon by Dr. John M.H. Lindbeck and Professor Benjamin I. Schwartz. The idea of a detailed study of a selected national minority area was suggested by Professor John K. Fairbank. To all of these persons at the East Asian Research Center I am most grateful, but I am perhaps even more indebted to Dr. Gerald Freund of the Rockefeller Foundation who made it possible for me to embark upon this project.

I am also indebted to Mr. Holmes Welch, at present a Fellow of the East Asian Research Center, for having made available certain published documents from his private collection which could not otherwise have been readily consulted. Without his assistance, this

monograph could not have been written in its present form. Dr. Peter Hsien-t'ing Ch'en generously helped me with an important source in Japanese which provided much of the material for Chapter 1. I am also grateful to the then Librarian of the East Asian Research Center, Mrs. Anne B. Clark, for many valuable suggestions, and to Mr. Howard L. Boorman, Director of the Modern China Project at Columbia University, for biographical material on key individuals. This biographical material was prepared by Mr. O. Edmund Clubb who also shared with me some of his first-hand observations of the Sinkiang area. Col. Geoffrey Wheeler, of the Central Asian Research Centre (London), contributed a great deal to my understanding of the Kazakh area of the Soviet Union, and Professor Owen Lattimore enlightened me concerning linguistic problems of the Sino-Soviet frontier.

The manuscript was edited by Mrs. Olive Holmes of the East Asian Research Center; in the preparation of the text I had the invaluable assistance of my wife, Eva. I alone am responsible for all statements of fact and opinion.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The Chinese Communists inherited the old cleavage between China proper and the outlying territories of the empire, between that part of the population considered to be Chinese in culture, or "Han Chinese," and the various non-Han peoples with their distinctive languages and religions. Although they constituted but six per cent of the total population of the country according to the 1953 census, China's non-Han peoples, or "national minorities," occupied no less than sixty per cent of the area of the Chinese People's Republic (CPR). Strategically located on China's land frontiers, these national minority regions lay exposed to encroachment by the imperialist powers during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The principal purpose of the national minority policy developed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), though cast in the dialectical language of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, was to eliminate foreign influence from China's frontier regions. To implement this process of Sinification, the national minority policy of the CCP called for a "socialist transformation" which would neutralize "bourgeois" or "reactionary" leaders and permit the alliance of the Han Chinese "proletariat" and the "laboring masses" of the national minorities to flower. Sinification and socialist transformation were complementary features of the CCP's program in China's frontier regions.

Sinkiang province, in China's far northwest, had long been subject to Russian influence, both imperial and Soviet.


The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou,¹ lying adjacent to the USSR's Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (Kazakh SSR), was especially open to Russian influence. Its non-Han peoples have natural ties with Soviet national minorities. By the time the CPR was established in 1949, China's influence had here been almost completely supplanted by that of the Soviet Union. The CCP was thus confronted with a dilemma in the Ili chou, for if it faithfully pursued the proletarian internationalism which was the announced goal of its national minority policy it could not justifiably restrict the influence of the Soviet Union, a fraternal socialist country. On the other hand, if it permitted this influence to remain and even to grow, Peking's authority in the Ili chou would never be secure and the Russians would always be able to take advantage of their position to suit their own ends, as they had been known to do in the past.

If Sino-Soviet relations in the Ili chou reflect the overall relations between Peking and Moscow, they also have their own, specifically local, rationale. This was illustrated most dramatically in the summer of 1962 when some 50,000 Kazakhs and other non-Han Chinese from the Ili chou crossed the border into the Kazakh SSR, where they sought refuge. Their flight marked the culmination of a crisis in Sino-Soviet relations brought on by the CCP's attempt to rid the Ili chou of Soviet influence, yet the CCP's decision to press forward with the Sinification of this politically sensitive area must have stemmed largely from the general breakdown in relations between the two states which had become marked by 1960. Responding to the flight of the Kazakhs, the Chinese Communists closed the border of the Ili chou with the Soviet Union, an act which must have led to further tension between Peking and Moscow. The geographical and historical position of the Ili chou, from

which its special sensitivity to Sino-Soviet relations mainly derives, should be reviewed in greater detail.

Dzungaria, the northern portion of Sinkiang province in which the Ili chou is located, is an arid basin framed by the Altai mountains on the northeast, the T'ien shan (Heavenly mountains) on the south, and the Ala Tau and Tarbagatai ranges on the northwest. It is triangular in shape, with its base along the T'ien shan range, which separates it from the huge Tarim basin to the south. The aridity of the Tarim basin has limited human habitation there to widely separated oases which depend for their existence on the melting snows of the T'ien shan in the north, the Pamirs in the west, and the K'unlun mountains in the south. Since virtually nothing grows between these oases, the Tarim basin is inhospitable to pastoral peoples. The walled cities of these oases are, however, linked together by caravan trails which, in the old days, also linked China with the West and with India. Kashgar, at the apex of these routes at the western end of the Tarim basin, was a cosmopolitan center. North of the T'ien shan, on the other hand, the nomad has traditionally ruled supreme, for Dzungaria's scanty rainfall does provide a belt of thin, seasonal pasture along the base of the mountains which encircle the basin. This is all that was required by the nomadic peoples who periodically traversed it, traveling westward out of high Mongolia to the low-lying steppes of present-day Soviet Central Asia. These intermittent waves of uncouth horsemen, always ready to pillage, slaughter, and carry off slaves, made it impossible for agriculturalists to establish themselves permanently in those parts of Dzungaria which were suitable for cultivation, notably the Ili valley.

No traditional Chinese dynasty ever governed the whole of Dzungaria. None was capable of or interested in doing so,



but the rich oases of the Tarim basin frequently came under imperial control.² Dzungaria was first united with China in the Mongol empire, but it was not until the Manchu or Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911) that Peking developed a positive policy toward this vast area of mountains, steppe, and desert.

The Ch'ien-lung emperor conquered Dzungaria in the 1750's. In the process the Dzungars, a confederation of Mongol tribes, were decimated, and the Chinese government was brought into contact with the Kazakhs for the first time. The Kazakhs, who had been a subject people in the empire of Chinggis Khan, pastured their flocks and herds all the way from the Caspian Sea to Lake Balkhash, and from the khanate of Tashkent in the south to the fringes of Siberia in the north. The westernmost Kazakh khans, those of the Little Horde, had already become subject to Russia, while those in the east, the Great Horde, were vassals of the Dzungars; in between, and to the north, was the Middle Horde, whose khans remained powerful and independent because of their ability to shift sides.³ With the Ch'ing conquest of Dzungaria, most of the Kazakhs of the Great Horde, and some of those of the Middle Horde, recognized the overlordship of the Manchus and began sending tribute missions to the Ch'ing court.

From the very first the Manchu government faced a dilemma in handling the Kazakhs, for, on the one hand, it wished to keep them submissive, while on the other, its policy was to exclude them from Dzungaria. But access to the pastures of Dzungaria was what the Kazakhs most desired. The virtual extermination of the Dzungars by the Manchus had left these pastures deserted, creating a sort of human vacuum which the surrounding nomads instinctively sought to fill. Apparently, the aim of the Ch'ing government was the gradual repopulation

of Dzungaria by "good" Mongols (those who had not been part of the Dzungar confederation), and to this end it encouraged the Khalkhas to come in from Mongolia and the Torguts to return from the south Russian steppe, where they had gone to escape the oppression of the Dzungars. To placate the Kazakhs, the Ch'ing court showered favors on their khans and permitted lucrative trading arrangements in the exchange of Kazakh horses for such Chinese luxuries as silk, cotton, tea, and porcelain.⁴

The pro-Mongol orientation of the Ch'ing government in Dzungaria⁵ was based on considerations of frontier security. The Mongols, devoted to Lamaism and dependent on Manchu favor, constituted a far more reliable frontier population than the Kazakhs, whose only connections with the civilized world extended westward, to the main body of the Kazakh nation, to Mecca, and to Russian culture.⁶ An extension of the western-oriented Kazakhs into Dzungaria would almost certainly bring trouble in the future. The loyalties of the Mongols, on the contrary, were to other parts of the Ch'ing empire--to the people of Mongolia and the Dalai Lama in Tibet. Finally, within the area of Sinkiang, a Mongol population in Dzungaria would tend to balance the strongly Turkish and Islamic culture of the Uighurs in the Tarim basin, who had connections with the Kokand khanate west of the Pamirs.

The overriding concern of the Ch'ing government with the security of the Dzungarian frontier was, however, manifested primarily in its program of agricultural colonization. Military colonies consisting of Manchu and other soldiers were established on the land in the Urumchi-Ili-Tarbagatai triangle (as well as at Hami). In addition, settler-farmers were encouraged to move to Dzungaria. Most numerous of these were Uighurs from south of the T'ien shan, who came to be known as Taranchis in their

new habitat. Tungans (Chinese Moslems) moved westward from Kansu, and groups of two peoples, the Solon and Sibo, were brought all the way from Manchuria. The principal focus of settlement was the Ili valley, where the Manchu military government had its seat at Kuldja. Protected from the steppe climate of Dzungaria by a spur of the T'ien shan, the Ili valley possesses the greatest area of cultivable land of any region of Sinkiang; it is the first region west of the Great Wall, from which it is separated by a thousand miles of steppe and desert, that is capable of sustaining a large population. It is thus the necessary anchor for any regime determined to control Dzungaria. Conditions favorable to agriculture, but on a less extensive scale, prevail on both sides of the Ala Tau and Tarbagatai ranges which stretch away from the Ili valley in a northeasterly direction. Between these mountains and Lake Balkhash lies the Semirech'ye (Seven rivers) district where the Russians found a considerable area suitable for agriculture. Just as the Chinese had encouraged colonization on their side of the frontier, so the Russians sought to stabilize their vast Central Asian domains by having Russian peasants settle in this area. On the Chinese side of the Ala Tau and Tarbagatai mountains lies the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou of today.⁷

These two basic policies of the Ch'ing government for the control of Dzungaria--the exclusion of the Kazakhs and the establishment of agricultural settlements--were in a large measure successful, enduring as they did for a hundred years, but they did not, in the end, provide a final solution to the problem of frontier control in Dzungaria. Not only did the problem remain in 1949 when the CPR was established, but it had been made even more difficult because the Kazakhs had entered Dzungaria on a large scale during the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. The Chinese

Communists were now confronted with precisely the situation which the Ch'ing government had sought to prevent: namely, the intrusion of an alien population on this exposed frontier. CCP policy in Dzungaria was nevertheless strikingly similar to that of the Manchus for, as we shall see, its key element was agricultural colonization, with this difference, that now the colonists were mainly Han Chinese.

The weakening of the Ch'ing government's position in Dzungaria in the nineteenth century was caused by the internal decay of the dynasty rather than by Russian pressure, but it occurred just as the Russians were establishing themselves immediately to the west of Dzungaria. Alma Ata, the future capital of the Kazakh SSR, was founded in 1854. The establishment in 1867 of the governor-generalship of Turkestan marked a stage of greater Russian power and authority in Central Asia. The Semirech'ye district was one of the regions within the administrative competence of the new office. The Kazakhs here had quietly gone over to the Russians in the 1840's, after having submitted to China in the previous century. To escape the mounting tide of Russian colonizers and officialdom the Kazakhs now, in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, started moving eastward through the easy mountain passes that led to Dzungaria.

An additional factor promoting the movement of Kazakhs from Russia to China was the relative emptiness of the steppes of northwestern Dzungaria. The Khalkhas and the Torguts had not filled up the vacuum left by the disappearance of Dzungars. Only small bands of Torguts had survived the long trek from the Volga to the Chinese frontier, while the Khalkhas had limited their advance into Dzungaria mainly to the grasslands on the western flank of the Altai mountains, adjacent to Mongolia. Thus, the Kazakhs gradually established themselves in what

is now the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou. They would probably have been stopped if the Ch'ing frontier posts had still been in effective condition, and if the tribute missions of the Kazakh khans, which had virtually ceased by 1850, had continued to make their way to Peking.⁸ This eastward movement of the Kazakhs, which had begun in response to Russian colonization combined with Chinese weakness, was given further impetus by the 1916 revolt of the Kazakhs in Russia and the collectivization of herds during the Stalinist period.

The intrusion of the Kazakhs into Sinkiang did not at once lead to serious political difficulties. The Kazakhs were not, however, the only Islamic people of Sinkiang who were restless under Chinese rule. It was actually a rebellion in central and southern Sinkiang, rather than disorders among the Kazakhs themselves, which permitted the Russians to obtain a long-coveted foothold in the Kazakh area of Dzungaria. In the 1860's and 1870's the Tungans (Chinese Moslems) and Taranchis (Uighurs settled north of the T'ien shan) rose in a great rebellion which temporarily extinguished Ch'ing rule throughout Sinkiang.⁹ The Russians saw their opportunity and seized the Ili valley. After the rebellion was methodically crushed by an army sent from China under the celebrated Tso Tsung-t'ang, the Russians retired from Ili, which they had occupied from 1871 to 1881. In exchange for the Russian withdrawal, provided for in the Ili Treaty of 1881, the Chinese were obliged to cede the lower Ili valley and to grant the Russians commercial privileges in Sinkiang.

The Ili treaty reveals the weakness of the Chinese position and the imperialistic nature of Russian interests in Central Asia at this time. Long frustrated in their efforts to enter into regular commercial relations with Dzungaria, the

Russians were now permitted to establish "factories" and diplomatic representatives at Ining, Tacheng, and Chenghua, and also at Kashgar and Urumchi.¹⁰ Urumchi became the capital of the new province of Sinkiang, established in 1884, which embraced Dzungaria and the Tarim basin; Kashgar was the scene of sharp Anglo-Russian rivalry for influence in Sinkiang during much of the nineteenth century. Ining, Tacheng, and Chenghua are the administrative seats, respectively, of the frontier districts of Ili, Tarbagatai, and Altai. In 1954, these three districts became the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou.

Following the conclusion of the 1881 treaty, many Tungans and Taranchis, the two peoples who had made up most of the rebellious forces and who had established a brief hegemony in the Ili region prior to the Russian intervention, either moved to Russian territory or remained in that part of the lower Ili valley which the Chinese had ceded. This defection of segments of the Tungans and Taranchis demonstrated the weakness of the Ch'ing settlement scheme, which Tso Tsung-t'ang sought to improve upon by relying on Han Chinese colonists; to his own soldiers were added peasants and exiles (including many Christians) from China. The practical difficulty of carrying out such a positive policy in a frontier region nearly half a year's journey from the capital was augmented by the dynasty's decline. China's loss of power relative to that of Russia was reflected in Sinkiang by the failure of Urumchi, officially the capital of the new province, to rival the influence of Ining and Kashgar. Whereas Urumchi is located in the center of the province, where the roads north and south of the T'ien shan connect with the long road to China, Ining and Kashgar lie in the more heavily populated border districts of western Sinkiang which were becoming oriented more and more toward Russia.¹¹

That the Ch'ing authorities were responsive to the exigencies of this situation is indicated by the fact that overall military authority for Sinkiang was vested in the Military Governor of Ili.

The collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911 brought Yang Tseng-hsin to power in Sinkiang, but he had to deal with a separate Chinese independence movement in Ili and Tarbagatai before consolidating his position. Following the 1917 revolution, he gradually closed the Sino-Soviet frontier, checking the Russian influence which had been gaining ground in Sinkiang for several decades. However, the completion in 1930 of the Turkestan-Siberian Railroad, running through Alma Ata and the Semirech'ye region, heightened the economic interdependence of the three districts and the Soviet Union. In 1931 the Sinkiang administration accorded the Russians the most sweeping concessions they had yet enjoyed in the province in exchange for Soviet arms with which to counter a Moslem army advancing from Kansu.¹² Then, in 1933-1934, the Russians were able to intervene decisively in Sinkiang's affairs by giving direct military support to General Sheng Shih-ts'ai in his rise to power in the province and in his victory over the Moslem forces of Ma Ch'ung-ying. During the following ten years Sheng's dependence on the Soviet Union enabled the Russians to maintain a military detachment at Hami, the last town in Sinkiang on the road to Peking, and to develop Dzungaria virtually as a Soviet colony.¹³

Chapter II

THE KAZAKHS AND THE EAST TURKESTAN REPUBLIC

In 1942 General Sheng, who seems to have expected a Nazi victory on the eastern front, turned against the Soviet Union and committed himself to the Kuomintang. He forced the Russians to withdraw from the rest of Sinkiang, but could not prevent them from retaining a paramount position in the three districts (Ili, Tarbagatai, and Altai). This successful Russian retrenchment coincided with an uprising there of the non-Han Chinese population. It began with a revolt of the Altai Kazakhs in the summer of 1944, said to have been touched off by a Kuomintang demand for the delivery of horses.¹ By November the uprising had spread to the Uighurs (Taranchis) in the Ili valley. The Soviets soon controlled the revolution in the three districts (although they may not have directly instigated it) and set up an "East Turkestan Republic" at Ining. Taking advantage of the Soviet consulates in Ining, Tacheng, and Chenghua in coordinating its activities, the Republic quickly extended its authority throughout the three districts; its Kazakh cavalry drove as far as Manas, a key town between Ining and Urumchi, and threatened the provincial capital itself. The Tarim basin, too, became infected by the revolt. Late in 1945 negotiations were opened, through the good offices of the Soviet consul-general in Urumchi, between the East Turkestan Republic and the Kuomintang. These protracted negotiations, which faithfully reflected the uneasy relations between Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek in the midst of the Chinese civil war, led to nothing. While negotiations continued intermittently, the

three districts remained virtually independent of China for five years, from 1944 until the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, and during these years the Russification of northwestern Sinkiang went forward at a greatly accelerated pace.

The establishment of the East Turkestan Republic was in part a local response to the assertion of Kuomintang rule in Sinkiang and in part a manifestation of Russian great-power politics in Central Asia.² Uighur and Kazakh nationalists, who sought to prevent a return to traditional Chinese rule, came together in the Republic. Its nominal leader, Akhmedjan Kasimi, appears to have sought a special, "autonomous" status for the three districts which would have made it possible for the Republic to maintain the distinctively Turkish culture of its people and the pronounced Soviet orientation of its economy. When Akhmedjan was killed in a plane crash on the eve of the establishment of the CPR, his lieutenant, Saifudin Azizov, who later became chairman of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region of the CPR, succeeded to the formal leadership of the Republic. Akhmedjan and Saifudin were both Uighurs, but whereas the former was a nationalist of the old school, Saifudin was a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and as such he faithfully carried out Stalin's will in the three districts. The circumstances of Akhmedjan's death invite suspicion, for the "accident" also carried away, at a convenient juncture, other leading nationalists of the Republic.

The quasi-independent status which the Kazakhs, Uighurs, and other non-Han peoples of the three districts enjoyed under Russian protection was a useful tool for Moscow in its negotiations with the Chinese government--initially with the Kuomintang and later with the CCP. The Soviet Union wished to perpetuate

its special position in Sinkiang and its influence in the three districts, which possess rich natural resources, including uranium. Moscow remained uncertain about the outcome of the Chinese civil war well into 1949. Had the Kuomintang emerged victorious, the three districts might well have been incorporated outright by the Soviet Union. This is what had happened to the nearby Turkic area of Tannu Tuva in 1944. It is not inconceivable, moreover, that all of Sinkiang might have drifted irretrievably away from Chinese control, perhaps under a Soviet-inspired regime similar to the one under which Outer Mongolia achieved its independence from China. The Kuomintang, for its part, flirted with a Machiavellian design to deliver Sinkiang up to the Soviet Union in order to undermine the CCP and thereby save the Chinese heartland.³

By mid-1949, however, the ultimate victory of the Chinese Communists had become obvious, and Soviet policy in the three districts shifted. This shift caused a split in the Republic's leadership and led to an agreement with the CCP for the unopposed entry into the three districts of People's Liberation Army (PLA) units in late 1949.⁴ Saifudin recalled years later that the question of Chinese hegemony had been the subject of discussions in Ining "before the Liberation of Sinkiang." After considerable debate, he said, it had been resolved that the question itself was "incompatible with the basic spirit of the revolution in the three districts."⁵ The "counter-revolutionaries" among the officials of the old Republic who were purged by the CCP in 1951 were probably those who had failed to acquiesce in the new line laid down by Saifudin.⁶ Many of those who did adhere to the new line, and who tended to be pro-Soviet, were subsequently purged, in 1958 and later, when the three districts underwent an intense process of Sinification at the expense of Soviet influence.

The formal return of the three districts to Chinese sovereignty in 1949 did not signify, however, a liquidation of the Soviet position there. The Moscow negotiations between Mao Tse-tung and Stalin in 1949-1950 resulted in the perpetuation of Soviet economic concessions in Sinkiang.⁷ Indeed, it was to take more than a decade for the CCP to completely integrate this distant frontier into the People's Republic of China.

Kazakh resistance, on the other hand, was not a serious impediment. Armed resistance was limited to perhaps a half-dozen chiefs, the strongest of whom could not have commanded more than a few thousand men. The most notorious of these was Osman Bator, whose friendly attitude toward Americans enabled him to command considerable attention in the world press.⁸ All these leaders were from a region in eastern Dzungaria (roughly corresponding to the two present-day Kazakh autonomous hsien of Mu-lei and Pa-li-k'un) which was outside the sphere of Soviet influence and tended to gravitate politically toward the more conservative Tarim basin,⁹ or else (as in the case of Osman) from the Altai district, the northernmost and most tradition-bound of the three districts which constituted the East Turkestan Republic.¹⁰ These chiefs had either never participated in the Republic or, like Osman, had at first joined the insurgents and later broken with them; long before the PLA captured Lanchow at the end of August 1949, thus sealing the fate of Sinkiang, they had committed themselves to the Kuomintang and to a Sinkiang which would be more influenced by the United States than by the Soviet Union.¹¹ Like those persons in the Republic's administration who had resisted the discipline imposed by Saifudin, these rebellious chiefs were harshly dealt with by the Chinese Communists.¹² In

contrast, the Kazakh units which had acquiesced in the directives from Moscow--by all indications constituting the major part of the Republic's armed forces--were either disbanded by or absorbed in the PLA.¹³

This divided response of Sinkiang's Kazakhs to the hegemony of the CCP requires some elucidation, for it reflects the dissimilar development of two groups of Kazakhs in Dzungaria before 1949 and anticipates their dissimilar fates at the hands of the Chinese Communists. Their treatment by the CCP, in turn, cannot be understood apart from the peculiarities of Kazakh social organization.

The Kazakhs who gradually moved into the Chinese administrative districts of Ili, in the southwestern corner of Dzungaria, and of Tarbagatai, which lies northeast of Ili, were of the Great Horde, while those who took over the pastures of the Dzungars in the Altai district were of the Naiman division of the Middle Horde.¹⁴ This distinction is by no means absolute, for there was much intermingling between these two hordes both before and after their shift to the east following the Ch'ing destruction of the Dzungars. Nevertheless, the Tarbagatai mountains, which stretch westward from the Sino-Soviet frontier, were a natural boundary between the two hordes in Russian territory, and as the Kazakhs moved to the east these mountains channeled those of the Middle Horde along the Black Irtish river into the Altai district. Groups of these Middle Horde Kazakhs subsequently moved south along the Altai mountains to the eastern Sinkiang region north of Hami, while a few moved farther south into Kansu and Tsinghai provinces, where they still reside; still other Kazakhs of the Middle Horde continued eastward into Outer Mongolia.

This general movement of the Kazakhs to the east cannot

be precisely chronicled, but the distribution of the Kazakhs among the Soviet Union, China, and the People's Republic of Mongolia (MPR) in the 1950's, by which time little further migration was possible, was as follows:¹⁵

<u>Country</u>	<u>Kazakh Population</u>	<u>Date of Census</u>
MPR	37,000	1956
China	470,000	1953 (est.)
USSR	3,622,000	1959

At the same time, the proportion of Kazakhs to total population within Sinkiang, where virtually all of China's Kazakhs reside, was as follows: in Sinkiang, 9 per cent; in Dzungaria 40 per cent; in the three districts, 60 per cent.¹⁶ In terms of human geography, Dzungaria represents a protrusion of Chinese sovereignty into a steppe zone stretching from the Caspian sea to western Outer Mongolia which since time immemorial had been the domain of nomadic herdsman. The rather low percentage figures for the Kazakh population in Dzungaria are due to the historically recent growth of non-Kazakh urban and agricultural communities. Thus, within the three districts, the percentage of Kazakhs is much higher in the Altai than in the Ili district, for the latter is richer in agricultural land and has a comparatively developed commerce and industry. The Tarbagatai district is an intermediate zone between the other two.

Russian commercial activity in the nineteenth century followed a pattern similar to that for agricultural development: it was more intense in Ili and Tarbagatai than in Altai.¹⁷ Furthermore, it was mainly the two southern districts that received the large numbers of Kazakhs who fled from Russia in the twentieth century, all of whom had directly experienced Russian rule. The special position which the Soviet Union began to establish in

Sinkiang in the early 1930's was, again, based on Ili. By the time the East Turkestan Republic made its appearance in 1944, the differences between the Ili and Altai Kazakhs had become quite pronounced. Perhaps the clearest evidence we have of this division is that some of the khans east and north of the Tarbagatai district could not accept the Soviet orientation of the East Turkestan Republic. They preferred to stay away from the Republic and to oppose the Chinese Communists. Indeed, the Ili Kazakhs had no khans at all; their hereditary aristocracy had disappeared by the end of the nineteenth century.

As a general proposition, it may be said that the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde, who escaped strong Russian influence prior to their eastward movement into Dzungaria, remained comparatively isolated in northern and eastern Dzungaria. The Kazakhs of the Great Horde, on the other hand, had already suffered social dislocation under the impact of the Dzungars and had undergone considerable Russian influence; located in the south and west, they remained comparatively exposed to Soviet influence. These differences were much more marked among the Kazakh leaders than among the Kazakh herders, and remained less pronounced in the distant steppe than in the proximity of the towns and agricultural communities.

The basic unit of Kazakh social organization was the *uru* or clan, based on patrilineal descent and exogamy.¹⁸ The *uru* was composed of a number of *aul* (extended families), and customarily included all blood relatives who could trace their descent to a common male ancestor seven generations removed. Marriage within this kin-community was not permitted. Frequently, the *uru* was co-extensive with the winter encampment of the Kazakhs, which in the springtime broke up into its constituent *aul* as the Kazakhs moved their livestock out to summer pasture. The size of

the *uru* varied considerably in practice, depending on the power of its leader; a large one might comprise several hundred yurts (the traditional felt tent). Larger units (for example, tribes, confederacies, hordes) were also based on patrilineal descent, being composed of *uru* the founders of which were descended from a more distant male ancestor. Leaders of the *uru* owed allegiance to a "tribal" chief, who was in turn obedient to a khan. The chiefs, who were often of aristocratic blood ("white bone," as opposed to the commoners, who were "black bone"), taxed the *uru* and called them together in case of military necessity. The maximum size of the community of which a Kazakh considered himself a member steadily shrank as the nation was broken up and dispersed by the inroads of the Russians, the Dzungars, and the Chinese, but the Communist regimes in Russia and China have caused a reawakening of Kazakh nationalism.

While it is difficult to ascertain to what extent the traditional life of Sinkiang's Kazakhs was affected by earlier changes in their external environment, it is evident that they were in a transitional stage of development when the People's Republic of China was established in 1949. The Kazakhs had been attracted to China by the indirect and distant rule of the Ch'ing (and early Republican) government as well as by the empty Dzungarian steppe. While the Tsarist government pursued an aggressive colonial policy, officials in China neither interfered with the Kazakh's sociopolitical organization or settled peasants on their best grazing land. Thus northeastern Sinkiang tended to become a refuge for those Kazakhs, of both the Middle and the Great Horde, who were most attached to their traditional way of life; if they did not come to Sinkiang precisely for this reason, nevertheless the great open steppe of Dzungaria permitted the perpetuation of their traditional nomadic life

to a much greater extent than was possible under Russian administration.¹⁹

Politically within China, Sinkiang's Kazakhs had nothing to fear from the Russians who came into Sinkiang with the opening of the province to Russian trade in the latter part of the nineteenth century; nor did they have anything to fear from the Russians who entered the province during Sheng Shih-ts'ai's rule in the 1930's and 1940's. Therefore, the Russian influence felt among Sinkiang's Kazakhs, limited though it was, was proportionately more powerful than in Russian Kazakhstan, where a deep hostility had inevitably developed between the proud Kazakhs and the intruding Russians. For Sinkiang's Kazakhs, in other words, Russian influence was politically neutral. It was not associated with a direct threat to their traditional life. And this influence could only have been enhanced by the relative backwardness of China. It was the Russians, therefore, who first exposed Sinkiang's Kazakhs to the twentieth century despite Governor Yang Tseng-hsin's efforts to exclude modern ideas from the province.

The economic, and also cultural, orientation of Sinkiang's Kazakhs toward the Soviet Union is proof of the attractiveness for them of modern society, and more especially of Kazakh society in the Soviet Union. If this orientation was present mainly among a limited upper stratum of the Kazakhs in the three districts, it nevertheless affected the Kazakhs at large by revealing a social pattern at variance with their traditional one. The East Turkestan Republic was the political manifestation of this orientation. Most of the Kazakhs in the three districts adhered to the Republic, at least passively. Traditional Kazakh social ideals then found their last refuge, as we have seen, in eastern and northern Dzungaria. The

Republic demonstrated that these traditional ideals could not compete on equal terms with those of the modern world, as represented by the Soviet Union.

The existence of the East Turkestan Republic did not, in any direct and immediate way, affect the life of the ordinary Kazakh herder, who was insulated by the poor communications and great distances of the steppe. Characteristically, he remained wedded to his traditional life, typified by the seasonal migration to and from summer pasture and by the *uru*. Very few Kazakhs even in the Ili district had settled down, in the limited sense of adopting permanent winter quarters, by 1949,²⁰ and there was no reason to alter their traditional kinship structure so long as they remained nomadic.²¹ To be sure, many individual Kazakhs had abandoned the yurt to enter the armed forces of the East Turkestan Republic, to seek higher education or official position in the towns, or to seek employment in the industrial or extractive establishments developed by the Russians in the three districts; many Kazakhs went to the Soviet Union. But these individuals had broken with a social pattern which they did not subsequently influence in any profound manner.²²

On the other hand, a general breakdown in the larger sociopolitical milieu in which the *uru* functioned had long been in progress among Sinkiang's Kazakhs. This breakdown was associated with a decay in the authority of the khans, who in the past had determined the allotment of pasture among the various tribes. The consequent instability in the grasslands invited feuding among local chiefs whose power rested to an increasing extent on private wealth. The differences between rich and poor *uru* and, within the *uru*, between rich and poor *aul*, became sharper; the poorest families were obliged to work for the rich or to turn to agriculture. In the main,

however, the *uru* continued to function as a cooperative enterprise with all its families having some claim on the livestock; the Chinese Communist attempt to identify a "pastoral proletariat" among Sinkiang's Kazakhs is an exaggeration of the actual state of affairs.²³ The impact of the East Turkestan Republic was felt at the top rather than at the base of Kazakh society; the Republic offered a new political cohesion to replace the vanished authority of the khans without, at the same time, challenging the legitimacy of the *uru*, which remained viable in terms of the pastoral nomadism practiced by the Kazakhs.²⁴

At the time of their adherence to the CPR in 1949, the three districts were rapidly evolving as a *de facto* Soviet dependency. With Russian blessing, the East Turkestan Republic had thrown off the Kuomintang "yoke" five years previously, thus achieving the theoretical "liberation" of the three districts prior to the arrival of the PLA. No other area of China had gone so far toward realizing the announced objectives of the Chinese Communists without direct assistance from the PLA or CCP. It appears that the Soviet-oriented leaders in the three districts were persuaded by the Russians to adhere voluntarily to the CPR and that the absence of popular resistance to CPR rule was due to the belief that the Russians, so nearby, would provide a guarantee for China's good behavior. In the end, everyone was to be disappointed, except the Chinese Communists. As the non-Han peoples of the three districts were to discover, no autonomy was any longer possible between Russia and China in the middle of Asia. For the Kazakhs, who had left Russia to preserve their traditional ways, CPR rule was a final irony. The pro-Russian and pro-Soviet orientation developed by the Kazakhs in Sinkiang had made it possible for the CPSU

to turn the East Turkestan Republic over to the Chinese, and Chinese rule was to prove even more oppressive than Russian.

Chapter III

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PATTERN OF CPR RULE

The absorption of the East Turkestan Republic by the People's Republic of China in 1949 did not cause any apparent difficulties in Sino-Soviet relations. The CCP and the CPSU interpreted the extension of Chinese sovereignty to the three districts in the same way.¹ Both parties viewed the East Turkestan Republic, despite its nationalistic shortcomings, as a positive factor in the revolution of the peoples of China. Not only were the three districts inalienable parts of China which the Soviet Union could not possibly covet, but the Republic was even credited with having spearheaded an alleged patriotic movement of Sinkiang's peoples directed at forestalling the attempts of the imperialists to dismember northwest China. (The Soviet Union could not, by definition, be an imperialist country!) With the victory of the Chinese people's revolution, the East Turkestan Republic became merged in the great, international, socialist movement led by the Soviet Union. Implicit in the parallel positions of the two parties was the assumption that the boundary between the two countries was merely an administrative demarcation rather than a barrier.

It can scarcely be doubted, however, that the Chinese Communists, arriving in the three districts in 1949-1950, deeply resented the influence of the Soviet Union that was everywhere apparent. While superficially the Russians and the Chinese were brothers in arms, together carrying forward the Marxist-Leninist banner of world revolution, the Chinese could not have forgotten that in former times their national boundaries

in the extreme northwest lay much farther to the west, in what had become the Kazakh SSR, nor that, only a few months before their arrival, Stalin's agents had been engaged in negotiations with the Nationalist government which might have legitimized a Soviet sphere of influence in Sinkiang. And although the three districts had not been appropriated outright by the Russians, they bore the earmarks of a Soviet satrapy. As the Chinese Communist Party chief for Sinkiang observed in 1950: "As a result of the proximity of Sinkiang to the Soviet Union, the Sinkiang people and its intellectuals have long been influenced by the victorious October revolution and the Soviet successes in socialist construction."² This remark was much more applicable to the three districts than to Sinkiang as a whole. The oil and mineral wealth of the area, including the uranium of the Altai district, were being exploited by the Russians and carried off to the Soviet Union, as were the abundant animal husbandry products of the three districts. The Turkic-Moslem culture of the towns had been overlaid by Russian, not Chinese, culture. Worst of all, the Kazakhs, Uighurs, and other non-Han Chinese of the area were on the best of terms with the Russians, and they measured everything against Soviet standards.

During the decade 1950-1960 the Chinese sought painstakingly to build real power in an area where they enjoyed, at the time of Liberation, only a fragile suzerainty based on close cooperation with the Russians. The Chinese enveloped the centers of Soviet influence from the base established in the grasslands by the Production-Construction Corps; in doing this they were enormously aided by the technicians and material assistance provided by the Soviet Union.

Initially, the CCP accepted the status quo in those areas of the three districts where Soviet influence was strongest--

namely, in the industrial sector and in the towns, where the pro-Soviet leadership of the Kazakhs and Uighurs was concentrated. Thus, in an unusual move, the CCP recognized the local governments in Ili, Tacheng, and Altai. These local governments were not "reorganized" and tied directly to the government in Urumchi until the latter part of 1950, after a delay of nearly a year.³ Moreover, the political organization of the old Republic, Akhmedjan's Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy, was not liquidated outright but was reconstituted, in the "united front" led by the CCP, as the Sinkiang People's Democratic League,⁴ and some 17,000 Soviet-oriented cadres of the Republic were retained by the Chinese Communists.⁵ Perhaps even more significant is the fact that apparently the Cyrillic alphabet continued to be used for Kazakh language publications, although in the language-reform discussions of the late 1950's the Chinese made it appear that the Arabic alphabet had exclusively been used by the Kazakhs in Sinkiang.⁶

The comparatively insulated Kazakh herders, less affected by the East Turkestan Republic than their compatriots in the towns, felt the impact of the Chinese Communist regime more quickly. Here, on the steppe, it was soon apparent that the Chinese were preoccupied with the exploitation of the Ili chou's human and natural resources. In the view of the CCP, these resources, which constituted part of the country's investment capital, had to be judiciously used to further the building of an industrialized state. Nothing could be wasted; not a single lamb could be allowed through negligence to perish prematurely, and no citizen could be allowed the luxury of idleness.⁷ Decked out in "Marxist-Leninist" ideology, this was, and remains, the real thrust of the party's program in the Ili chou, as elsewhere in China. But it was difficult to

persuade the non-Chinese minorities that it was in their interest to struggle for a prosperous China; nor were they as accustomed to hard work as were the Chinese whom they were now expected to emulate.

The CCP encountered peculiar difficulties in harnessing the Kazakhs to China's national chariot. Quite aside from their orientation toward the Soviet Union, the Kazakhs were, of all China's frontier peoples, possibly the most distant from the Han Chinese--historically, culturally, and psychologically. And the mobility of these mounted herders, whose steppe and mountain environment was alien to the Chinese, made them difficult to reach physically. Moslem, Turkic, and nomadic, the Kazakhs of Sinkiang were at least apprehensive about their fate in the new Chinese polity. Far from ignoring these peculiarities, the party made a sustained effort, by means of specific actions as well as propaganda, to overcome Kazakh suspicions and to persuade the herders that they had an unprecedentedly bright future in the People's Republic of China.

Immediately after Liberation an intense propaganda campaign was launched in the three districts. It proceeded on two levels. In its approach to the more sophisticated town-dwellers, among whom the Kazakhs were less important numerically than the Han and Uighur, the party made use of the Ili Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. The SSFA's propaganda emphasized socialism rather than the Chinese revolution as such, and much of its material came directly from the Soviet Union, if not, indeed, from the Soviet propaganda apparatus already established in the Ili region.⁸ In the Kazakh grazing areas, on the other hand, as in national minority areas all over China, it was the PLA that mounted the propaganda campaign. Mobile theatrical troupes contrasted the oppressive Chinese regimes of the past

with the enlightened government of the People's Republic, under which fraternal respect and mutual help would replace the former discrimination of one nationality against another. At the same time, the PLA distributed tools and food supplies to the herders, and army medical teams provided them with free treatment. A mission from the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the central government toured the three districts to discuss local problems and presented the Kazakhs with banners demanding that "All Nationalities of the People's Republic of China Unite!" The banners were said to have been personally written by Mao Tse-tung.⁹

Under party control and direction, the PLA also played a prominent role in the "reorganization" of Kazakh society in the first years of the Chinese Communist regime. As the deputy chief of staff, Sinkiang military district, recalled years later:

In order to enable the working people to liberate themselves thoroughly, the PLA sent a large number of cadres to take part in the great struggles of rent-reduction, anti-despot, agrarian reform and social reforms. They went deep into the rural areas and remote corners of Sinkiang to help the people of various nationalities rise to their own feet.¹⁰

Counter-revolutionaries were suppressed and the chiefs who had not openly rebelled were, along with the imams (Moslem religious leaders), stripped of their prerogatives and deprived of their income.¹¹ There was some distribution of livestock seized from wealthy herders, but it appears that Kazakh resistance obliged the party to retreat before this movement had progressed very far, and in 1952 a policy of "no struggle, no liquidation, and no distinction of classes" was adopted.¹² Whereas the agrarian reform movement, notably among the Sibo in the Ili valley (where they have their own autonomous area, the Ch'apch'aerh

Sibo Autonomous Hsien, close to Ining), was basically completed in 1953, mutual aid teams (a primitive form of cooperative enterprise) were just beginning to be organized at that time among the Kazakhs. In general, major social and economic changes in the grazing areas were postponed until 1955 or later. Meanwhile, the party sought to complete the political reorientation of the Kazakhs and to increase the productivity of their herds by, among other things, distributing shotguns for the control of wolves¹³ and raising the price of animal husbandry products.¹⁴

In theory, the establishment of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou in November 1954 signaled the completion of the basic political reorganization of the Kazakhs and the commencement of their economic reorganization. It was quite clearly the product of careful party planning rather than of any spontaneous desire on the part of the Kazakhs themselves.¹⁵ Previously, on April 20-21, a "Preparatory Committee of the Kazakh Autonomous Area in Ili, Tacheng, and Altai" had been established by the Sinkiang Provincial People's Government. Representatives of "all circles and nationalities" were already on hand to attend the first session, which was held then and there. A Kazakh named Pathan Sugurpaev (Pa-ta-han) was named chairman of the committee; the principal report was delivered by Saifudin, then Fourth Secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party.¹⁶ The preparatory committee, with its headquarters in Ining, dispatched cadres to advertise the benefits of regional autonomy and, at its second meeting, in June, approved the chairman's draft work plan. The committee now considered that: "the people have basically realized the national autonomy policy," thereby laying the foundation for their own autonomous area. But just at this point a most embarrassing

situation arose. The party's policy of regional autonomy required that governments of autonomous areas consist of representatives chosen by the people, but the *Ili Daily*, official newspaper of the region, reported that elections could not be held in the herding (i.e., Kazakh) areas because conditions there were "too unsettled." (In fact, no elections were held there until 1956, a delay which revealed the extent of the difficulties encountered by the party in asserting its control over the Kazakhs.)¹⁷ Nevertheless, 239 deputies--representing not only the Kazakh majority but also Uighur, Mongol, Han Chinese, Sibo, Uzbek, Tungan, Tatar, Russian, Kirghiz, and other national communities residing in the chou--were on hand to form a people's congress when the chou was formally established on November 21, 1954.¹⁸ A 36-member people's council, theoretically the executive organ of the chou government, was elected by the deputies with Bartierhan and Usufu Khan (both Kazakhs) as chairman and vice-chairman, respectively. The Sinkiang Provincial People's Congress, with 48 Kazakhs out of 375 deputies, had already met in July and dispatched 21 representatives, including two Kazakhs, to the National People's Congress in Peking.¹⁹ The Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (SUAR) upon which the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou is administratively dependent, was, however, established only in 1955.

The establishment of the Ili chou was of no practical significance for the Kazakhs. It merely defined an administrative area; this might just as well have been accomplished by a decree of the central government had it not been necessary to satisfy an ideological requirement. The representatives of the Kazakhs who served at various levels in the administration did not represent the interests of their constituents; rather, they implemented directives from above. Their success depended on how enthusiastically

they could advance the interests of the state regardless of local sentiment. Even this function was extremely circumscribed, however, for real power was exercised by the party, the organization of which paralleled that of the government administration.

If in most of China's autonomous regions the people's congresses and people's councils²⁰ provided a formal structure which might capture the imagination of the inhabitants while the party actually ruled, among the Kazakhs it was no more possible for the party than for the local people's governments to rule, for the party encountered insuperable difficulties in attempting to recruit Kazakh cadres who would faithfully carry out the policies of the Chinese state. As late as 1959 party organizations did not even exist in many pastoral districts: that this difficulty with the Kazakhs was not characteristic of Sinkiang's minorities generally²¹ is shown by the fact that approximately half of all government and party cadres in the SUAR were by this time minority nationals.

How, then, were the three districts governed by the Chinese Communists during the decade 1950-1960? It appears that to a remarkable extent the pre-Liberation status quo was perpetuated, although at an early date the new regime superseded the Soviet Union as the over-all master of the situation. As we have seen, in Ining and wherever else Soviet influence had been marked, Soviet-oriented personnel remained at the working levels of the administration; only those who were notoriously bourgeois were purged. On the vast steppe and in the remote mountain pastures where the Kazakhs tended their livestock, on the other hand, CCP or central government control was, apparently, either non-existent or extremely weak. In both the towns and on the steppes, the party lacked total power;

it was not able to assert itself fully in the Soviet sphere of influence because of the political and economic modus vivendi reached by Mao and Stalin in Moscow in 1950, and it simply lacked the wherewithal to extend its control into the herding areas. But the party could have acted with more vigor than it did; a measure of restraint served its larger design for the modernization and industrialization of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region in which Soviet participation was crucial. Furthermore, there were economic reasons for the party's adoption of a cautious policy in the grasslands. With animal husbandry products constituting 90 per cent of Sinkiang's exports to the Soviet Union during the early 1950's²² the Kazakh herder was obviously an important factor in the economy of the region.

According to 1948 data, the three districts produced 80 per cent of the livestock of northern Sinkiang,²³ and although slightly over half of the province's livestock was raised in the south, most of the latter was consumed and most of that from the north exported. The Kazakh herder clearly had a central role in the party's plans for changing the "poor and blank" face of Sinkiang.²⁴ His livestock, which must have been purchased with cash by the government, was exchanged for the Soviet capital goods which made up some 80 per cent of Sinkiang's imports.²⁵ This trade was probably handled by the local development companies which were established specifically in each of the three districts of Ili, Tacheng, and Altai, while a Sinkiang trading company, which had an "export mission" to fulfill, handled the trade elsewhere in the province.²⁶ The *People's Daily* boasted in 1955 that enough wool had been exported from Sinkiang since 1949 to purchase 3,100 Stalin No. 80 tractors, and that the sheep casings exported during

the same period were exchanged for all the equipment needed for the Urunchi thermal power plant.²⁷ The scale of this trade, which increased by 61 per cent between 1950 and 1955²⁸ is suggested by the fact that in 1958 nearly half of China's total exports of animal husbandry products came from Sinkiang.²⁹

Communist China's economic dependence on the Soviet Union thus had a tangible effect on the party's handling of the Kazakhs; furthermore, the Russians were unquestionably more sympathetic at this time to the Kazakhs as a people than were the Chinese, a sympathy which may have exercised a restraining influence on the CCP. This Soviet influence was made more immediate by the presence in northern Sinkiang of a large number of Soviet nationals (some of whom, it seems reasonable to suppose, may have been Kazakhs) who were employed as technicians in a multitude of projects--agricultural as well as industrial--in the Ili chou and as personnel in the Sino-Soviet aviation and joint-stock companies.³⁰ These companies represented a perpetuation of concessions which had been granted the Soviet Union by Sheng Shih-ts'ai and which the Russians had sought to renegotiate with the Nationalist government in the spring of 1949. But the similarity of the two situations was quite superficial, since Soviet participation in Sinkiang's development after 1949 was a calculated policy of the central government in Peking.³¹

Two vignettes may help to contrast the Soviet and the Chinese traditions in northern Sinkiang. Among a team of Russian specialists who toured Sinkiang in 1959 was a certain Tzu-lo-ni-k'o-fu (Chinese transliteration of a Russian name), "an expert in animal husbandry who had worked in the Ku-nai-su Sheep Farm [in the Ili chou] in Sinkiang some twenty years ago, and because of this had a particularly deep personal feeling for livestock production in Sinkiang."³² Our second vignette

is from a newsletter written by a *People's Daily* correspondent who visited Mosowan, in the heart of the Dzungarian basin, in 1960. "Mosowan," he writes, "is dry. A hundred years ago, the Manchu government attempted to colonize the place with troops sent to rule the people of different nationalities in Sinkiang. But the troops had to evacuate the place due to drought. When the people's fighters [Production-Construction Corps of the PLA] made their way into Mosowan on a large scale, they discovered the broken walls of old days and some corpses which had not yet completely decomposed due to the dryness of the place."³³

The political hegemony and economic control exercised by the Chinese People's Republic in the Ili chou would have been flimsy indeed had they rested solely upon the tenuous institutional arrangements already described. But, in the Production-Construction Corps, the party had the means to guarantee the security of the Dzungarian basin and to ensure its economic development. At the same time, the corps provided the party with an instrument for the rapid introduction of large numbers of Han Chinese into the region. And, as we shall see, Sinification--ingeniously rationalized in "Marxist-Leninist" terms--was the policy finally adopted by the party for reversing once and for all the drift of northwestern Sinkiang toward the Soviet Union. Like the seizure of power in China proper, this process first took hold in the "countryside" and gradually neutralized the centers of population, where, in the case of Dzungaria, the Russians and their protégés among the national minorities were entrenched. But here the corps first had to populate the countryside, thus rendering harmless those nomads who refused to abandon their "monotonous" life for the security of the state farm.

Chapter IV

THE PRODUCTION-CONSTRUCTION CORPS

The Production-Construction Corps in Sinkiang drew its manpower from the former Nationalist army which had surrendered in 1949 as well as from the PLA. Units of the PLA were assigned production tasks as the number of men required for military duty diminished following Liberation. These soldiers had already accomplished a great deal of non-military work by the time the Production-Construction Corps was actually institutionalized in 1953.¹ The organizational structure of the PLA was retained in the corps, and it was made subordinate to the Sinkiang Military District. The 100,000-man Nationalist army was, it appears, initially assigned project areas separate and removed from those of the PLA, but the distinction between the two gradually disappeared as the Kuomintang soldiers demonstrated their capacity for socialist construction. Nationalist and Communist Chinese thus closed ranks against the nomad, the Russian, and the terrifying wilderness of the Dzungarian basin, parched in summer and frozen in winter. As early as 1950 the combined Nationalist and Communist forces of the corps numbered no less than 200,000, since 110,000 of the 193,000-man PLA in Sinkiang had been transferred to production tasks at the outset.² But this number was steadily augmented by subsequently demobilized PLA units, local personages undergoing reform through labor, and, most important, peasants from China proper. By 1960 this disciplined Chinese community had established 182 state farms, doubling the cultivated area of Sinkiang.³

Given over largely to wheat and cotton, but also including livestock on a major scale, these state farms were

immense. Such was the degree of their mechanization that in the mid-1950's they may have possessed one-third or more of all the tractors (calculated in horsepower-units), in China.⁴ Miles upon miles of irrigation canals were dug to carry the water of Sinkiang's rivers out onto the prairie that was being turned to the plow.⁵ The farms were spread along the base of the mountains--the source of almost all of Sinkiang's water--or along the larger rivers which flow out from them. In other words, they were located on the pasturage--particularly the critical winter pasturage--of the indigenous herders. Some oases (such as Mosowan), which rely on subterranean water, were also developed: these, too, had been used by the nomads.

A map published in the *People's Daily* in 1958 showed that the corps was heavily concentrated on the northern edge of the T'ien shan, from Urumchi in the center of the province to the Manas river, which reaches into the Ili chou in the west. Other important corps sites were in the Ili valley, on the Black Irtish and Urungu rivers in the Altai district, as Palikun and Hami (where, presumably, they expanded existing oases) in the east, and in several pockets along the Tarim river in southern Sinkiang.⁶ These locations do not by any means delimit the corps' activities: they merely identify certain key areas of 1958, a year which, in fact, marks the beginning of a rapid expansion of the state-farm system in Sinkiang; moreover the corps engaged in many enterprises aside from the state farms.

The state farms of the Production-Construction Corps provided the party with a stable base of operations in each of the three districts of the Ili chou.⁷ These islands of hard-working and politically reliable Han Chinese were expanded as rapidly as possible: the Kazakhs constituted 54 per cent of the chou's population in 1955 but only 43.5 per cent in 1959,

the year in which large-scale Han immigration only began.⁸ It was this Han base, rather than progressive elements among the national minorities, that led in the tasks of "socialist construction" and "socialist transformation in the Ili chou. From the bases established by the corps the party was able to reach and gradually control the Kazakh herder, thus isolating the political leadership of the Kazakhs which had survived in the towns under tacit Russian protection since the demise of the East Turkestan Republic.

There were several ways in which the party, acting through the corps, could influence or bring pressure upon the Kazakh herder, heretofore protected by his remoteness and mobility. First of all, it could control the market for his animal husbandry products. In this role the corps acted as an extension of the development companies referred to in Chapter 3. The Kazakhs in the three districts were accustomed to exporting to the Soviet Union on a large scale;⁹ much of their income from livestock sales was, in turn, expended on imports from south of the T'ien shan. Flour was but the most important of a variety of items purchased. The party seems to have maintained fairly high prices for animal husbandry products, at least for a number of years following Liberation, thus increasing production and, at the same time, orienting the Kazakh toward the new regime and increasing his dependence upon it.¹⁰

Secondly, the corps physically established itself on some of the Kazakhs' pasturage. It is difficult to ascertain to what extent this occurred and precisely what form it took, but this kind of expropriation must have been extensive since, by and large, it was prairie, not desert, that the corps "reclaimed." It is possible, as the Chinese Communists often say, that the reclamation work of the corps actually increased

the amount of good grass available to the Kazakh herder. On the other hand, the vehemence with which the corps was denounced on all sides during 1957, when criticism was encouraged, suggests a less happy situation. An Englishman who visited a wheat and cotton farm of the corps in the Manas region in 1956 was told by the military commander that where the new crops grew "nothing had grown...before but scrub and straggling weed, and thin pasture for a few thin cattle." He was assured, nevertheless, that somehow the native stock-breeders were benefiting by the state-farm system.¹¹ This might be so, for there would always be a marginal belt of land around the farm which would not be sufficiently well watered for tillage but would nevertheless benefit, as pasture, from the water brought into the farm by the new irrigation works of the corps. (In the same way, much of the livestock of southern Sinkiang was always pastured on the periphery of the oases.) Such a situation would, however, make the herder dependent, at least potentially, on the corps.

Then again there were the state livestock farms.

Livestock farms, built and operated by the corps and totally owned by the state, numbered at least eleven in the Ili chou in 1955.¹² They were stocked largely with superior breeds from the Soviet Union and they employed the latest techniques, including artificial insemination, disease control, and winter shelter and fodder. In their turn, these farms supplied advanced methods and high-quality breeding stock to the Kazakhs of the Ili chou, presumably in ways which advanced the objectives of the party. For instance, the party probably bargained in this way to persuade the Kazakhs to accept joint public-private livestock farms or join cooperatives, the initial forms of the socialization of the livestock industry in Sinkiang. This direct assistance would have complemented the corps' increasing ability to control wintering grounds for livestock and to

provide new water supplies through labor-intensive irrigation projects, as well as other improvements.

A third way in which the corps, as an arm of the party, sought to bring the Kazakh under state control was through propaganda. As in other border regions, the various mass campaigns which swept over China invariably reached into the Ili chou. In 1958, for instance, we find the Kazakhs actually building blast furnaces on the prairie. But the effect of these campaigns seems, for the most part, to have been limited to the towns and agricultural communities in the western part of the chou. The movements and production slogans designed by the party specifically for China's nomads had greater impact on the Kazakh herder. An example of such a campaign was the movement, "Struggle to realize self-sufficiency in food grains and energetically build fodder bases!" which was being pursued in the grasslands of the Ili chou in the late 1950's.¹³ But mass campaigns were only special features of the constant propaganda which corps activists directed at the Kazakhs. The effective range of this propaganda may have been limited, but the corps followed the example of the PLA in attempting to seek out the Kazakh in his own environment to explain to him the meaning of the people's revolution in China, to reveal the blindness and danger of anti-Han sentiment, and to spur production. Whereas propaganda and mass movements were the chief engines of the revolution in China proper and wherever, among the minorities, the party had a firm grip on the people, these methods only became important among the Kazakhs as they began to settle down. This they were led to do by other means--those mentioned above together with the policy of "buying out" which we will come to farther on--and so it appears that the Kazakhs remained largely indifferent to party propaganda.

Thus, while the corps provided the party with a base on

the steppes of the Ili chou which it was for the most part unable to establish directly,¹⁴ the type of party activity radiating therefrom was rather unconventional. The general pattern of developments in the Ili chou suggests rather strongly that basic changes in Kazakh society were deferred until 1960 and later. The party's weakness and pragmatism together caused this delay and allowed a realistic concern with production to take precedence over communist dogmatism. Before 1950, it may be presumed, the party had not, in general, succeeded in breaking the *uru* (clan) unit but had been obliged to content itself with sweeping away the chiefs and imams as influential Kazakh leaders, a task which had been largely completed in the first two to three years of the new regime.¹⁵

However, the party's program did not advance at a uniform pace among all the Kazakhs. Some remote Kazakh groups were difficult to reach, and the wealthier clans were harder to penetrate than the poorer ones. On the other hand, poorer families or individuals within an *uru* may in some cases have defected, or indeed have been jettisoned by the group as a whole in the interests of the survival of the more privileged. The mountains and plains of the Ili chou, virtually without roads or communications, were as much an advantage to the Kazakh, at home in the saddle, as they were an obstacle to the Chinese. The state farms established by the Production-Construction Corps only changed this situation in a relative sense; they merely gave the Chinese Communist Party a few secure bases in an immense and inhospitable terrain. Working from and constantly enlarging this network of bases, the party very gradually and with great difficulty extended its influence among the Kazakhs until the most stubborn groups were isolated and rendered harmless. It is not at all unlikely that a few such groups may still be

holding out today, despite repeated assurances in the Chinese Communist press that "all the Kazakh people" have adopted socialism and a settled life. But the reverse is equally true: namely, that those Kazakhs most opposed to "reform" and "transformation" could be disregarded, if not altogether excluded, and left to shift for themselves in the least desirable parts of the chou, facing a future with ever diminishing prospects for survival.¹⁶

Chapter V

REFORM OF THE KAZAKH HERDERS

Due to the relative immobility of the Chinese, the poor communications of the chou, and the weak CCP organization among the Kazakhs, no specific policy or movement could be launched among all the Kazakhs in the Ili chou simultaneously nor could it be carried out at a constant, deliberate rate. This feature of the chou distinguishes it from most areas, including most national minority areas, of the People's Republic of China, as do the peculiarities of Kazakh society--loosely and ineffectively knit together on a national basis but strong at the clan, or *uru* level. These special features largely determined the nature of the confrontation between the Chinese Communists and the Kazakhs, a confrontation which appears to have developed in three stages.

The first stage was that of pacification and "democratic reform," lasting from Liberation until the establishment of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region on October 1, 1955 (nearly a year after the establishment of the Ili chou). We have already noted the incompleteness of this movement by referring to the delay of basic-level elections in the three districts until 1956; in fact, it was not really completed until 1958-1960, when the party was finally able to shatter the political position of the Kazakh leadership in the towns. Pacification, including the neutralization of the Kazakh chiefs by the PLA, on the other hand, was quite thoroughly accomplished by 1953. In the second stage, lasting from 1955 to 1958-1959, the bulk of the Kazakhs were enticed or coerced--as social groups, not as individuals--to settle down. This is the period with which we are about to deal

in greater detail. The third stage, beginning in 1959-1960, saw the party finally achieve effective control over the Kazakhs, who were now reduced, as individuals, to the status of ordinary workers in the intensely industrious society of the People's Republic of China. The sequence, with some overlapping, was as follows: (1) liquidation of the traditional leadership at the tribal, or supra *uru*, level (political revolution); (2) organization of the *uru*, as such, into production units amenable to state control (economic revolution); and (3) the destruction of the *uru* from within and the reorientation of the individual Kazakh toward the state and away from his patriarchal-feudal loyalties (social revolution). The party does not formally recognize the second stage, which is perhaps the crucial one both in the evolution of Kazakh society under the Chinese Communists and in the imposition of state control in the pastoral areas of the Ili chou. According to the party, which never developed a specific "Marxist-Leninist" program for China's nomads,¹ there are only two stages: "democratic reform" (political remolding plus, in agricultural areas, land reform) and "socialist transformation" (the acquisition by the state of the means of production which obliges everyone to join the uniform ranks of "the people").

If the first stage was the special responsibility of the PLA and the third stage the concern primarily of the emerging CCP organizations within the communes, the settling down of the Kazakhs in the second stage was the special task of the Production-Construction Corps. As the corps' political commissar has said, not without some ambiguity, "It was especially in Sinkiang's socialist revolution in agriculture and animal husbandry that the Corps, through the state farms that it had established, was able to make a good productive example for all

the nationalities."² The corps was able to demonstrate, for the edification of the Kazakh herder, the very real advantages of modern ranching techniques which, because of increased productivity per man or per *uru*, made possible a settled and more prosperous life. Traditional herding practices among Sinkiang's Kazakhs--representatives of a nomadic society which once extended throughout Central Asia--were, it must be said, notoriously backward. There was no protection against drought or disease, and continued open grazing through the winter, with neither shelter nor fodder, left the animals exposed to hunger, if not starvation, as well as to calamitous blizzards. Under extreme conditions³ whole flocks and herds would simply fall over dead; the only recourse of the Kazakhs was to gorge themselves on the temporary superabundance of meat. In view of these hazardous conditions it is not difficult to imagine that the efforts of the corps to induce the Kazakhs to settle down on well-managed ranches would find some response. The fact that their kinsmen in western Turkestan had begun to settle down even before the intrusion of the Russians suggests that the Kazakhs in Sinkiang were prevented from doing so only by a lack of capital and technical know-how, if not by environmental factors peculiar to the Dzungarian basin.⁴ In any event, the Kazakhs of the Ili chou may well have seen in the example of the state farms a possible solution to the severe problems of existence which had plagued them from time immemorial. The awareness of such a possibility must have been a powerful counterweight to the natural and traditional suspicion with which the Kazakh viewed the Han Chinese.

The party was chiefly interested in expanding livestock production and in asserting firmer control over the Kazakhs. Both aims were served by helping them to enlarge and improve

their own flocks and herds. There was thus, initially, mutual interest in a settled life for the Kazakhs in the Ili chou, though, on the part of the Kazakhs, it may have been largely a passive interest.

With antecedents going back to the pre-1949 period, the settling-down process of the Kazakhs in the Ili chou gradually gathered momentum under the banners of mutual aid teams, cooperatives, and communes. The several forms of collective enterprise are never (until we come to the "re-organized" commune of 1960 and later) precisely defined, and the conflicting statistics regarding the numbers of herding families so organized suggest that the point at which they could be considered as having "settled down" was only vaguely defined. In one case, seven Kazakh households, acting as a mutual aid team, established a "village" in 1953; by 1957, 140 Kazakh households had settled there and joined the local cooperative; and, in the following year, this unit became a "production brigade" of a people's commune.⁵ But this was the exception, as the following data will suggest. By late 1955 it was claimed that 14 per cent of all herding families (including Mongol and Kirghiz as well as Kazakh) in the Ili chou had been organized into the 630 pastoral mutual aid teams that had been established by that time,⁶ and a specific task of the mutual aid teams was to "help the indigent pastoral people build their own [permanent] homes."⁷ Cooperatives first appeared in the pastoral areas of the Ili chou at the end of 1955⁸ and spread rapidly during 1956 and 1957. By the end of the latter year, 46 per cent of the herders in Sinkiang as a whole were reported to have been organized in 1,078 cooperatives;⁹ by June 1958 the corresponding figure was 72 per cent.¹⁰ In late 1958 the cooperatives were superseded by the communes, "which

greatly accelerated the implementation of the program of having the nomads settle down."¹¹ There were said to be 140 communes (both agricultural and pastoral) in the Ili chou in June 1959 and over 80 per cent of the Kazakhs were reported to have settled down.¹² At the same time, it was claimed, 90 per cent of Sinkiang's herding families belonged to 108 communes.¹³ By 1963 it was reported that "a settled life for all the Kazakh nomads" had been achieved.¹⁴

Accepting the definitions of the party, it would appear that the bulk of the Kazakhs in the Ili chou had "settled down" during the period of the cooperatives, which lasted from 1955-1956 until late 1958.¹⁵ Furthermore, the cooperatives remained the basic organizational unit even after the introduction of communes: only when they became sufficiently advanced were they combined into communes, with each cooperative becoming a "production brigade." Even those Kazakh herders who were settled after the initiation of the commune movement were first organized within the framework of the cooperative. In practice, therefore, it was the cooperative movement which coincided most closely with the party's program of settling the Kazakhs. The mutual aid teams, which preceded the cooperatives, were not nearly so widespread; in essence, they were a primitive form of cooperative and were frequently seasonal rather than permanent.

The term "cooperatives" as applied to the fixed settlements of the Kazakhs was undoubtedly a euphemism. Its use by the party reflected an extension to the Ili chou of a movement being carried on at that time throughout China. In the various pastoral regions of the country, it was supposed to change the livestock industry "from an individual economic undertaking to a collective economic undertaking."¹⁶ But to

a considerable extent the *uru* of the Kazakhs was itself "a collective economic undertaking." It is difficult to ascertain the attitude of the party on this question since it does not discuss the specific nature of Kazakh society in relation to socialism.¹⁷ The party speaks only of "herders" and "herd-owners" when, in fact, the herding economy of the Kazakhs was organized on the basis of the *uru* rather than on an individual basis. There was probably a compromise, with the *uru*, in fact, being perpetuated as a "cooperative" unit. Party officials--especially if they were remote from the grasslands--would be able to satisfy themselves that "cooperatives," in the sense of proletarian herders working together, had actually been established. This supposition is strengthened by repeated assertions from Saifudin and others that the party had emphasized flexibility in reorganizing the herding economy. The apparent absence in the Ili chou of the kind of adamant resistance to the cooperative movement that developed among the Mongols and Tibetans in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Tsinghai province would also point to a compromise. The comparative restraint of the party in promoting the cooperative movement among the Kazakhs may also reflect a deferential attitude toward the ubiquitous Russian technical advisers in the Ili chou and the example, so near at hand, of the Kazakh SSR.

Traditionally, the *uru* had dwelt together during the winter and split up into smaller, family groups on the more extensive summer pastures. The summer pastures were typically in the mountains and the winter pastures along the base of the mountains, in both cases wherever water was most plentiful and grass most abundant. There was less movement of both men and animals in winter than in summer. Moreover, each *uru* generally used the same wintering ground year after year, as established

by custom or by feuding. It would have seemed logical, then, to establish the cooperatives on the winter pastures; it was the winter economy of the nomads which needed improvement, especially by the storing of hay, while traditional summer practices were relatively efficient. From all indications, this is precisely what was done.

A considerable capital investment was required in order to provide reliable water supplies and winter fodder so that the Kazakhs could make the transition to permanent winter locations. The Production-Construction Corps provided this capital, consisting of tools, material, and Han Chinese labor. The corps built irrigation canals, houses, and roads. All kinds of tools, including horse-drawn mowing machines, were provided, as well as lumber for building purposes. Probably a large share of the initial building, cutting of hay, and so on, was done by the corps while the Kazakhs were learning the new methods and practices and convincing themselves that "only by taking this bright road of socialism can a life of true happiness be attained."¹⁸ Farming, made possible by irrigation, would develop around the settlement and the number of *uru* members who stayed there the year around would gradually increase, as would the variety of their activities.

Such might have been the scene in a typical *uru* wintering area as the corps struggled to restrict the movements of the Kazakhs and to increase their productivity. The chief innovation in all of this was the division of labor. No longer was everyone obliged to accompany the livestock from one pasture to another; now, many members of the cooperative could "stay behind to farm, hunt, fish, collect herbs, and work at mining" while the most experienced herders tended the livestock.¹⁹ In this development

a noteworthy characteristic of Kazakh society is revealed which parallels the waste and inefficiency in their animal husbandry practices: namely, the almost continuous underemployment, particularly of the men, which characterized their seasonal life. Save for a few busy seasons, such as lambing time in the spring, the Kazakh men had little to do except hunt and play with the children while the women did most of the work. (Could this have made the Kazakh men anti-communist and their women pro-communist?) The point is that, whatever their preference, it was virtually impossible, on account of their peripatetic existence, to engage in any serious activity aside from herding. The new division of labor was made possible by the corps' capital investment which facilitated the establishment of permanent homes for the Kazakhs. The economic return on this investment was two-fold: livestock productivity went up as a result of the modern techniques which could now be applied, and secondly, a considerable new supply of labor could be tapped for the fuller development of the land.

In addition to working within the milieu of the individual *uru*, the corps also employed various forms of state livestock farm in its drive to break the traditional nomadism of the Kazakhs and to make available to the state increased supplies of animal husbandry products. In some cases it probably turned over to the Kazakhs livestock farms which the corps itself had developed, perhaps at entirely new locations by means of irrigation projects, just as it turned over to peasants from China Proper the agricultural farms it had created. A larger labor force was required to reclaim land than to utilize it once it had been developed, so the corps was able to turn over tracts of developed land to others as it moved on to new locations.²⁰ Furthermore, there were state livestock farms other than those built by the corps,

as well as joint public-private livestock farms. These two types of farms were probably established partly on expropriated pasture and partly on land newly developed by the corps. They seem to have been used, in the main, for settling, controlling, and gradually fleecing the owners of the larger herds or, perhaps, the wealthier *uru*. It seems impossible to elucidate in any detail the way in which these various forms of state control were used, but a basic differentiation between the ordinary and the rich Kazakhs is indicated by the party's assertion that the former were organized into cooperatives and the latter brought into the joint farms where, presumably, Han Chinese participation would be more in evidence than in the cooperatives. The difficulty is, as already pointed out, that there is no explicit reference to the *uru*, as if, by ignoring it, the party might somehow make it disappear. Thus, we can only surmise what actually took place. The following, written in October 1959 (that is, after the introduction of communes but before their "reorganization") by Saifudin, will suggest the tone and pattern of party statements on the question (and there are very few even of these):

Stock farming makes up a relatively large proportion of the national economy of the [Sinkiang] autonomous region. Accordingly, we have adopted even more careful and safe measures for our transformation in the pastoral areas [as compared with agricultural areas]. In the period of rehabilitation of the national economy immediately after the liberation and during the First Five-Year Plan period [1953-1957], we pursued a policy of "no struggle, no redistribution, and no demarcation of classes" which was favorable to both the herd owners and the hired hands.

A number of measures were also taken with regard to production, so as to promote vigorous expansion of production in the pastoral areas. In the years between 1956 and 1958, socialist transformation was carried out with regard to the herd-owner economy and the individual economy of the herdsmen, and the people's commune movement was basically completed after the fall of 1958. With regard to the transformation of the herd-owner economy, we adopted a policy of "buying out" [the capital of the herd owners], in accordance with which public-private jointly operated stock farms were formed, with the private herd owners retaining their shares in these farms and receiving dividends out of these shares. After the establishment of people's communes, these shares of animals were converted into money at a certain price and a fixed interest was paid the private owners, and the private owners were given suitable jobs on the farms. After a suitable period, all these public-private jointly operated stock farms will be gradually transformed into state-owned farms. With regard to the transformation of the individual economy of the herdsmen, the same measures as taken in agricultural cooperativization were adopted. The animals owned by these herdsmen were pooled together in cooperatives and the profits were shared among the herdsmen according to the number of animals and amount of work they had contributed to the pool. Subsequently their animals were bought by the communes at a certain price. With regard to the means of production in the pastoral areas, these were dealt with more elastically than they were in the agricultural areas. These measures were realistic in the pastoral areas, and as a result they were supported by the herdsmen of all nationalities,

transformation of animal husbandry was carried out smoothly, sabotage and losses to livestock were avoided, and expansion of livestock breeding was greatly promoted.²¹

Clues to the actual situation are perhaps contained in the description of the herders' cooperatives as "semi-socialist cooperatives"²² and in the assertion that the "farms" of the "herd-owners" were "as a rule transformed into state-private farms so that in the future they can be transformed into state farms."²³ And in view of the fact that there were already some 1,200 herders' cooperatives and 76 jointly owned farms in Sinkiang in early 1957 (which were supposed to account for only half of the province's pastoral population!),²⁴ it would seem that the pastoral zone of the province, intricately divided among the various nationalities and clans, would have been well covered by the new forms of economic enterprise.²⁵

Concerning the location of the herding cooperatives and state farms we can be reasonably clear. There is every reason to believe that the available pasture and watering places had long been fully utilized by the Kazakhs, to the extent that their primitive methods permitted, and we know that these were, in general, parceled out among the clans, with each having the customary use of a certain area. There can be little doubt, then, that the "new" organizations for livestock production established by the Production-Construction Corps were located according to the same pattern. The corps, with all its labor, could, at least in the short run, extend this pattern only marginally. The ecology of Kazakh pastoralism, deriving from the interaction of man and environment in the steppes and mountains of Dzungaria, was a fact of life with which even the party could scarcely take issue. Nevertheless, we find references to surveys and investigations of Sinkiang's grasslands,²⁶

leading to a detailed plan for the location of the "thousands of new settlements" in the Ili chou,²⁷ which seem to suggest an undifferentiated, blank prairie.

By analogy with this example of party oversimplification, it should be evident that omission of any reference to the *uru* does not mean that it was not made use of. On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that the traditional Kazakh social organization as represented in the *uru* remained equally strong among all the Kazakhs of the Ili chou. It did, however, clearly remain the dominant social mode among them, just as animal husbandry remained the dominant economic mode. The two are, in fact, inextricably related.²⁸

For the bulk of the Kazakhs, then, taking up fixed points of residence meant settling down within the context of the *uru* and being confirmed, by the state, in possession of their customary grazing grounds. It was a natural step forward in terms of their history as well as in terms of their actual economic situation. And it was a step which tended to close rather than widen the gap between the Kazakhs in the Ili chou and their kinsmen in the Soviet Union. These settlements took the form of cooperatives located at permanent sites on the wintering grounds of the *uru* and were gradually developed by herdsmen mobilized and assisted by the corps. Little, if any, expropriation was involved. The land, which had not been privately owned but held collectively, remained in the possession of the *uru*. The dwellings (yurts), tools and utensils, etc., of the individual family, the only area in which there clearly was private ownership in traditional Kazakh society, were not affected by the establishment of the cooperatives except in a positive way: namely, the families were helped to build permanent dwellings and given additional tools and supplies to improve their material status. With

respect to livestock, the party seems to have taken an ambiguous position. Theoretically, the livestock of an *uru* was owned collectively by its member-families, while in fact private ownership (that is, family, not individual, ownership) had long been developing *pari passu* as the traditional *uru* structure underwent change. Now, in the cooperative, the livestock was theoretically owned by individual families, at least in the sense of a contribution upon which, along with contributions of labor, the remuneration of the families was to be based; in fact the livestock was owned by the cooperative (as an agent, to be sure, of the People's government). To the extent that wealthier member-families lost livestock to the cooperative, thereby benefiting the poorer member-families, the establishment of cooperatives tended to restore the *uru* ideal.

While the situation of the *uru* among the Kazakhs in Sinkiang varied greatly, the policies carried out by the corps with respect to them in the "settling-down" phase seem to have followed a constant pattern. The deviations from this pattern were in matters of detail rather than conception. Two dissimilar groups stood out, however, each representing a departure from the *uru* pattern. These were, at one end of the spectrum of Kazakh society, the powerful owners of great herds and, at the other, the disinherited families who had virtually nothing. If the latter led a poor, wandering life on marginal pasturage without the protection of the *uru*, the rich Kazakhs had established empires for themselves on the choicest pasturage of the *chou*. These, as we have seen, were taken over directly by the state, while the poorest families were generally organized into mutual aid teams which the corps could assist in finding adequate pasturage, in settling down,

and in developing as viable productive units. And if the owners of large herds, notwithstanding the party's "buying out" policy, were under no illusions about their prospects under the new regime, the lowest strata of Kazakh society would certainly seem to have gained.

The initiation of the cooperatives on a broad scale among Sinkiang's Kazakhs during 1956-1957 reflected a realistic approach to the economic and political problems confronting the party in the grasslands of the Ili chou. The herdsmen's cooperatives there registered a 20-per-cent increase in the number of livestock in 1956, and further increases were claimed for 1957 despite a serious drought.²⁹ At the same time, as we have seen, output of animal husbandry products was increasing at an even faster rate on the state livestock farms. Thus, the corps' slogans, "While expanding our own production we must also expand the production of the masses"³⁰ and "If it doesn't contribute to nationalities unity, don't do it,"³¹ seem to have been taken seriously. The gradual cooperative movement had been a success. Higher livestock productivity, upon which Sinkiang's overall progress was heavily dependent, seemed assured, and a practical approach to the nationalities problem was proving fruitful. A party conference on work in the pastoral areas, held in Urumchi in the fall of 1957, decided that "for a comparatively long period to come only semi-socialist livestock cooperatives and joint state-private livestock farms would be formed."³²

Unfortunately for all concerned, this was not to be the case, for scarcely a year later pastoral people's communes were introduced in the Ili chou.³³ These communes, which, the party boasted, "resolved those remaining problems of individual economy which confronted the cooperatives,"³⁴

enormously increased the animosity between the Kazakhs and the Chinese. The party, which had worked so doggedly to reorient the Kazakh herders away from Ining and the Soviet Union and toward Urumchi and the CPR, now found itself confronted by a hostile population in the chou. Such was the degree of control exercised by the corps throughout the grasslands, however, that the Kazakhs were not able to offer effective resistance.

Chapter VI

REFORM OF THE KAZAKH INTELLECTUALS

The establishment of pastoral people's communes on the Dzungarian steppes was preceded, and also heralded, by the humiliation and dispersal of the Soviet-oriented Kazakhs in the towns. This had occurred in 1958 while the CCP was still buoyed up by the success of its moderate program for the herders; it was associated with the "rectification campaign" instituted all over the country in late 1957 in response to the outspoken criticism which had been briefly tolerated during the preceding Hundred Flowers period.¹ The "rectification" of the Kazakh intellectuals² demolished the entire structure of that modern leadership of the Kazakhs which had been nurtured by the ideas reaching Central Asia from the west. This leadership, established as a political force in the East Turkestan Republic, continued to play a prominent role in the towns of the three districts after 1950. Its destruction by the CCP in the late 1950's had the effect of severing the connections between the Kazakh herding areas in China and the bulk of the Kazakh nation in the Soviet Union.

A high degree of cooperation and ideological unanimity had characterized Chinese-Russian relations in Sinkiang during the years 1950-1956.³ But the Hundred Flowers Movement, as well as the institution of people's communes, marked a divergence from the theory and practice of the CPSU. If the Chinese and the Russians could adjust to their countries taking divergent roads to socialism, this was not possible for the Kazakhs. For them, a breakdown in Sino-Soviet understanding meant that they would be left at the mercy of the Chinese, unless, as no

one could seriously expect, the Russians used force to protect them. The anguish and blind fury of the Kazakhs in the rectification campaign and the commune movement are those of a people forced to contemplate extinction.

The rectification campaign among the Kazakhs represents a specific phase of the party's attempt to exert total control over all aspects of life in the Ili chou.¹⁴ It will be recalled that in the first years of the Chinese Communist regime in the three districts the non-Communist, bourgeois leaders of the old East Turkestan Republic had been the target of a purge, while those who had accepted the direction of Saifudin and the CPSU remained in positions of authority. In those days, a good Communist was still a good Communist, and one could not properly distinguish between pro-Russian and pro-Chinese elements among Marxist-Leninists; whether an individual was a member of the CPSU or the CCP was, officially, a matter of convenience rather than of doctrine.⁵ Thus, whatever its true attitude, the CCP was obliged to tolerate the perpetuation of the Soviet-oriented group, which was confined largely to the towns of the Ili chou and which included more Uighurs than Kazakhs. These men were the nominal leaders of the chou while Chinese Communist strength was being built in the grasslands. By 1956-1957 the party had induced a major proportion of the Kazakh herders to settle down under the tutelage of the Production-Construction Corps. This success tended to weaken the links between the steppes and the Soviet-influenced towns and to give all areas of the chou, except those under especially strong Soviet influence, an emphatically Chinese stamp. With its rear thus secured, the party was able, in the rectification campaign beginning in late 1957, to tidy things up in the towns. In 1958-1959, once the pro-Soviet remnants had been paralyzed, the party launched the communes in the pastoral districts of the Ili

chou; in 1960, the party established the urban people's communes in Ining and the other towns and cities of western Dzungaria.⁶ Thus, in ten years' time, the party succeeded in attaining complete authority in this once far-away land, transforming by imperceptible stages the long-established suzerainty of China into actual sovereignty, and sovereignty into the suffocating immediacy of a "people's dictatorship."

The particular flowers which bloomed among China's frontier peoples during the Hundred Flowers period were those of opposition to Han domination. The party's chief enemy in the ensuing rectification campaign was therefore "local nationalism."⁷ This campaign took place almost exclusively within the party: the local nationalists were first of all party members who were all the more reprehensible because they reflected a widespread nationalistic sentiment among the minority population at large. Thus, local nationalism represented a dangerous schism within the CCP; it revealed the fragility of the Marxist-Leninist bonds which the party had been so intent on forging among China's "fraternal nationalities" since Liberation. In a broad sense, this antilocal nationalist campaign which began in late 1957 marked the failure of the party's nationalities policy as it had existed in theory since the assumption of power by the Chinese Communists in 1949. The anticipated cooperation on the part of nationality (that is, non-Han) cadres in the transformation of their backward societies (thereby bringing them closer to the more advanced Han Chinese) had failed to materialize among the important frontier peoples in northern and western China. Instead of disciplined and reliable nationality cadres who could take the leading role in effecting basic changes in their own societies, the party found itself

infested with unreformed representatives of nationality interests *per se*.

Local nationalism took an especially serious turn in Sinkiang because the minorities here cited the nationalities policy of the CPSU to support their demands for separation from China. Among the Uighurs, the demand was for a "Uighurstan," whereas the Kazakhs called for the re-establishment of the East Turkestan Republic;⁸ they were together in railing against the domination of the Han Chinese, who were depicted as nothing other than colonists. Saifudin himself was denounced as a traitor to the Uighur people.⁹ Autonomy, they cried, is the same as no autonomy. A Uighur student in Peking put the matter succinctly when he declared: "Regional autonomy in Sinkiang cannot solve the question of national self-determination [as the CCP pretends]; only with the establishment of a federal republic or an autonomous republic [as in the Soviet Union] may national equality be realized."¹⁰ At an enlarged meeting of the regional CCP committee held in Urumchi from December 1957 to April 1958, over one thousand speakers inveighed against the anti-party groups representing local nationalist sentiment. The speakers charged the anti-party groups with misunderstanding, or opposing, the party's nationalities policy; they also accused them of "revisionism"¹¹ and of having been influenced by the Hungarian uprising.¹²

The cadres with "local nationalist" tendencies were also accused of a fundamental opposition to socialism. Many of them, it was said, came of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie and remained unreformed.¹³ It was claimed that the re-emergence of local nationalism in Sinkiang, after its worst manifestations had been suppressed in the pacification campaign that followed Liberation, had coincided with the cooperative movement ("socialist transformation") which began in earnest in 1956.¹⁴ At least

during 1957, lawlessness had become fairly serious in many parts of Sinkiang, and the participation of Han Chinese as well as Uighurs and some Kazakhs in these outbreaks of sabotage and violence¹⁵ does suggest that there was an economic motivation. However, one must not too readily accept CCP statements concerning the antisocialist nature of its opponents, for all opposition, including local "revisionism" and anti-Hanism, tended to be defined as counter-revolutionary: thus, a proponent of the CPSU's nationalities policy might well be branded by the CCP as an enemy of socialism.

The lengthy meeting of the CCP Sinkiang Committee in Urumchi set the stage for an intense and prolonged antilocal nationalist struggle in all areas of the province. The conflict seems to have been most serious in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou. The First Secretary of the Ili area CCP Committee glossed over the nature of this movement when he stated a year later that "the cadres at large and the broad masses have greatly enhanced their faculty of distinguishing right and wrong, have further heightened their socialist and communist consciousness, have achieved uniformity in understanding and have removed the obstacles to progress."¹⁶ For what was really involved was a serious attempt by the Kazakh leadership in Ining to exclude Uighurs as well as Han Chinese from the chou and to establish a separate Kazakh state. As Jahoda, the Kazakh governor of the chou and ringleader of the plot, was quoted as saying, "The Han nationality is the distant enemy and the Uighur nationality is the enemy nearby."¹⁷ The Soviet Union was unquestionably considered to be a friend, if not an ally.

This separatism indicates a much more marked nationalism than was evident among the Kazakhs of the old Republic. This new tendency is quite inexplicable unless one assumes an

increasingly positive and effective influence of the adjacent Kazakh SSR on the Ili chou during the years 1950-1956. Indeed, it appears that the superficially identical Marxism-Leninism of the Chinese and Russians during these years left the Chinese Communist Party at a distinct disadvantage, isolated as it was psychologically from the Kazakhs, and provided the Soviet Union with opportunities unmatched in the past for penetration of the Kazakhs in the three districts. The wide influence of the Kazakh "anti-[Chinese Communist] Party group" revealed in the rectification campaign supports this theory. Saifudin and his Han Chinese colleagues would seem to have had good reason for their apprehension about the drift of things in the Ili chou where, it appears, a tug-of-war for influence over the Kazakh herders was in progress between the Soviet-oriented Kazakh leadership in the towns, on the one hand, and the Production-Construction Corps, on the other.

The situation was summarized in the Peking *Kuang-ming Daily* as follows:

A big victory has been achieved in the struggle against local nationalism in various areas of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region....

The victory was most markedly revealed [as compared with other areas in the SUAR exclusive of Urumchi] by the enlarged session of the CCP Ili Area Committee which thoroughly smashed the anti-Party group of local nationalists led by Chia-ho-ta [Jahoda], Governor of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou. This group included among its principal figures Ah-mai-ti-ha-li Pi-tung-pa-yeh-fu [also a Kazakh], Vice Director of the Propaganda Department of the Ili Area Party Committee, and Hsia-yi-ma-erh-tan [a Kazakh], President of the People's Court of the Ili Chou. These elements

were extremely hostile toward the Han nationality and other nationalities in Sinkiang. They preposterously attempted to drive all other nationalities out of the autonomous chow and to turn the latter into an independent kingdom. They maliciously attacked the socialist system and the people's democratic dictatorship. Everywhere they relieved counter-revolutionaries and bad elements of responsibility for crimes they had committed, and, taking hold of the opportunity of review of court cases, they arbitrarily released large groups of criminals who should have been punished. They, furthermore, brought into the state organs for work a number of landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries and bad elements from among the nationalities and their friends and relatives, in order to expand the anti-Party forces.

These anti-Party elements wore the cloak of nationalism and maliciously undermined the unification of the fatherland and the unity of the nationalities, opposed and obstructed socialist transformation and socialist construction, opposed and weakened the proletarian dictatorship, opposed and attempted to usurp the leadership of the Party, and did their best to replace socialism with nationalism. After thoroughly crushing this anti-Party group, the enlarged session of the Ili Area Party Committee unanimously adopted the resolutions on the opposition to and overcoming of local nationalism and on the expulsion from the Party of Chia-ho-ta, Ah-mai-ti-ha-li Pi-tung-pa-yeh-fu, and Hsia-yi-ma-erh-tan, and also decided to relieve them of all posts within and outside the Party.¹⁸

Further details on the activities of the Kazakh anti-party group appeared in the *Ili Daily* in August 1958. After

noting the "decisive victory" over local nationalism achieved by the Ili CCP Committee during the summer, the *Ili Daily* article identifies, in addition to Jahoda's antiparty group, a "reactionary group" led by the deputy governor of the chou, Abdurahim Aissa, though the two groups are subsequently mentioned together as exemplifying local nationalism. The article then discusses the various references to regional autonomy in the CPR Constitution and the actual autonomy enjoyed by the Ili chou in such measures as taxation, nationality cadres, and political representation. "The above facts show," the article asserts, "that the Party and the state have given us all the self-governing powers possible. The key to the question is not that we lack authority, but rather how we may fully make the best use of such powers." It then goes on to describe how these powers should be used to support the party, build socialism with Han Chinese help, and so on. But, the article goes on to say, local nationalists have acted in a contrary manner:

Jahoda, Aissa, and such local nationalists cried that we have no power, that we have posts but no authority, but they did not stress the fact that when we have posts and authority, we must also assume responsibility. Because they themselves did not assume responsibility and did not exercise their own powers, they claimed that they had no powers. The Party and the state wanted cooperativization, the development of a socialist economy, and the improvement of the people's livelihood. Jahoda said, "Cooperativization has been carried out too rapidly, the living standard of the peasants has dropped and they are no longer enthusiastic, the horses have grown thin, and the wheels of the wagons no longer turn."

This is entirely a distortion of the truth.

The Party and the state decided on the purchase of the native and special products of the agricultural and pastoral folks in the interests of the state and the people's livelihood. But Jahoda stated that the price policy was unreasonable, that the purchase of horse manes and tails violated the customs of the Kazakh people, and issued orders to suspend such purchases. The Party and the state wanted to strengthen national unity and consolidate the unification of the motherland. But Jahoda actively worked to move the people of the Kazakh nationality in other areas to Altai, to move 20,000 households of the Uighur nationality from Ining to Urumchi, and to move the Kazakh people from Urumchi and other cities to Ining in order to turn Ining into a Kazakh city. He said, "The enemy near at hand (referring to the Uighur people) is more serious than the enemy at a distance (referring to the Han people)." He attempted thus to undermine national unity, to split the unification of the motherland, so as to realize the goal of establishing an independent kingdom.

The Party called on the Han cadres to work contentedly in Sinkiang, to take root in Sinkiang in order to develop the frontiers of the motherland. Jahoda and other local nationalists, under the pretext of promoting the national character of the area, wanted the Han cadres to get out and go back south of the Great Wall. The Party called on the cadres to go deep into the rural areas, to share comforts and hardships with the working people and to establish close ties with them. But Jahoda went deep into the rural areas in order to

visit the homes of the anti-Party and anti-socialist elements, and to dance, wine, and dine with them. He collected the views of the anti-Party and anti-socialist elements who expressed dissatisfaction with the situation to use as the basis for an attack on the Party.

Jahoda abused his powers, put up the pretext of upholding the customs and habits of the Kazakh people, violated the laws and orders of the customs administration; disregarding the effects on the state, he took the lead in smuggling, giving permission to smugglers and protecting them.

The Party and the state pursued the policies of suppression of counter-revolutionaries, the consolidation of the people's democratic dictatorship, and purifying the ranks of the cadres. But in dealing with counter-revolutionaries and other criminals, Jahoda adopted the policy of lenient treatment and even set them free at will. He employed in the organs of state power persons without a clear historical record, with doubtful ideological tendencies, with bad working style, and even with records of criminal activities.

In the rectification campaign and the struggle against rightists, he violated the policy and principle of the struggle, divorced himself from leadership procedures, and gave shelter to rightists, saying that there were no rightists among the national minorities, and that even if there were rightists, the Han nationality could not interfere with them.

At the meeting for the reform of the written language, without the discussion and approval of the Party committee, he arbitrarily stated that it was the business of the

Kazakh nationality, and other people should not interfere.

All these are manifestations of the violation of the principle of the collective leadership of the Party.

Jahoda also failed to abide by the financial system of the state, issuing private orders at random, drawing from public funds at random, and used the funds of the state to bestow small favors, in order to win over private supporters and build up his own clique.

The above facts show that the small number of local nationalists headed by Jahoda wanted authority not for the promotion of the socialist cause nor in the interests of the working people of all nationalities, but to oppose the Party, the people, and socialism; to undermine the laws of the state, to undermine national unity, and to split the unification of the motherland.

The Party and the state absolutely cannot give them such authority. Fortunately, such authority has not been given them, for otherwise there would have been confusion and chaos, and the working people of all nationalities would suffer. If such authority had been given them, the small groups of local nationalists headed by Jahoda would foster bad people and do bad things, and bring harm to the working people of all nationalities. If such rights had been given them, the bad people would have their way freely, there would be corruption and lawlessness, and the good people would be freely molested and groan in pain. The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou would have become an independent kingdom where the people could not earn a living and where there would be no sunshine, but only eternal darkness.

The present meeting has basically exposed the frantic

ambitions of the small group of local nationalists headed by Jahoda. We must carry out serious ideological criticism to educate the people, so that the people of all nationalities will recognize clearly the reactionary aspirations of these elements, and completely break up their ambitions and activities, not resting in our efforts until this goal is reached.¹⁹

It is not necessary to imagine that Jahoda and his group could actually have created a separate Kazakh state, or that the Soviet Union was actually supporting this movement, in order to appreciate the seriousness of the schism within the party and the state that his movement represented. The barbs of Jahoda's opposition drove directly at the heart of the CCP's real policy of Han Chinese domination in the Ili chou as epitomized by the Production-Construction Corps. His group did not represent the reactionary tribal leadership of the Kazakhs but rather their most progressive elements; Jahoda stood for the pro-Soviet tradition among the Kazakhs as it had developed in the East Turkestan Republic in opposition to the (pre-Communist) Chinese and the backwardness of traditional Kazakh society. Saifudin must have had Jahoda and his followers in mind when he said in Ining at the height of the rectification campaign that "this revolution [referring to the East Turkestan Republic] had its correct aspects and played a definite role in the Chinese Revolution. However, its aspect of nationalism was very serious. Some people now have realized this point but others have not. Those who have not are neither willing nor eager to undergo ideological remolding. Some of them even call themselves Marxist-Leninists in order to resist ideological reform. This is extremely wrong."²⁰

In calling themselves Marxist-Leninists the anti-party group challenged the theoretical legitimacy of the CCP position. They referred to two contradictions in the CCP's program for the Ili chou: first, the contradiction between the nationalities policy of the CPSU and that of the CCP; second, the contradiction between the CCP's theoretical and its actual nationalities policy. These dissimilarities came into sharp focus only in 1958 and subsequent years. If the formal differences between the Soviet and Chinese Communist positions on the nationalities question could be papered over by reference to the actual situation of the national minorities in China and the peculiarities of China's historical development,²¹ the actual differences, which were becoming evident by 1958, could not be ignored. Only China's historical development *after 1949* can explain these differences. In this sense, the deviation was on the part of the CCP itself rather than on the part of the Jahoda "anti-Party group." As recently as May 1956, Jahoda himself had delivered a slashing attack against "counter-revolutionaries."²²

The "errors" on the part of the local nationalists in the Ili chou must therefore be seen as a desperate attempt to forestall the Sinification of the three districts and, more particularly, the denationalization of the Kazakhs.²³ Quite possibly the sudden harshness of the party's reaction came as a surprise both to the Russians and to the local nationalists, for there is every indication that Jahoda's deviation had been developing for a long time.²⁴ It is also likely that the Russians would have been willing to give tacit support to persons such as Jahoda for as long a time as the Chinese would tolerate it, possibly calculating that the three districts might yet, given some unforeseen turn of international events or of Chinese affairs, be

added to the Soviet empire. The Chinese reaction, on the other hand, must be seen in the context of developments in China as a whole and in Sino-Soviet relations. These issues are much too complex to discuss here, but it should be mentioned that, no sooner had the Sino-Soviet joint stock companies in Manchuria and Sinkiang²⁵ been turned over to exclusive Chinese control early in 1955 than the Chinese, by 1956, began to drift away from their Russian mentors in terms of economic methodology as well as of ideology. It was, therefore, an extraordinarily complicated pattern of forces which operated on developments in the Ili chou at this time. To a considerable extent, it seems clear, the results produced by these forces--in the sense of the division of the Kazakh nation and the Sino-Soviet antagonism in the Ili chou--were not premeditated on either side. Nevertheless, the clash of interests between the two which was manifested in the rectification campaign brought out in the open, for attack by the party, those pro-Soviet elements among the Kazakh leadership which must have long been recognized as at least a potential threat to the Chinese state. In this sense, the campaign provided the CCP with a comparatively subtle instrument for the eradication of Soviet political influence in the Ili chou, an influence which frequently must have appeared to the Chinese as interference in the affairs of the Chinese People's Republic.

The meeting of the Ili Area CCP Committee, which was credited with achieving a "final victory" over local nationalism during the first half of 1958, was in fact only the opening round in a struggle which was to embroil the three districts for several years. In the first instance, rectification campaigns were carried out in all circles of the chou, including government offices, factories and mines, and agricultural and herding cooperatives.²⁶ We are ignorant of

the number of cadres involved as well as of the nature of the punishments meted out, but there is every indication that the number was substantial and that the most common disciplinary measure was "reform through labor."²⁷ While the Kazakh cadres in the towns (the Soviet-oriented intellectuals) were the principal target, the party clearly made a determined effort to extend the purge throughout the chou in order to eradicate the roots of nationalistic sentiment revealed by the activities of the Jahoda anti-party group. Whether or not the party seriously expected to succeed in this undertaking may be open to question, but there can be little doubt that it did expect the movement to stifle all overt manifestations of local nationalism. The purge of the Kazakh leadership removed, probably for good, any possibility of an alternative to unrestrained Han Chinese domination, just as it served notice on the Russians that the CCP would not tolerate any questioning of the orthodoxy of its nationalities policy. The party's message in the rectification campaign seemed to be that its program for the transformation of the Ili chou would be carried out with or without Kazakh cooperation and with or without Soviet approbation.²⁸

The fundamental issue in the rectification campaign in the Ili chou was, of course, not Kazakh nationalism but rather Han Chinese nationalism. The question was: production for whom? The Kazakhs, like China's other minority peoples, were expected to work harder and produce more for China. In this, said the party, lay their only salvation. For it was an ideological premise of the party that economic progress was necessary and that the Kazakhs, unable to achieve it on their own, would have to have either Han Chinese or "imperialist" help. Thus, Kazakh reluctance to labor on behalf of a powerful

China was, in the eyes of the party, traitorous. From the point of view of the "local nationalists," however, it appeared that the Kazakhs were simply being robbed. The advances in production which the party ecstatically held out as the justification for Han Chinese tutelage and as the indicator of the well-being of the non-Han Chinese were quite meaningless to the Kazakhs. In effect, the presumed unity of the "proletariat" of all of China's nationalities, upon which the party's national minority policy was based, did not exist.²⁹ This contradiction was revealed in the Hundred Flowers Movement in two forms: first, in the persistently voiced demand for the creation of nationality parties,³⁰ and, second, in the assertion of the "Marxist-Leninists" among the local nationalists that they were not opposed to socialism itself but that they wanted to build it themselves along national lines.³¹

The main force of the campaign against local nationalism among the Kazakhs was not, indeed, the rectification campaign itself but the commune movement with which it became associated at the end of 1958. Linked together, these two movements, in the course of several years, sought to crush not only "local nationalism" but also "Kazakhism," for the two could not really be separated. As with mass movements generally, the campaign to establish communes in the Ili chou served the unannounced purpose of political and ideological purification. But there is a unique correspondence between the anti-local nationalist campaign and the commune movement among the Kazakhs in the Ili chou, for it was largely by means of the communes that the socialist transformation of the Kazakhs, with the dismemberment of the *uru*, was achieved. Kazakh acceptance of this transformation, to be accomplished "with the help of the Han Chinese," was the objective of the rectification campaign.

While the communes thus served the party in denationalizing the Kazakh herders, along with the Sibo and Uighur agriculturalists, it was the reform of the Kazakh written language which, perhaps more than any other movement, served the party in definitively subjugating the Kazakh intelligentsia in the towns.³² We observed earlier that the Cyrillic alphabet remained in use among the Soviet-influenced Kazakhs after 1949, although the party has not found it desirable to make the fact known.³³ The extent to which Cyrillic, as opposed to Arabic, was used in writing the Kazakh language might be a good indication of the strength of Soviet influence among Sinkiang's Kazakhs and, latterly, of the influence of the anti-party group. Unfortunately, we have hardly any information about the situation, but it may be supposed that Cyrillic was known to the Kazakhs in the towns, while Arabic was reserved for the imams and the few other literate persons among the Kazakh herders. Furthermore, the use of Cyrillic probably tended to spread to outlying areas during the late 1940's and early 1950's.³⁴ Such a pattern is suggested by a party reference to the use of the Latin alphabet in Sinkiang during the 1930's when it was being universally adopted by the Turkic minorities of Soviet Central Asia. "The minorities in Sinkiang were...in contact with the alphabet," the report says. "Cultural workers of the different nationalities in the [Sinkiang] region started as early as 1934 studying the Latin alphabet and the intellectuals then were fond of writing letters in the Latin alphabet; students in secondary schools and institutes of higher learning used it to take notes. In 1938-1940, the Uighur *Sinkiang Daily* printed short and simple news stories and wrote headlines in the Latin alphabet...."³⁵ If the Latin alphabet maintained a certain vogue among the Uighurs right down to the 1950's, as the report

goes on to suggest, the Kazakhs must have begun using the Cyrillic alphabet early in the 1940's. In Soviet Central Asia the Unified Latin Alphabet, introduced in 1928, was replaced by the Cyrillic alphabet for the writing of the Kazakh language in 1939-1941, but the change was not made for the Uighur language until some fifteen years later. Russian, too, was known to many Kazakhs of the three districts.

A Soviet Kazakh who visited Sinkiang in 1958 reported that one thing people there were striving to retain was the Cyrillic alphabet.³⁶ And it is to be recalled that one of Jahoda's "deviations" was that "at the meeting for the reform of the written language [probably in early 1958], without the discussion and approval of the party committee, he arbitrarily stated that it was a matter for the Kazakh people to decide, and others should not interfere."³⁷ It was at the beginning of the rectification campaign, in December 1957, that Chou En-lai announced the State Council's decision that the new Han phoneticization plan, employing the Latin alphabet, would be used for "coining and reforming the written languages of the national minorities,"³⁸ thereby reversing a 1956 decision, never carried out, that Cyrillic would be used in Sinkiang. In the interval, a team from the National Academy of Sciences, which visited the Ili chou, had studied the language-reform problem in Sinkiang.³⁹ By June 1958 a draft for the reform of the Kazakh language, based on the Latin alphabet, had been developed.⁴⁰ Addressing the "forum for the study of the languages of the nationalities" which had completed a scheme for the writing of Uighur and Kazakh according to Han phoneticization, Saifudin declared that "the decision on the introduction of the new written languages was a great socialist victory...,

coming as a result of the successful struggle against local nationalism in 1957 and 1958, the combat against bourgeois tendencies in linguistic work, close adherence to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and years of diligent efforts."⁴¹ Continuing, Saifudin said that "unwillingness to accept the Han language phoneticization plan for the romanization of the Uighur and Kazakh languages, or to rely on it for the development of the languages of the minority nationalities, would be tantamount to the disapproval of the efforts of the people of all nationalities of Sinkiang to realize socialism and communism, the unification of the motherland and the unity of the nationalities. For the language reform has a very close connection with the socialist-communist cause of the nationalities." He admitted, however, that the "realization of the plan" would be a "complicated and difficult task" which might take "three to five years." Undoubtedly in response to the evident hostility to the new plan, and in order to make clear that the party would not be deflected from the path set, Saifudin declared: "Let it be emphasized that this is bound to be what is going to happen."⁴²

Although the issue of Soviet versus Chinese influence in the cultural life of the Kazakhs and Uighurs was not squarely faced in the published documents, the language-reform discussions in Sinkiang are incomprehensible without reference to it. For instance, it was acknowledged that many of the national minority intellectuals were quite satisfied with the adequacy of their languages for the tasks of socialist construction, that both the Uighur and Kazakh languages are liberally endowed with technical terms "from the languages of foreign countries," and that the reorientation of these languages toward reliance on Chinese would entail the substitution of Chinese terms for the "foreign" terms already

borrowed. Far from being apologetic about this situation, the party explicitly advocated the gradual fusion of Uighur and Kazakh with Chinese as a part of the inevitable amalgamation of these Central Asian Turks with the Chinese. An editorial in the *Sinkiang Daily* declared in December 1959 that "in building socialism in the minority areas, aid from the Han people is essential....It necessarily follows that language as the means of intercourse must serve the unification of the motherland and the unity of the nationalities. In other words, the languages as they are spoken and written by the minority nationalities must be made as close as possible to the language of the Han people." Those who oppose this fusion "on the grounds that they are against 'assimilation'" merely reflect their "bourgeois nationalism," for it represents "a process of natural union between the various nationalities in the great cause of socialist construction and is essentially different from the policy of the reactionary ruling class which sought to assimilate the minority nationalities."⁴³

Chapter VII

THE COMMUNES AND THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD

A "natural union" of the nationalities--in particular, a union of pastoral and agricultural peoples--was an objective of the people's communes, introduced in the Ili chou in the fall of 1958. Wang En-mao, First Secretary of the CCP Sinkiang Committee, faced the issue squarely: "There is reason to say that with the people of minority nationalities being brought into closer contact and cooperation [with the Han as well as with one another] as a result of the establishment of the people's communes, there will be a greater union which will eventually lead to the complete blending of all the nationalities, and this will have a tremendously far-reaching significance for the steady development of socialist and communist construction in Sinkiang."¹ Ethnic fusion, justified in terms of China's need for a rapid economic development, was to remain for several years the path chosen by the party for the peoples of the Ili chou.

Like virtually all Chinese Communist movements in the three districts, the building of people's communes was a national movement which the party sought to extend uniformly throughout the country. The commune movement was the organizational mode of the Great Leap Forward; both sprang from "the general line for building socialism more, faster, better, and more economically" which had been laid down by a plenary session of the CCP national congress and transmitted to the SUAR by a directive of the CCP Sinkiang committee in June 1958.² Like the many national movements that preceded it, the "general line" was less well suited to the needs of the minority peoples in the borderlands--even assuming their evolution along Chinese Communist lines--than to

the Han Chinese core of the country. The claim of the June directive that "this general line correctly reflects the will and energy of the people of all nationalities in China" was not only extravagant but a complete falsification of actual conditions in the Ili chou. The Sinkiang Committee was quite aware of this contradiction, for in another directive issued in the following month it noted, in connection with the Great Leap Forward in the pastoral areas, that "the minds of the leaders [in the herding areas] are not completely set free...and the mass movement is not powerful enough."³ Saifudin was more specific in a report of January 1959 (following the introduction of communes), when he gave as one of the reasons for the poor rate of growth in animal husbandry production during 1958 that "we did not have a tight grip on it" and admitted that the "necessary conditions" did not exist in many of the livestock cooperatives in the province to permit their conversion to communes.⁴

It may be inferred that the "general line" failed to arouse the enthusiasm of the Ili chou's herders. Specifically, the party did not have the kind of organization at the local level which would have made it possible to arouse their enthusiasm. We have already referred to the weakness of this organization in the grasslands, which had limited the scope and pace of the party's program in the Ili chou.⁵ But there is every indication that even this feeble apparatus, painstakingly built up over the years, was shattered in the rectification campaign, a campaign which seemed to demonstrate that it was impossible to be a good Kazakh and, at the same time, a good Chinese Communist. The fundamental reason for this crisis was, of course, that the path charted by the party for the Kazakhs and other nationalities of the chou

had quite plainly diverged from the Soviet model, which represented the maximum degree of socialization which they were prepared to accept. The tone of the party's reaction to the difficulty of recruiting reliable cadres in Sinkiang was indicated in a 1958 article in the *Kuang-ming Daily*: "One way to solve the problem is to 'take socialism easy' and to wait till sufficient numbers of cadres of the local nationalities are trained before setting up factories, farms and everything else. The other way is to transfer some of the Han cadres to Sinkiang to help. This would permit the rapid building of socialism while active training is going on....All who really love socialism and their own nationalities will choose the latter course."⁶

The substitution of Han for local leaders was most likely concentrated in the upper echelons. One would suppose that there was a correlation between the input of Han cadres and the local nationalists who had been relieved of their functions, and more particularly, that the Jahoda anti-party group was replaced by Han functionaries. The pattern was probably different at the lower levels. Many nationality cadres were demoted, with perhaps only the most dangerous ones being expelled from the party or assigned to "reform through labor." Moreover, there is reason to believe that the influence of the anti-party group was limited to the more Soviet-oriented Kazakhs, the more nationalistic in a progressive sense, as opposed to the comparatively traditional Kazakhs who made up the bulk of the Ili chou's herding population. For the leadership of the basic pastoral cooperative (corresponding, after our analysis, to the *uru*), the rectification campaign--insofar as it was political rather than economic--probably had the main function of encouraging correct behavior. Finally, the Production-Construction Corps gave the party a form of control in the

grasslands which it lacked in the towns. The removal of the anti-party group and with it the counterpoise of Soviet influence left the Kazakhs at large more than ever isolated and susceptible to the influence of the corps. The Russian presence, as a politically meaningful factor, had been removed.⁷

The actual establishment of pastoral people's communes in the Ili chou was a slow and arduous process, although party enthusiasts sometimes asserted that it had been accomplished at once. The *People's Daily* announced in June 1959 that, since the previous fall, "the universal building of people's communes was completed" in the chou,⁸ while the journal *Nationalities Unity* of the same month, speaking of the Sinkiang Region, said that 90 per cent of the herding families had joined communes.⁹ And Saifudin, in a statement of January 1959, declared that 70 per cent of the SUAR's herdsman had entered communes during the intensive drive of September-October 1958 alone.¹⁰ Perhaps at this early stage the bulk of the herders had been induced to declare, in principle, their acceptance of the communes. An organizational framework may also have been developed for the communization of the Ili chou's herding economy, but it is doubtful if very much was accomplished in the way of solving the serious problems of the transition from the cooperative to the commune during 1958-1959. Communization of the agricultural communities of the chou, on the other hand, was carried out expeditiously, though not without opposition from Han Chinese peasants (including demobilized PLA soldiers who had been given land) and the peasants of the "fraternal nationalities." The communiqué of a January 1959 CCP Sinkiang party session, while somewhat ambiguous, made clear the distinction between the situation of agricultural and of pastoral

people's communes:

Following the Great Leap Forward...and an unprecedented awakening of the people, people's communes have been rapidly established in the rural areas of the autonomous region, and 98 per cent of the peasant households have already joined the people's communes. The people's commune movement is also developing in a healthy manner in the pastoral areas, 70 per cent of the herdsmen having already joined the people's communes.

The communiqué continues, a few paragraphs farther on:

The meeting agreed that the development of animal husbandry should take the same direction as agriculture, that is, it should go from the cooperative stage to the stage of people's communes. But as cooperativization of animal husbandry was comparatively late, conditions in the pastoral areas was more complicated, and work in these areas was less developed, the tempo of transformation into communes could be slower and more time might be allowed, but the transformation must nevertheless be carried out.¹¹

By the end of 1959 the party claimed that "in the Altai district, where the people of Kazakh nationality predominate, the various people's communes have, during this year, built and expanded 150 resettlement villages, enabling over 80,000 Kazakh nomads to move into their new houses."¹² Another success, that of the East Wind commune at the foot of the T'ien shan, where Kazakh herders commingled happily with the Han Chinese of the Production-Construction Corps, was claimed.¹³ In the Altai example, it would seem that the term "commune" was simply applied to places where the Kazakhs had permanently

settled, no doubt along "cooperative" lines, and that the principal objective of this organization was to extend and make more permanent the settlements already begun. If this were the case, it would correspond rather well with a pastoral people's commune of the same period in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, which "altered small-group ownership [of the cooperative] into big-group ownership," except that the "individual herding economy" of the Mongols, which the party had struggled to extirpate in the cooperative (not the commune) movement, had not been the chief obstacle among the Kazakhs.¹⁴ It seems likely that the commune in the Altai district was actually a conglomeration of *uru*. In the example of the East Wind commune, it would appear that the Kazakhs involved were families alienated for one reason or another from the *uru*, and were therefore susceptible to Han influence.

But the actual communization of the Kazakh herders was something quite different from either of these examples of commune "successes." It implied, as suggested earlier, the dissolution of the traditional Kazakh social structure and the reorientation of the individual Kazakh toward the state. Not only the *uru*, but the extended-family units (*aul*) which constituted it, were to be tossed on history's rubbish heap and the individual Kazakh was to be made into a single labor unit and applied to the land together with any desired number of other labor units. His dispossession--what the party fancied as his liberation--was to be total: not only were his social values to be squeezed out of him, but he also had to be made into a Chinese, and in this denationalization process his ordeal considerably surpassed that endured by his Han "brothers." Saifudin had said that national dissolution was nothing to worry about because it would take a long time, but the Kazakhs

were, nevertheless, expected to respond like Chinese to the demands of the Great Leap Forward. If they refused to cooperate, they could perish: the communes made it possible for the party to reduce the Kazakhs to dependence on the state, even for their food.

In the last few months of 1958 and during most of 1959 the commune drive in the Ili chou appears to have been comparatively moderate, possibly because this initial drive was stalled by the opposition of the herders. Saifudin said in January:

With regard to the original livestock cooperatives, we must proceed with readjustment and consolidation. All the cooperatives which are qualified for being changed into people's communes should be thus transformed in good time. For those which are still not qualified, we should resort to the active development of production and the creation of the necessary conditions. The public-private, jointly operated livestock farms should be merged and operated on a consolidated basis.¹⁵

And as late as June 1959 the cadres were still being exhorted to complete the cooperative movement in Sinkiang's pastoral areas and reminded that "in our work we must fully heed the different features of farming and herding..., advancing carefully as conditions permit."¹⁶

By November, however, the party's tone changed, evidently because of the demands of China's Great Leap Forward. A meeting on "socialist education and overhaul of communes" was convened by the CCP Sinkiang Committee. Aimed, it appears, at shortcomings in the Ili chou especially,¹⁷ "the meeting decided that in the winter of this year a mass movement for overhauling people's communes, with the struggle between the two roads

[socialism vs. capitalism] and socialist education as its program, be unfolded in all agricultural and pastoral areas in the autonomous region." The conference determined that the landlords, counter-revolutionaries, criminals, and "reactionaries in pastoral areas who were carrying out sabotage under cover" should be dealt with "as our enemies" and "struck against without hesitation." The meeting equated the expansion of production, required for the Great Leap Forward, with success in tidying-up the communes by means of socialist education: "whether production is successfully carried out or not must be looked upon as an important yardstick for determining whether the work to tidy-up the communes with central emphasis given to socialist education is a success or failure." In a commentary in the *Sinkiang Daily* it was noted that opponents of the communes "openly uttered such falsehoods as 'the people's communes are a mistake,' and 'people's communes were built too soon and poorly built,'" and that even the cadres of the party had been infected by these notions.¹⁸

All available activists--from the party committees, the PLA, and the Production-Construction Corps--were mobilized in the great campaign of "tidying-up" the communes of the Ili chou in the winter of 1959-1960. This campaign was linked with the anti-local nationalist and anti-rightist movements;¹⁹ it also coincided with a strenuous recruitment drive to find new blood for the party, and with the hysteria of the Great Leap Forward. By spring, the Kazakh herders were members of pastoral people's communes, the vehicle for their destruction as a distinct people; at this point the history of the Kazakhs of Sinkiang comes to an end. They have been made an "unhistorical" nation. In the Soviet Union, too, the party had sought to "de-historicize" the non-Russians, but for the CPSU it was enough to absorb the

historical head, or intelligentsia, of the nationality into the multinational, Marxist-Leninist leadership of the country, leaving the disappearance of the nationality to the future emergence of a classless society. This was too slow a process for the Communist Party of China, which determined to absorb the minorities forthwith.²⁰ We shall return to this question farther on.

We have little precise information about the communes in the Ili chou, but it appears that, among the Kazakhs, they were made up of several cooperatives, each of which became a production brigade in the new commune. This formal organizational structure was no different from that of communes elsewhere; what was distinctive about the Kazakhs' pastoral communes was that their production brigades at first retained, so far as we can determine, the *uru* survivals which we found associated with the cooperatives. The party does not refer to this question directly, but we can gain some insight into the nature of the transition from the *uru* based cooperative to the supra-*uru* commune--and thus from clan ownership to state ownership--from the guidelines laid down in November 1959 for overhauling Sinkiang's communes (for "production brigade" read *uru* in the sense of cooperative):

The meeting requested that, in the process of overhauling people's communes, the existing problems in people's communes be dealt with correctly in conjunction with the socialist education movement, that the internal relations in people's communes be readjusted and made rational, and that the positive factors of all quarters be exploited extensively. The meeting held that the system of ownership at three levels with ownership at the level of production brigades (that is, production brigades which are basic

accounting units) as basic, which was being enforced in people's communes, would play an extremely important role in the development of the socialist economy and the consolidation of the people's communes. Such a system should therefore continue to be enforced for a considerable length of time to come. Concerning this, there should be no doubt whatsoever. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the transition from basic ownership at the level of production brigades to basic ownership at the level of communes would be inevitable in the development of people's communes. Conditions should therefore be prepared actively for such a transition. The principal thing to do at the moment would be to develop energetically the economy owned by production brigades (that is, basic accounting units) and at the same time to develop actively the commune-owned economy as well. Production brigades that were poorly endowed by nature should be given great help, and leadership over them should be strengthened.²¹

At the same time, certain institutional arrangements associated principally with the communes--notably, the public mess halls--were developed within the framework of the cooperatives (production brigades) pending their merger into communes.

It would seem, then, that the undermining of the *uru* was accomplished by overextending it. Initially, the *uru*-cooperative was changed into an *uru*-production brigade, the latter remaining as the "basic accounting unit" of the larger commune, which was not yet a reality. Since it was the accounting unit, the members of the *uru* could contribute their animals and labor to it, and receive their rewards from it, in much the same way as they had in the cooperative. But as the commune, incorporating several production brigades,

became the accounting unit, the *uru* ceased to be functional, for labor and rewards were no longer apportioned along clan lines.²² In the same way, the livestock held in common by the *uru*, as production brigade, became merged with that of other production brigades in the larger commonality of the pastoral people's commune. Such an hypothesis gives meaning, with reference to the Kazakhs, to the party's assertion that the pastoral people's communes "resolved those remaining problems of individual economy which confronted the cooperatives."²³ It also puts into proper focus a statement by Saifudin that the herdsmen would continue to be paid interest on livestock contributed to the cooperatives and now absorbed in the communes.²⁴

While this change was taking place the Kazakhs were being affected in even more direct ways by the Great Leap Forward, the main concern of which was the expansion of production. In the Ili chou, agriculture was emphasized at the expense of animal husbandry. It was hoped that a great leap forward would also take place in the output of animal husbandry products, but this could not readily be achieved through the application of greater quantities of labor, as was the case with agriculture. Indeed, it was considered that the surest way to raise livestock production was to increase the supply of feed grains. Thus, a great leap forward in agriculture could automatically provide for a great leap forward in the output of animal husbandry products. These considerations account for the central theme of the commune movement in the Ili chou, which was to combine agriculture and animal husbandry and to achieve thereby a more rational use of the land and labor of the chou. This meant that the communes would combine nationalities as well as occupations, for the Kazakhs and other

pastoralists of the chou could not be expected on their own to maximize the utilization of the land for agriculture, even assuming that they had any interest in doing so.

Ideally, agricultural cooperatives were combined with pastoral cooperatives in the establishment of communes. In a few cases it may have been possible for Kazakh pastoral communities to combine with long-established agricultural communities of the Uighurs, Han, and Sibo; in general, however, the Kazakh herders joined forces with the farms created by the Production-Construction Corps on land newly reclaimed from the steppe. Increasingly, these farms were worked by Han peasants brought in from China Proper, releasing the corps for further reclamation work.²⁵ Within the "pastoral" production brigade, too, the division of labor begun with the cooperatives was carried forward, making it possible for more and more herders to work the land, an occupation they had to learn from the "fraternal" nationalities who were experienced in agricultural pursuits. Clearly, the grasslands of the Ili chou, the traditional pasturage of the Kazakhs, were being transformed--with or without the cooperation of the Kazakhs themselves. From this perspective, it can be seen that the most momentous event for the future of the Ili chou at the time of the Great Leap Forward was probably the opening of the Lanchow-Sinkiang railroad in 1959.

Whereas only 60,000 Han settlers had come to Sinkiang from south of the Great Wall during the years 1955-1958,²⁶ between March and October 1959 over 100,000 "young and able-bodied people," the advance party of a movement which was expected to continue, arrived from the provinces of Kiangsu, Hupeh, and Anhwei to aid in "socialist construction" in Sinkiang.²⁷ Saifudin anticipated this influx in January 1959

when he observed that "after the Lanchow-Sinkiang railroad is opened to traffic, the population [of Sinkiang] will necessarily be greatly increased."²⁸ This was not simply because there was a huge reservoir of excess labor in China Proper which could be siphoned off to Sinkiang by means of the new railway, but also because, according to the party, sparsely populated Sinkiang required a substantial increase in its labor force, so that its natural wealth could be effectively exploited. "Manpower," Saifudin said on another occasion, "is the only thing lacking in carrying out large-scale socialist construction in Sinkiang."²⁹ The peoples of Sinkiang were assured, however, that "The Party and Chairman Mao are anxious about the autonomous region. In fraternal provinces on the other side of the Great Wall, the state is mobilizing large numbers of youths and middle-aged people to come over to the autonomous region to take part in socialist construction. This has huge significance for the solution of the labor problem and the speeding up of socialist construction here."³⁰

Railroads provide the indispensable framework for the expansion of the Han Chinese into the borderlands of the country and for the economic and political integration of these outlying regions with interior China. The effects of the foreign-built railroads which pierced the Great Wall between intramural China, on the one hand, and Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, on the other hand, had been plain long before the appearance of the People's Republic of China. The question of a railroad linking China and Sinkiang via the Kansu corridor had been a point at issue between Akhmedjan and Chang Chih-chung during their 1947 negotiations for ending the secession of the three districts: "From the point of view of the non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang, railway communication meant the danger of being

submerged by a flood of Chinese colonists."³¹ Sinkiang's peoples would have been only too glad to see perpetuated a situation in which their economic interests were served by the Turk-Sib railroad which skirted the western border of the province, while they remained under Chinese political hegemony. This balance, steadily undermined by the Chinese Communists in the years following Liberation, was given its *coup de grace* by the opening of the new railroad from Lanchow, long China's extreme northwestern railhead, to Hami, Sinkiang's easternmost town, at the end of 1959.³²

By the beginning of 1960 the population of Hami had registered a ten-fold increase, from 10,000 at the time of Liberation to 100,000. The sleepy old garrison town, known only for its melons, had become a bustling center of economic activity, with iron and steel mills, a power station, machinery and cement plants, flour mills, and open-cut coal mines with a projected capacity of three million tons a year. Moreover, the new railway was "bringing machinery, building materials, and whole sets of big modern equipment from the country's major industrial centers for the development of the whole of the Sinkiang Autonomous Region."³³ During 1960 oil from the Karamai fields in the Dzungarian basin and cotton from the Tarim basin began to be shipped from Hami on the new line.³⁴ These developments signaled the reorientation of Sinkiang's economy away from the Soviet Union and its integration with the Chinese economy. The feelings of the Soviet consul general in Sinkiang who witnessed the departure of the first east-bound train from Hami on December 31, 1960, must have been mixed.³⁵

The length of the Hami-Lanchow line represented only a little over half the 2,300 kilometers that the new railroad

was to traverse in linking the Soviet Union and China through Sinkiang, the two countries being already connected by railroads through Manchuria and Mongolia. But it has never been completed. In 1961 Urumchi was reached after overcoming the tremendous natural obstacles of the Turfan depression and the T'ien shan mountains (the latter required 4.5 thousand meters of tunnels), and from Urumchi branch lines have been built in various directions.³⁶ But the long-heralded project for through service to the Soviet Union has apparently been dropped. Clearly, this about-face was occasioned by political rather than natural obstacles.³⁷

The extension of the railroad through the Ili chou and the Dzungarian Gates, the pass through the mountainous Sino-Soviet frontier long used by Central Asia's nomads, would have met a spur of the Turk-Sib railway from Aktogay being built by the Russians. Had there been continued economic cooperation and a developing economic interdependence between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union, this link would have facilitated the exchange of Sinkiang's oil and mineral wealth for Soviet capital goods. Failure to complete the line meant that the CPR had determined to exploit these raw materials itself: this is the main import of the Great Leap Forward in Sinkiang. Economic interdependence would henceforth be developed between Sinkiang and China Proper rather than between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union.

Urumchi was to be the economic center as well as the political capital of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, slated to become "an industrial base of the motherland for the production of iron and steel, petroleum, coal, non-ferrous metals, machine tools, textiles, and sugar, as well as a base for cotton cultivation."³⁸ This new industry, located chiefly

at the northern base of the T'ien shan westward from Urumchi, would be served by the new Lanchow-Sinkiang railway. Already the leading processing and manufacturing center of Sinkiang, Urumchi was to be connected by a new rail line with Kashgar and other centers of the Tarim basin. Presumably, the mineral wealth, agricultural raw materials, and animal husbandry products of the Ili chou would now find their principal outlet to the east.³⁹ Emphasizing the need to expand the transport network westward from Urumchi, a delegate to the National People's Congress observed in April 1960 that "Ili has always been known as a granary; wheat and corn produced each year are piled like mountains, but at present they cannot be shipped out."⁴⁰ The problem of transport was to become even more urgent, for in the summer of 1960 the Ili valley became the scene of the largest irrigation project in Sinkiang, with half the waters of the Ili river being diverted for agricultural purposes by the Production-Construction Corps.⁴¹

Shortly before the Lanchow-Sinkiang railway reached Urumchi it was predicted that, as a result of the completion of the new line, the distance between China and Sinkiang "will be shortened in the minds of the people and the close ties between various nationalities will then be further strengthened."⁴² From the rail center at Urumchi, truck transport reached west and north into every commune of the Ili chou.⁴³ By means of this transportation network, the additional manpower required for the success of the Great Leap Forward at the basic level of the commune could be brought in from the outside, while the increased product from the land could thereby be extracted. In consequence, the Ili chou was increasingly bound to Urumchi, which, with its industry and Han Chinese population, was rapidly replacing the Soviet border regions (especially Kashgar and Ili)

as the center of gravity of Sinkiang.

Within the Ili chou, as elsewhere, the commune was the institutional structure within which the individual underwent the paroxysm of productive effort and self-reform associated with the Great Leap Forward. Following the establishment of agricultural and pastoral people's communes during 1958-1960, the urban people's commune movement swept the chou in the spring of 1960. Ining was said to have been completely communized in the month of April. Comrade Pai Yun-hai, of the CCP Ining Municipality Committee, described the movement in the city:

The masses of residents, staff members and workers and their families, students, public organ cadres, small merchants and hawkers have flocked to the respective residents' committees, administrative divisions, Party municipal committees, and the various communes in the suburbs to apply for joining the communes, beating cymbals and drums in an ecstasy of joy. Some people have stayed awake at night seized with a great desire to join the communes. From April 1 to April 20 the whole municipality set up 199 factories, 138 service stations and teams, 14 mess halls and 12 nurseries. Of the former 7,000-odd idlers, eighty-six per cent have plunged into collective production and labor. The whole municipality has realized collectivization of production and labor and socialization of household chores. A new situation in which everyone has work, every family gets occupied and everything is being taken care of now prevails.⁴⁴

To supply the new communes with the necessary facilities, "the masses immediately vacated their own houses for the public mess halls and nurseries."⁴⁵ As a result of the urban people's commune movement in Ining, which was said to be a "natural

product of the Great Leap Forward," a "coordination between production and livelihood" was attained which "brought about increasing changes in the spiritual outlook of the people."⁴⁶

The herdsmen of the Ili chou had one advantage over the agricultural and urban communities: since they possessed none of the fixed capital (in the form of buildings and other facilities) required for the communes, these things could not be taken from them but had to be newly built. This construction, undertaken by the corps with increasing support from nomads liberated from the "sorrowful" life of tending animals, represented a considerable investment of capital by the state in the pastoral districts of the chou.⁴⁷ But this advantage was of only passing moment, for within the pastoral people's communes, said to represent the "urgent desire of the herdsmen,"⁴⁸ the Kazakhs and other pastoralists of the chou were soon reduced to the status of ordinary laborers.

Within the communes, the institution used to control the herders was the mess hall; in order to eat and survive, they had to work and cooperate. "The peasants and herdsmen of all nationalities in Sinkiang have a warm affection for the mess halls," the *People's Daily* declared in June 1960, when 97 per cent of them were said to belong to 30,000 communal mess halls.⁴⁹ Adhering to the system of "to each according to his labor," a comprehensive ration system, employing meal tickets, was developed on the principle of "determining the quantity of grain for every type of person."⁵⁰ Women, "emancipated from the fetters of domestic labors," left their children behind in commune-run crèches and joined the men in forming labor teams whose nuclei were the mess halls. Mobile or stationary as required, each mess hall fed 30 to 300 workers.⁵¹

In pastoral areas, permanent kitchens and dining halls were built at those locations where cooperatives had been

established on the wintering grounds of the nomads. With the development of agriculture, these kitchens and mess halls were credited with introducing a more diversified diet among the herders "so that they may have greater energy to work."⁵² Moreover, the mess halls followed the herds to summer pasture: "On the Ili and Altai grasslands, when the herds are kept closer to one another in the spring season to facilitate the delivery of lambs, most of the mess halls are organized with the animal husbandry production brigades as units. In summer, the herds are moved to pastureland in the high mountains for dispersed grazing, and the mess halls are organized with the grazing teams as units."⁵³

That the increased productivity of labor in the communes resulted, as the party claimed, in better nutrition and higher earnings for the herders is extremely dubious, for the objective of the whole movement was not, in the first instance, to improve the standard of living of the people but, rather, to rationalize the utilization of labor. The herder was to be a more efficient producer, but primarily in order to reduce the number of herders required for the tending of animals. If his productivity were doubled, another herder was released for other types of labor; it did not follow that his real income would double, if it increased at all. Indeed, the two results are, in the context of the Chinese Communist economy of the "Leap" years (1958-1960), mutually contradictory.

Each commune was a microcosm of the national Great Leap Forward. Each was to develop diversified economic undertakings while, at the same time, increasing the output of commodities traditionally produced in the particular locale.⁵⁴ Industry--especially iron and steel--was the first desideratum; grain production--especially the increase needed to support industrialization--was the second. The new industry put a tremendous

load on the feeble transportation network of the SUAR, while vast new reclamation and irrigation projects were required to meet the demands of agricultural expansion.

According to one report, the herders in the Ili chou, "helped by commune members of the Uighur, Han, and Sibo nationalities..., are increasingly improving their techniques of agricultural production."⁵⁸ Another report said that "a large amount of labor was enabled to leave animal husbandry for agriculture."⁵⁶ But the party was not content with the mere fact that the pastoral areas were achieving self-sufficiency in grain for men and animals, erecting buildings, and developing the land. The herders, joining the "youths and adults" from the interior of China, were increasingly put to work at industrial sites, reclamation projects, and road building. The communes had been turned into an organization for the total and rapid development of the chou. The party took special pride in the blast furnaces the Kazakhs were building on the prairie. The following description is by a *People's Daily* correspondent:⁵⁷

Our car traveled along the Ku-nai-su River on the boundless grassland. Flocks of sheep were silently grazing, moving about slowly, like white clouds over the green sea. Having climbed over several snow-capped mountains, we suddenly found in front of us a fiery scene, like that of a battle. A long line of hot-air furnaces and iron-smelting furnaces were emitting dark smoke. Trucks loaded with ore and equipment were moving about like shuttles on looms. The blasting of rocks--part of the mining process--and the sound of machines broke the silence of the grassland. This was the new iron and steel city--Hsinyuan Iron and Steel Works--in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou.

"Some of the workers," the story continued, "are Kazakh people who have just laid down their shepherd's staves...." And another report noted that the Hsinyuan works would have "great practical significance for the removal of mystical views from the thinking of the people and for the cultivation of Communist-style boldness in thinking and acting."⁵⁸

In 1958-1959 it was reported that "one million people of various nationalities, about one-fifth of the total population of Sinkiang," were working at the "local-type blast furnaces and open-hearth furnaces,"⁵⁹ while in 1959-1960 "more than one million laborers" were put to work on water-conservancy projects.⁶⁰ In an appeal for more Han labor from China, in which he also called upon Sinkiang's nationalities to exert themselves further, the director of the personnel bureau of the SUAR People's Council observed that Sinkiang had "only about 3,000,000 units of labor power" available in a population of "some 5,000,000."⁶¹ Thus, fully one-third of all the able-bodied people of Sinkiang must have participated in these mass-campaign projects. This is confirmed by a June 1960 report by the head of the party's rural work department in Sinkiang, in which it is said that one-third of the SUAR's labor power would be assigned to land reclamation projects "following the autumn harvest." Apparently, then, the mass-labor projects were, at least in part, of a seasonal nature. In this way the labor from the agricultural and pastoral sectors of the economy could be fully utilized during the slack winter season. "However," the report continues, "the objective situation is developing so fast that it is no longer enough to open up waste land and build water conservancy projects in this period alone. We must change the old habit and make it a year-round practice....Judging by the concrete conditions in the autonomous region, by the widespread

development of agro-technical innovation and revolution, and by the constant raising of labor productivity, it is appropriate and possible to set aside and organize 15 per cent of the labor power into special forces....If so, a land reclamation and water conservancy army of nearly 300,000 persons can be formed in the whole region."⁶²

There were, therefore, several ways in which the manpower of the Ili chou, as elsewhere in Sinkiang and throughout China, was mobilized by means of the commune organization.⁶³ First, by rationalizing the use of the available labor within the commune, a substantial amount of labor was withdrawn from traditional occupations and employed in new projects for the development of diversified economic undertakings within the commune. Second, manpower mobilized on a seasonal basis, corresponding to the slack periods of the traditional occupations, was employed in the mass-campaign projects which were not necessarily confined to the particular commune. Third, a smaller fraction of the commune's labor force was withdrawn from the commune and turned into "special forces" which could be sent anywhere at any time. At each of these levels of labor mobilization the local nationalities were obliged to intermingle with and "learn from" the personnel of the Production-Construction Corps and the "young volunteers" from China Proper.

In connection with the Han peasants coming into Sinkiang's communes, it was noted that "we should educate the old commune members and old workers to overcome the thought of exclusiveness and local nationalistic sentiments and to establish a correct understanding of the coming of more youths and adults to the frontier region, welcome them warmly, take care of their livelihood, and treat them as members of one family."⁶⁴ In one

instance, "workers of minority nationalities on a sheep farm voluntarily asked for permission to move to underground caves so that the young newcomers might live in their houses."⁶⁵ These newcomers from China proper were said to have adopted the slogan of "taking farming as their profession and the commune as their home" and to be showing "great solidarity with the local, old commune members," with whom they were "working side by side."⁶⁶ Thus, the party turned the communes into controlled experiments in multinational cooperation for the exploitation of the province. While seeking to ease as much as possible the hardships encountered by the Han immigrants in settling down in Sinkiang, the party attempted to make of all commune members--Han and non-Han alike--undifferentiated "units of labor."⁶⁷ All their necessities--including clothing as well as food--were rationed out to them, and everything was in increasingly short supply.

A movement which aided the party in implementing this rigorous program was the drive to form people's militia units. In Sinkiang it was closely associated with the Great Leap Forward. We have seen that several other movements, prominent among which was the continuing antilocal nationalist campaign, armed the party with psychological tools in its campaign to organize the people under the "three red banners" of the general line, the Great Leap Forward, and the people's communes. In contrast, the people's militia movement, employing, after 1958, the slogan of "turning everyone into a soldier," sought to protect the communes from attack once they were established,⁶⁸ although it was also useful as a means of exerting psychological pressure.

While the cooperative movement among Dzungaria's Kazakhs owed its relative success to an appeal to the economic self-interest of the herders, the driving force behind the building of communes was propaganda.⁶⁹ Not only did the party not appeal

to the herders' instinct of bourgeois acquisitiveness: it called upon them to join with all the peoples of China in sacrificing themselves for the industrial development of the state. Material rewards would only be forthcoming at some future time. The party was able to effect the commune movement among the Kazakhs, albeit slowly, by virtue of the increased authority it had developed within the cooperatives and the concomitant undermining of Kazakh ability to resist on a broad scale. But to insure the stability of the communes a new institution was required.⁷⁰

An SUAR people's militia work conference of February 1960 called upon all people's communes, state farms, industrial and mining enterprises, government organs, schools, and even the Production-Construction Corps to organize militia units which were to defend the national frontiers and safeguard socialist construction; they were warned "to prevent landlords, rich peasants, reactionaries, and undesirable elements from worming their way into the people's militia to carry out their subversive activities" and to make arms available only to those who were deemed politically reliable.⁷¹ It was to be an elite arm of the party, setting production standards for the masses to emulate while guarding against sabotage of the communes. In a sense, the movement of "turning everyone into a soldier" was a universal extension of the Production-Construction Corps' mode of thinking and acting, and thus an intensification of the party's constant agitation to have the nationalities emulate the Han.

But far more important for propaganda purposes than any of the movements associated with the communes were the communes themselves. Created by means of propaganda, the communes became the party's primary vehicle for further

propaganda. Individuality was under constant attack in these living communist organisms. Even the party cadres among the Kazakhs had been but superficially transformed by Marxism-Leninism, while the thinking of the herders at large had been altered little, if at all. Since their experience of settling down in the cooperatives had lacked a clear ideological import, they remained essentially unreformed at the time the communes were introduced. The class struggle was to be waged within the commune rather than in preparation for it. In their remolding, moreover, the Kazakhs were to be joined by the national minority cadres being purged of their bourgeois individualism and local nationalism. Nor was this all, for the party held up the communes as living testimony of the correctness of Mao Tse-tung's thought, as something distinct from Marxism-Leninism and, by implication, distinct from the practice of the Communist party of the Soviet Union.

The three red flags of the general line, the Great Leap Forward, and the people's communes came to be subsumed under the fluttering banner of the thought of Mao Tse-tung "which integrates the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution."⁷² Indeed, it was this marriage which produced the general line, the Great Leap Forward, and the people's communes, all unknown in and abhorred by the Soviet Union. Saifudin, the old CPSU member and faithful agent of Stalin, rose before the assembled delegates to the National People's Congress in Peking and declared:

In order to fulfill triumphantly the tasks henceforth, it is necessary to hold aloft the red flag of the thinking of Mao Tse-tung. Mao Tse-tung's thinking is the banner of victory. The historic experiences of our country in

revolution and construction sufficiently prove that by adhering to the direction pointed out by the thinking of Mao Tse-tung victory is certain. On the contrary, deviation from the direction of Mao Tse-tung's thinking will inevitably lead to mistakes.

Mao Tse-tung's thinking represents union of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution and construction. In order to become a true Marxist-Leninist, and in an effort to successfully realize, as early as possible, socialism and communism in our country, it is necessary to study carefully and conscientiously the thinking of Mao Tse-tung, and to arm ourselves with Mao Tse-tung's thinking.⁷³

On another occasion in 1960 Saifudin said:

Chairman Mao's works are the guide to our socialist revolution, socialist construction, and communist construction, and are the sole correct program for the Chinese revolution. If we do not continue to study Chairman Mao's works, we shall be bound to make mistakes and cause loss to the revolutionary cause. Needless to say, we should also study well Marxist-Leninist classic works at the same time of studying Chairman Mao's works. Marxism-Leninism is not a dogma but should be integrated with practice and applied and developed in practice. Chairman Mao is the best model for integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.⁷⁴

Practice, as well as study, was required for the cadres in order that they might attain a correct ideological orientation. The communes--the embodiment of Chairman Mao's creative thinking--

were the natural arena for this "practice." Reform through labor, in the sense of going "down" to the communes, working with and becoming immersed in the masses, became universal. By rotation, cadres in special need of labor training, such as those still requiring "rectification" and cadres recently admitted to the party, were to participate in labor at the commune level over a period of several years; they generally spent a full year at manual labor.⁷⁵ First secretaries of hsien (county) party committees were ordered to spend at least two months of the year in communes, while "leadership cadres" had a labor requirement of four months in the year.⁷⁶ The separate mess halls for cadres which had cropped up in many places were abolished, with the cadres henceforth eating together with the commune members.⁷⁷ To grasp the thought of Mao Tse-tung was to become a "true" Marxist-Leninist, but Mao's thought could not be comprehended by a purely intellectual effort: direct participation in the mass-labor of the communes was essential. The cadres,⁷⁸ their thinking purified through labor and contact with the masses, were, in turn, to animate the collective will of the communes in order to achieve an uninterrupted revolution on the political front and a continuous leap forward in production. Put another way, Mao's thought could only be realized by the masses led by a party steeped in the living ideology of the communes.

In the foregoing discussion of the commune movement and the Great Leap Forward it may appear that we have departed from our proper theme of developments in the Ili chou to a more general discussion of Sinkiang affairs during the years . 1958-1960. But the principal effect of the Great Leap Forward on the Ili chou was the integration of the three districts with the rest of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, a Sinkiang now firmly bound to China. Along with

this diminishing economic distinctiveness, the Ili chou lost, in the commune movement, its lingering political uniqueness. Henceforth, the three districts simply constituted a portion of the SUAR, scarcely differentiated from the other parts; moreover, we find progressively less material in the Chinese Communist press which deals specifically with the Ili chou.⁷⁹ Although the name remains, the Ili chou no longer has a history: the political entity, as well as its Kazakh population, has been absorbed--from the party's point of view, transcended. However, the very process of integrating the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou with the Chinese People's Republic gave rise to a frontier tension between the chou and the neighboring Kazakh SSR which is unique on the Chinese periphery.

As for the Kazakh herders, the CCP held up the communes as the ultimate solution of the problem of transforming the pastoral economy and the nomadic society. "Facts have proved," Saifudin exulted, "that only the people's communes could basically change the backward economic and cultural conditions in the pastoral areas."⁸⁰ It was also said that the pastoral people's communes were correct in terms of the Marxist-Leninist "law of the development of history," and the authoritative journal *Nationalities Research* explicitly referred to the fact that "the establishment of people's communes in the pastoral areas is a completely new phenomenon with which nobody [i.e., the Soviet Union or other socialist countries] has had any experience."⁸² A Soviet observer who studied the situation of the nationalities in Sinkiang in 1959 must have had these communes in mind when he declared that "the achievements of the Chinese People's Republic in the solution of the national question represent a new triumph for the ever victorious ideas of Marxism-Leninism."⁸³

The communes were said to have brought many wonderful

new things into the lives of the herders, but the evidence suggests only harder work, a deteriorating diet, and depressed livestock production. In 1959 there were said to be 6,990,000 head of livestock in the Ili chou, representing a 110-per-cent increase over the 1949 figure,⁸⁴ but the figure claimed for 1962 was only 7,380,200 head.⁸⁵ Much of this slight increase during the Great Leap years must, moreover, be attributed to the Production-Construction Corps and the state livestock farms, which together possessed ten per cent of the SUAR's livestock by 1958.⁸⁶ It is quite possible that the number of animals possessed by the Kazakh production brigades actually declined, the loss remaining hidden in the total figure which included the corps' livestock.

But whether the livestock industry prospered or not presumably mattered little to the individual herder, for regardless of his production enthusiasm he was dependent on the state for a subsistence which must have been uniform for all commune members because it was scarcely more than that required for survival. By early 1960 a "mass campaign to implement the economic use of grain" was launched throughout Sinkiang. The people were told: "Although...the grain output of the autonomous region is increasing every year, yet...the quantity of grain each person can get is still not much.... Instead of leading a better life right now, life must be led in a way as if we were still poor...." The mess halls were advised to "popularize the advanced method of planned use of grain through mixing coarse grain with fine grain, making delicate dishes with coarse grain, and serving solid food and porridge alternately."⁸⁷ The shortage was attributed to the rapid pace of industrialization and the SUAR's expanding population as well as to transportation difficulties; although

such shipments are not mentioned, it would seem logical for the state to have shipped grain from Sinkiang to China Proper, where the food shortage was acute. By the spring of 1960 a massive transportation tie-up had developed as the result of unusual shipments of grain from southern Sinkiang to north of the T'ien shan, although prior to the Great Leap Forward the north had been self-sufficient in grain.⁸⁸ It appears that much of the frenetic activity associated with the Great Leap Forward subsided with this paralysis of the transportation system. Politics had failed to take command of economics, natural obstacles had not yielded to human will, and the SUAR's development problems remained.

Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION: THE EXODUS AND ITS AFTERMATH

The Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) was followed by some relaxation in economic policy and by steady deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, signaled by the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China in 1960 and a steep drop in Sino-Soviet trade after 1959. In 1962 the Sino-Soviet split produced a large-scale exodus of non-Han peoples to the Soviet Union: this was the culmination of the people's revolution in the Ili chou, a revolution which had run its course in China a dozen years earlier. If in China Proper the revolution had been a national movement which succeeded in expelling the Western imperialists and their lackeys, the revolution in the Ili chou was also a national revolution but one directed against the Soviet imperialists and their lackeys. The local nationalism of the Ili chou had fallen victim to Chinese nationalism: the "local nationalists" were actually anti-Chinese Marxist-Leninists, for the true local nationalists--those personalities of the East Turkestan Republic who had refused to go along with Saifudin--had been purged in 1951, as we have seen.

The bitterness of the local people, caught in the cross-fire of Sino-Soviet rivalry and deserted by their Russian protectors, must have been matched by the frustration of the Russians, who had presided over their own elimination from the three districts by helping the Chinese Communists develop strength there. Soviet industrial plants dotted the landscape; Soviet tractors crawled over the state farms; improved strains of livestock from the Soviet Union grazed the mountain pastures; Soviet trucks plied the highways; Soviet generating plants

supplied electricity to the towns and communes. Of course, the Chinese were still paying for these things, but had they not been available from the Soviet Union the development of the Ili chou would have been a great deal slower and the economic influence and control of the Russians would have remained that much longer. If the Russians had imagined that the provision of this technical assistance would bring them a political return at the local level, they awoke in the early 1960's to discover that they had been laboring under a great misapprehension. The Chinese had succeeded in developing the Ili chou and the rest of Sinkiang essentially as an appendage of the Soviet economy, at the same time constructing a massive political apparatus for controlling the same area. In due course the entire structure of Chinese Communist power was turned against the Russians and used to exclude them.

Frustration on the part of the Russians may have been an important factor in the 1962 exodus of national minorities from the Ili chou to the Soviet Union. A White Russian refugee from Sinkiang reported in Hong Kong that Soviet consular officials in the three districts (and their superiors), infuriated by Chinese Communist attempts to extirpate Russian influence there, issued thousands of passports to Uighurs and Kazakhs who had been demanding them. Soviet passports had even been obtainable on the black market. The refugee recalled that, as these legal travelers began to cross the border in late May 1962, many other people, without proper documents, took advantage of this "relaxed situation" by fleeing from China.¹ In another incident during the same month, a group of several hundred Ili chou residents seeking permission from a CCP committee headquarters to go to the Soviet Union had been fired upon with machine guns: many people were killed and the whole population was incensed. The

officials responsible for the shooting were not punished.²

Some 60,000 people crossed the border between April and August 1962, the peak months in a movement that may have begun several years earlier and which undoubtedly continued on a smaller scale despite Chinese Communist efforts to seal the border.³ The majority were resettled in collective farms on the grasslands of the Kazakh SSR; it seem clear that most of them were Kazakhs, with a sprinkling of Uighurs and other minority nationals. In the spring of 1964 Saifudin was still berating the Russians for their "large-scale subversive activities against Sinkiang," which he blamed for the Kazakh defections.⁴

It might be suggested, hypothetically, that there were two kinds of Kazakh émigrés. On the one hand, there were the the Soviet-oriented intelligentsia--the "local nationalists" and their sympathizers. Many of these Kazakhs may have had a legitimate claim to Soviet citizenship, due either to previous residence in the Soviet Union or to some arrangement during the days of the East Turkestan Republic whereby they could apply for it. Others probably had family ties or previous business connections with the Kazakh SSR which would have made them normally eligible for Soviet visas. It seems likely that most of this group went to the Soviet Union in a legal or quasi-legal status. On the other hand, there were the Kazakh herders living close enough to the frontier or to centers of heavy Soviet influence near the frontier to have been aware of the material benefit of a Soviet as opposed to a Chinese domicile. For these Kazakhs, who must have comprised the majority of the 1962 exodus, the Kazakh SSR may well have seemed a "showcase of socialism." Moreover, there must have been contact between these two groups, between town and steppe, dating from the East Turkestan Republic and tested in the antilocal nationalist campaign. This hypothesis,

which is consistent with our general analysis, finds some confirmation in the testimony of Kazakh refugees which appeared in the Soviet press in 1963. In their denunciation of Chinese persecution of the "so-called national minorities" in Sinkiang, these refugees referred to two specific grievances. National minority persons in Sinkiang "who openly expressed their sympathy with the Soviet people" were put into re-education camps "which are in reality concentration camps," and "those with Soviet citizenship" received particularly harsh treatment.⁵ The second major irritant was the commune. A refugee who said that the people's revolution had been welcomed declared that the regimentation of the communes, where "life is measured by the ringing of a gong" and where, as in the old days, nothing was to be seen "but the tattered yurt and the herds of sheep," was intolerable.⁶

The Chinese People's Republic became intensely concerned about the fractured society left behind in the Ili chou by the refugees. The Soviet consulates in the three districts, along with the office of the consulate general in Urumchi, were closed; the border was sealed and a strip of territory along it cleared; substantial military reinforcements were moved in from Kwangtung and Tibet; and propaganda about the happy, socialist life which the people of Sinkiang were supposed to be enjoying was greatly expanded. "Cold war" and "peaceful competition" were now the order of the day on the Sino-Soviet frontier in western Dzungaria. The CPR's concern with the well-being of the people was not just a superficial phenomenon, however, for it was obvious that the low standard of living in the Ili chou compared to that in adjacent Soviet territory was a serious liability. "They could look and compare," the chairman of a collective farm in the Kazakh SSR remarked apropos of the Chinese effort to remove the population

from the nearby border.⁷

The economic change which followed the Great Leap Forward and which continued to manifest itself in 1964⁸ was practical rather than theoretical: the three red banners of the general line, the Great Leap Forward, and the people's communes remained hoisted aloft, but little was actually said about them. In livestock-producing areas, the expansion of agriculture was now de-emphasized. It was held that the "improper large-scale cultivation of grassy plains in livestock areas for grain crops" must be avoided and that the development of a variegated economy around livestock production must serve animal husbandry rather than undermine it.⁹ The importance of the pastoral areas as a source of work animals and animal husbandry products for the whole nation was emphasized, as was the need to correctly and positively integrate the non-Han herders into the sociopolitical fabric of the nation. The *People's Daily* declared editorially that "the proper handling of the work in the livestock areas and the vigorous development of livestock production will have an important bearing on solidifying the country, reinforcing the national defense, strengthening the union of the nationalities, and constructing a socialist nation."¹⁰ Finally, it was admitted that the herders still exhibited a "spontaneous tendency towards capitalism" which would completely disappear only after "a long historical phase,"¹¹ but it was made clear that this transformation would be accomplished within the pastoral people's communes, which had demonstrated "a powerful life force and an incomparable superiority."¹²

The crisis produced by the 1962 exodus would undoubtedly have been even more serious had it not been for this general relaxation in economic policy which ran parallel to the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. That the situation of the Kazakh herders was being ameliorated is suggested by a steady

improvement in the livestock industry during the years 1961-1963, which reversed the stagnation of the Great Leap years.¹³ A fresh start was being made, and the party was offering more in return for Kazakh cooperation. It was obliged to do so not only because the Kazakhs, like people throughout China, were weary, but also because the influence of the Soviet Union in the Ili chou could not be erased altogether. The Kazakhs, forcibly quarantined from the more affluent part of their nation, were restless, and Chinese patrols along the frontier could not keep out Kazakh language radio broadcasts from Alma Ata.¹⁴

In terms of the frontier problem which had confronted the Ch'ing government in Dzungaria, the People's Republic of China had succeeded in establishing a firm base north of the T'ien shan from which political authority could be exercised. In doing so, it had triumphed over the very situation which the eighteenth-century Ch'ing court had most dreaded: namely, the establishment in Dzungaria of an alien people--the Kazakhs--whose ties were with distant centers of power in the west. The CPR's success had been made possible by the effective utilization of machines and material unknown before the industrial and technological revolutions and produced not in China but in Russia. With the assistance of Soviet experts, the CCP, combining technology and Han Chinese labor, had overcome Dzungaria's natural obstacles and tied this frontier firmly to China Proper. The result was that a forward position established by the Russians in Central Asia had been destroyed and the real Sino-Russian frontier pushed back. The Han Chinese had successfully extended themselves into an alien environment and overcome their cultural, "natural" frontier in the northwest beyond which the mounted nomad had always ruled supreme.

But CPR policy in Dzungaria was more than a Ch'ing

policy technologically refined: it was also ideologically refined. Marxism-Leninism, as an ideology of egalitarian material well-being, made possible a positive approach to the non-Han Chinese in the three districts. Without such an inclusive ideology, the new Chinese thrust into Dzungaria could only have led to the decimation of the native peoples or to a Sino-Soviet war. In fact, there is every reason to suspect that the Han Chinese could never have returned to the three districts without this Marxist-Leninist shield.

This Marxism-Leninism of the Chinese ("Maoism"), while broad enough to include the poor Kazakh herder, was not--whether by nature or intent--expansive enough to encompass the Russified intellectuals who gradually became, in the eyes of the CCP, Soviet agents whether or not they actually engaged in subversive activities. Psychologically, they were stretched between two cultures across a steadily widening chasm, and they were eventually broken.

The evolution of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou can be visualized in terms of the collective labor of Han Chinese which gradually overwhelmed all else, reducing everything to this one, uniform standard. This mass labor, exemplified in the Production-Construction Corps, was at first only one level of activity on which were superimposed the government, the national minorities, Islam, the elegant machines and experimental farms of the Russians, etc., but in ten years' time it absorbed or displaced this entire superstructure. Individual sacrifice through impersonal labor, virtually the entire content of Maoism during the Great Leap Forward years, became the norm of all activity. This labor was different from labor in the Soviet Union: it was much harder and much more collective. This was the real "cultural" gap between the Kazakh SSR and the Ili chou in the late 1950's and early 1960's.¹⁵

The tenth anniversary of the establishment of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou was celebrated in 1964. The occasion was marked by recitations of the achievements of the peoples of the Ili chou under the guidance of Chairman Mao and the CCP as well as by denunciations of the schemes of the Khrushchev-revisionist clique.¹⁶ Most of the data presented lends confirmation to the arguments advanced in this monograph. Of particular interest is the forthright manner in which the activities of the Production-Construction Corps are treated; no room is left for doubt as to the leading role played by the corps in the "socialist transformation" of the Ili chou.¹⁷ Rather puzzling is the assertion that the Kazakhs still comprise more than half the population of the Ili chou, as they did ten years earlier, for circumstantial evidence suggests a continued influx of Han Chinese. Changes may have been made in administrative boundaries so as to preserve the appearance of a Kazakh majority in the Ili chou.¹⁸ Summing up the benefits which have accrued to the Kazakh people during the chou's first decade, its Kazakh governor, Irhali, reported that "the Kazakh people were most satisfied with these three things: (1) they need not travel when they want to buy or sell; (2) they can find a doctor when they are sick; and (3) their children can go to school."¹⁹

On October 1, 1965, a year after the tenth anniversary of the Ili chou, the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region was celebrated. CPR Vice Premier Ho Lung led an imposing delegation which flew from Peking to Urumchi to mark the occasion.²⁰ The struggle against Khrushchev revisionism, singled out several years earlier as a particularly dangerous trend in Sinkiang, was stressed in the speeches of Ho Lung, Wang En-mao, Saifudin, and others. Apparently a major purge of suspected "Khrushchev revisionists" was even then being carried out in Sinkiang.²¹

There is little doubt that the CCP has been seriously concerned about the situation in Sinkiang, where "the domestic class struggle and the class struggle in the international sphere are interwoven."²² Because of its history and geographical position, the Ili chou is particularly susceptible to "class" antagonisms of this kind. Only steady improvement in the life of the Kazakhs and other peoples of the Ili chou can ensure the security of this exposed frontier, as the CCP realizes. Paradoxically, the Kazakhs of Dzungaria still derive economic benefit from their links with the Kazakhs of Soviet Central Asia, while the CCP regards these same links as a mortal danger to its own position of authority.

NOTES

Abbreviations Used in the Notes

- CB *Current Background* (Hong Kong: United States Consulate-General)
- ECMM *Extracts [later, Selections] from China Mainland (SCMM) Magazines* (Hong Kong: United States Consulate-General)
- JMJP *Jen-min jih-pao* (People's daily)
- JPRS Joint Publications Research Service
- NCNA New China News Agency
- NPC National People's Congress
- SCMP *Survey of China Mainland Press* (Hong Kong: United States Consulate-General)
- SUAR Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region

I. Introduction

1. Usually, for want of a better term, translated as "prefecture," a *chou* comprises several *hsien*, or counties, and is subordinate to the province or autonomous region. *Chou* vary greatly in size and population. The Ili *chou* is larger than England but contains only a million people. Autonomous areas, which have been created by the Chinese Communists wherever the ratio of national minority to Han Chinese population is comparatively large, occur at all administrative levels. As the example of the Kazakhs will suggest, China's minorities enjoy no real autonomy.
2. The Tarim basin is the real "Chinese Turkestan," a designation often applied indiscriminately to all of Sinkiang.
3. Alexis de Levchine, *Description des Hordes et des Steppes des Kirghiz-Kazaks*, tr. from the Russian by Perry de Pigny (Paris, 1840). For a map showing the disposition of the several hordes, see Alfred E. Hudson, *Kazakh Social Structure* (Yale University Publications in Anthropology, No. 20; New Haven, 1938), p. 6.

4. Saguchi Tōru 佐口 透, *Jūhachi jūkyū seiki Tō-Torukisutan shakai-shi kenkyū 18-19 世紀 東トルキスタニ社会史研究* (Social history of East Turkestan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; Tokyo, 1963), p. 292. According to Saguchi, horses were needed by the Ch'ing government's agricultural colonists in Dzungaria.
5. The Manchus did not directly control those Kazakhs who did move into Dzungaria but preferred an indirect administration via Mongol intermediaries. Responding to an entirely new situation, the policy of the Sinkiang government in the early twentieth century favored the Kazakhs over the Mongols, who were now considered a threat on account of Outer Mongolian nationalism.
6. Just as the Manchus patronized Mongol Lamaism, the Russian government actively promoted the spread of Islam among the Kazakhs, for which purpose they employed faithful Tatar agents.
7. Before the arrival of the Chinese and Russians here in modern times, certain "barbarian" kingdoms, notably the Chaghatai house of Chinggis Khan's realm, as well as its successor, the Dzungar confederacy, controlled both sides of these mountains, thereby extending their rule over all of present-day Sinkiang and much of Russian Turkestan, including the Semirech'ye region. Both these kingdoms had their capital near the Manchu administrative city of Kuldja (Ining) in the Ili valley.
8. These missions are listed individually in Saguchi, pp. 300-303.
9. *The Ili Crisis* by Dr. Immanuel C.Y. Hsu (Oxford, 1965) deals with this period in detail. For first-hand observations of the appalling devastation of the Ili region caused by the uprising, see Eugene Schuyler, *Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja*, 2 vols. (New York, 1876), Vol. 2, Chap. 12.
10. Caravans from Semipalatinsk had been visiting Tacheng and Kuldja (Ining) since the end of the eighteenth century, and Russian trading establishments at Ili and Tacheng had been sanctioned in a treaty signed at Kuldja in 1851, but trade between Russian Central Asia and Dzungaria does not seem to have flourished until the latter part of the nineteenth century, when Ining and Tacheng take on the aspect of "treaty ports."

11. See Herold J. Wiens, "The Historical and Geographical Role of Urumchi, Capital of Chinese Central Asia," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 53.4:441-464 (December 1963).
12. Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia* (Boston, 1950), p. 67.
13. Sheng's own account of this period is contained in Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?* (East Lansing, Mich., 1958).

II. The Kazakhs and the East Turkestan Republic

1. K.F. Kotov, *Autonomy of Local Nationalities in the Chinese People's Republic: Citing As an Example the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region* (Moscow, 1959), tr. in U.S. Department of Commerce, JPRS, No. 3547:17 (Washington, July 18, 1960). A contemporary observer was of the opinion that the Kazakh revolt had been in response to a scheme of the Nationalist government to settle Chinese refugees on the nomads' pasture. See Lt. Col. N. McLean, "The Much-Courted Kazakhs," *The Geographical Magazine*, 21:256-263 (London, 1948).
2. Probably the fullest description of the East Turkestan Republic, concerning which there remains considerable mystery, is to be found in Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia* (Boston, 1950), pp. 86ff. See also "The Uprising in Northwest Sinkiang, 1944-1949," *Central Asian Review*, 11.2:181-195 (1963). This is an abridged translation of a 1962 Russian article. A detailed account, which gives the Kuomintang view of the Ili movement, is contained in Chang Ta-chün 張大軍, *Hsin-chiang chin szu-shih nien pien-luan chi-lleh* 新疆近四十年變亂紀略 (An account of rebellions in Sinkiang during the past forty years; Taipei, 1954), pp. 64ff.
3. Henry R. Lieberman (from Nanking), "Nanking is Seeking a Deal with Soviet," *The New York Times* (Feb. 1, 1949); Walter Sullivan (from Urumchi), "China Northwest Veering to Russia," *ibid.* (Mar. 30, 1949).
4. Arrangements for the entry of the PLA were made between Peking and Ining, presumably with Russian participation, and not via the provincial government in Urumchi. On September 26, 1949, Burhan, who headed the Sinkiang

government, sent a cable to Mao Tse-tung in which he declared the province's surrender, adding, "we will request the provincial government members now in Ili to return to Urumchi for cooperation." See "The Peaceful Liberation of Sinkiang," *People's Handbook*, 1950 (Shanghai: Ta-kung pao), tr. in *CB*, No. 365:44-46. But Saifudin, representing the East Turkestan Republic, was already in Peking. *The New York Times* (Sept. 25, 1949).

5. "Saifudin Reports on Local Nationalism at Enlarged Meeting of CCP Sinkiang Region Committee," *JMJP* (Dec. 26, 1957); in *CB*, No. 512.
6. *The New York Times* (Dec. 23, 1951); report by Henry Lieberman from Hong Kong entitled "Turkis liquidated by Sinkiang Reds." Burhan, chairman of the Sinkiang Provincial People's Government, had noted in a report of June 26, 1950, to the central government: "Since the Liberation, political and economic unification has gradually been achieved between the three areas of Ili, Tacheng, and Altai [and the rest of the province]...but owing to the long period of isolation in the past, this unity is not yet fully established. There is still inadequate unanimity in ideological trends and working attitudes of government cadres in all areas." *Ibid.* (Aug. 10, 1950).
7. In January 1950 Saifudin proceeded separately to Moscow to participate in these talks, and it was rumored that the Russians were demanding that the Chinese grant broad autonomy to their northwestern minorities. *Ibid.* (Jan. 29 and Apr. 28, 1950).
8. Osman was thought to be in close touch with American consular officials in Urumchi. Among the several reports written by American correspondents who visited him in his mountain hideout east of Urumchi, probably the most discerning was by Walter Sullivan, in *ibid.* (Apr. 18, 1949). For a valuable summary of the Kazakh situation at this time, see A. Doak Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (New York, 1963), Chap. 17: "Chinese Turkestan," pp. 236-281.
Osman was accused by the Chinese Communists of being "an armed spy of American imperialism in Sinkiang." Charges against him were carried in an NCNA dispatch of May 5, 1951, from Sian: "American Agent Osman Bator and Others Executed in Tihwa."
9. This "right wing" tendency is noted in Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, p. 219.

10. The conservatism of the Altai district was remarked upon in Wang Chih-lai 王治来, "Shih-lun chieh-fang ch'ien wo-kuo Ha-sa-k'o tsu ti she-hui hsing-chih" 試論解放前我國哈薩克族的社会性質 (A preliminary essay on the nature of Kazakh society in China before Liberation), *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh 民族團結* (Nationalities unity), No. 1:30-33 (Peking, 1963). For a map showing the various Kazakh autonomous units in the CPR, see U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *China: Provisional Atlas of Communist Administrative Units* (Washington, 1959), plate 2.
11. One of them, Yolbars, subsequently became "governor of Sinkiang province" in the Nationalist government on Taiwan.
12. Their forces were scattered in engagements with the PLA in May and June 1950. Some Kuomintang and Chinese Moslem troops (the latter from Kansu) were also involved. Osman held out in the rugged Tsinghai-Sinkiang border region until his capture in February 1951. He was publicly executed in Urumchi in April. It was from these mountain strongholds in the extreme south of the province that harried groups of refugees made their way to Kashmir. About 2,000 people were involved in this pitiful flight, in which many starved or froze. See Milton J. Clark, "How the Kazakhs Fled to Freedom," *National Geographic Magazine*, 106.5:621-644 (November 1954); and Godfrey Lias, "Kasakh Nomads' Struggle against Communism," *The Times* (London, Feb. 17 and 18, 1955).
13. The initial relationship between the two armies remains obscure: one Chinese Communist source says they "joined forces." Technically, the Republic had already been "liberated" before the arrival of the PLA. Saifudin is supposed to have said in November 1952, on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the beginning of the Ili revolt, that in August 1949 "the Ili armed forces had joined the Chinese Communist troops." *China News Analysis*, No. 103, citing *JMJP* (Nov. 19, 1952).
14. Chinese sources refer to the Great Horde as the "right" division and the Middle Horde as the "left" division of the Kazakhs. The Kazakhs (and the Kirghiz) enjoyed a relationship with the Ch'ing court which was unlike that of any other people inside or outside of China, being intermediate between subject nations (e.g., Tibet, Mongolia) and tributary states (Burma, etc.); as China's only Turkic nomads, they were to remain unique among China's peoples right down to the present day. For a full discussion of

government, sent a cable to Mao Tse-tung in which he declared the province's surrender, adding, "we will request the provincial government members now in Ili to return to Urumchi for cooperation." See "The Peaceful Liberation of Sinkiang," *People's Handbook*, 1950 (Shanghai: Ta-kung pao), tr. in *CB*, No. 365:44-46. But Saifudin, representing the East Turkestan Republic, was already in Peking. *The New York Times* (Sept. 25, 1949).

5. "Saifudin Reports on Local Nationalism at Enlarged Meeting of CCP Sinkiang Region Committee," *JMJP* (Dec. 26, 1957); in *CB*, No. 512.
6. *The New York Times* (Dec. 23, 1951); report by Henry Lieberman from Hong Kong entitled "Turkis liquidated by Sinkiang Reds." Burhan, chairman of the Sinkiang Provincial People's Government, had noted in a report of June 26, 1950, to the central government: "Since the Liberation, political and economic unification has gradually been achieved between the three areas of Ili, Tacheng, and Altai [and the rest of the province]...but owing to the long period of isolation in the past, this unity is not yet fully established. There is still inadequate unanimity in ideological trends and working attitudes of government cadres in all areas." *Ibid.* (Aug. 10, 1950).
7. In January 1950 Saifudin proceeded separately to Moscow to participate in these talks, and it was rumored that the Russians were demanding that the Chinese grant broad autonomy to their northwestern minorities. *Ibid.* (Jan. 29 and Apr. 28, 1950).
8. Osman was thought to be in close touch with American consular officials in Urumchi. Among the several reports written by American correspondents who visited him in his mountain hideout east of Urumchi, probably the most discerning was by Walter Sullivan, in *ibid.* (Apr. 18, 1949). For a valuable summary of the Kazakh situation at this time, see A. Doak Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (New York, 1963), Chap. 17: "Chinese Turkestan," pp. 236-281.
Osman was accused by the Chinese Communists of being "an armed spy of American imperialism in Sinkiang." Charges against him were carried in an NCNA dispatch of May 5, 1951, from Sian: "American Agent Osman Bator and Others Executed in Tihwa."
9. This "right wing" tendency is noted in Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia*, p. 219.

10. The conservatism of the Altai district was remarked upon in Wang Chih-lai 王治来, "Shih-lun chieh-fang ch'ien wo-kuo Ha-sa-k'o tsu ti she-hui hsing-chih" 試論解放前我國哈薩克族的社会性質 (A preliminary essay on the nature of Kazakh society in China before Liberation), *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh 民族團結* (Nationalities unity), No. 1:30-33 (Peking, 1963). For a map showing the various Kazakh autonomous units in the CPR, see U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *China: Provisional Atlas of Communist Administrative Units* (Washington, 1959), plate 2.
11. One of them, Yolbars, subsequently became "governor of Sinkiang province" in the Nationalist government on Taiwan.
12. Their forces were scattered in engagements with the PLA in May and June 1950. Some Kuomintang and Chinese Moslem troops (the latter from Kansu) were also involved. Osman held out in the rugged Tsinghai-Sinkiang border region until his capture in February 1951. He was publicly executed in Urumchi in April. It was from these mountain strongholds in the extreme south of the province that harried groups of refugees made their way to Kashmir. About 2,000 people were involved in this pitiful flight, in which many starved or froze. See Milton J. Clark, "How the Kazakhs Fled to Freedom," *National Geographic Magazine*, 106.5:621-644 (November 1954); and Godfrey Lias, "Kasakh Nomads' Struggle against Communism," *The Times* (London, Feb. 17 and 18, 1955).
13. The initial relationship between the two armies remains obscure: one Chinese Communist source says they "joined forces." Technically, the Republic had already been "liberated" before the arrival of the PLA. Saifudin is supposed to have said in November 1952, on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the beginning of the Ili revolt, that in August 1949 "the Ili armed forces had joined the Chinese Communist troops." *China News Analysis*, No. 103, citing *JMJP* (Nov. 19, 1952).
14. Chinese sources refer to the Great Horde as the "right" division and the Middle Horde as the "left" division of the Kazakhs. The Kazakhs (and the Kirghiz) enjoyed a relationship with the Ch'ing court which was unlike that of any other people inside or outside of China, being intermediate between subject nations (e.g., Tibet, Mongolia) and tributary states (Burma, etc.); as China's only Turkic nomads, they were to remain unique among China's peoples right down to the present day. For a full discussion of

- Dzungaria, the Kazakhs, and Ch'ing policy, see Hsiao I-shan 蕭一山, *Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih 清代通史* (General history of the Ch'ing dynasty), 3 vols. (Shanghai, 1928), II, 138-157.
15. A direct count of the Kazakhs was not made for China's 1953 census; the estimate is based on figures supplied by Kazakh leaders. A Soviet source (Kotov, *Autonomy of Local Nationalities in the CPR*) estimated China's Kazakh population at 500,000 in 1959; the same figure appears in contemporary Chinese Nationalist sources.
 16. Wang Wei-p'ing 王維屏 and Hu Ying-mei 胡英楣, *Hsin-chiang Wei-wu-erh tzu-chih ch'u 新疆維吾尔自治區* (The Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region; Peking, 1959), p. 46. A very good ethnographic map of the SUAR appears in *Central Asian Review*, 11.2:197 (1963).
 17. Under the old Manchu administration, the Altai district was not subject to the governor-general in Ili, as was the Tarbagatai district, but was administered together with the Kobdo region of western Outer Mongolia. It was not completely incorporated into Sinkiang until the advent of the Chinese Republic; in the late Ch'ing period, however, imperial officials at Ining sometimes, as in the treaty of 1881, spoke for the Altai-Kobdo region in their negotiations with the Russians. This separation was an additional factor in the perpetuation of the distinctiveness of the Altai Kazakhs.
 18. There is no general agreement among scholars with regard to the application of various Kazakh terms which refer to their social units. In using the term *uru* I follow Alfred E. Hudson, *Kazakh Social Structure* (Yale University Publications in Anthropology, No. 20; New Haven, 1938). Hudson, who did field work in the Alma Ata region, drew upon the considerable body of Russian material, mainly pre-Communist, on Kazakh society. To my knowledge, the Kazakhs in Sinkiang were never studied, either by Westerners or by Chinese, prior to the Communist period. A very good, recent summary of Kazakh society is to be found in Lawrence Krader, *Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads* (Indiana University Publications, Uralic and Altaic Series, Vol. 20; The Hague, 1963), pp. 178-286.
 19. The great expanse of the Kazakh steppe, and its correspondingly low population density, made the sociopolitical organization of the Kazakhs extremely sensitive to the intrusion of new forces into the steppe. The various Cossack

"lines" established by the Russians had the effect of limiting the movement of the Kazakhs and even of dividing them, thus reducing the size of the Kazakh group which possessed unrestricted internal communication and which could readily gather together. There is, moreover, a relationship between the completion in the eighteenth century of the "encirclement" of the Kazakh steppe by a series of Russian forts and the drift eastward of the Middle and Great Horde Kazakhs: in part they were already outside this line and in part they later broke out of it. The general process of the Russian advance is discussed in Richard A. Pierce, *Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960). Similarly, the establishment of Chinese Communist military colonies in Dzungaria had an immediate effect upon the Kazakhs, especially in restricting their freedom of movement, long before they themselves came under tight administrative control.

20. Wang Chih-lai, p. 31.
21. Lawrence Krader has thrown much light on the relationship between the society and economy of the Kazakhs, and those of other steppe pastoralists, in his *Peoples of Central Asia* (Indiana University Publications, Uralic and Altaic Series, Vol. 26; The Hague, 1963), esp. pp. 141ff.
22. This very high degree of separation and mutual exclusion between the nomadic and settled communities seems to be universal.
23. Wang Chih-lai.
24. The staying power of the Kazakh kin-community in the Soviet Union has been described in Irene P. Winner, "Some Problems of Nomadism and Social Organization Among the Recently Settled Kazakhs," *Central Asian Review*, 11.3:246-267 and 11.4:353-373 (1963).

III. Economic and Political Pattern of CPR Rule

1. For a statement of the Russian position, see A.G. Yakovlev, "K voprosu o national'no osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii narodov Sin'tszyana v 1944-1949" (On the question of the national liberation movement of the peoples of Sinkiang during 1944-1949), *Uchenye Zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniya* (Moscow, 1955), XI, 155-188. Cf. Saifudin, "How to Understand the Revolution in the Three Districts," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Nov. 13, 1951).

This CPSU interpretation of the take-over in the East Turkestan Republic may be shifting because of the Sino-Soviet split and the restlessness of Sinkiang's Kazakhs. Interestingly, a recent Soviet article makes it clear for the first time that the CCP had no hand in the revolt and that the CPSU was in effective control throughout. The article, by N.N. Mingulov, appeared in *Voprosy Istorii Kazakhstana I Vostochnogo Turkeстана* (Alma Ata, 1962). See abridged translation in the *Central Asian Review*, 11.2:181-195 (1963), cited above (Chap. 2, n. 2).

2. Wang Chen, "The Past Year in Sinkiang," *JMJP* (Peking, Oct. 1, 1950); in *CB*, No. 20.
3. K.F. Kotov, *Autonomy of Local Nationalities in the Chinese People's Republic: Citing As an Example the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region* (Moscow, 1959), tr. in U.S. Department of Commerce, JPRS (Washington, July 18, 1960), No. 3547:69, 72. This "reorganization" corresponds to the purge referred to above.

It would appear that, in effect, the organizational structure of the East Turkestan Republic was perpetuated for a time under the CCP, and that its reorganization was a fairly gradual process. Chinese nationalist observers take this circumstance as an indication of the colonization of Sinkiang by the Soviet Union.

Traces of the Republic are still discernible in the present-day administrative organization of the Ili chow, which is the only such unit in the CPR to comprise subsidiary districts (*chuan-ch'u* 专区). See *Jen-min shou-ts'ue* 1965 (Peking, 1965), p. 110.

4. See n. 2 above.
5. Han Tao-jen, "The Emancipation of Islamic Nationals in China," *JMJP* (June 6, 1952); in *CB*, No. 195. According to Saifudin (*Sinkiang jih-pao*, Nov. 13, 1951), only 1,000 of these cadres were "progressive."
6. The use of Cyrillic is confirmed in Ma Hsüeh-liang 馬學良, "Chin-nien lai wo-kuo shao-shu min-tsu wen-tzu fa-chan ti kai-k'uang" 近年來我國少數民族文字發展的概況 (General developments in the written languages of our national minorities in recent years), *Hsin chien-she* 新建設 (New construction), No. 4:65 (Peking, 1957). Compare "Sinkiang Government Passes Plan for Reform of Uighur and Kazakh Written Languages," *JMJP* (Feb. 10, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2198. Presumably the Arabic alphabet remained

in use among the small literate class in the more traditional milieu of Kazakh society which remained outside the range of strong Russian influence.

7. It seems clear that, in the long run, "regional autonomy" itself came to be considered a luxury which the CPR could not afford: thus, the actual content of regional autonomy constantly shrank in the years following its enshrinement as state policy in 1952 until it virtually disappeared during the years of the Great Leap Forward, 1958-1960. In practice, there was far less "autonomy of local nationalities" in the CPR than in the Soviet Union during these years, and the comparison seems to remain valid today. This accounts, in large measure, for the attractiveness of the Soviet Union for those of China's nationalities who were close enough to the frontier, as in Sinkiang, to be aware of the difference.
8. *Ch'un-chung jih-pao* 羣衆日報 (Masses daily; Sian, Nov. 7, 1951). It seems clear from the article in this paper by T'eh-li-ha-t'eh, head of the organizational department of the Ili Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, that the Russians had a hand in directing the activities of the SSFA. The CCP organization was extremely feeble in the areas of SSFA strength, so the party had little choice but to use the SSFA as best it could.
9. Shen Chun-ju, "General Report of the Central People's Government Mission to the Northwest," NCNA (Peking, Mar. 22, 1951); in *CB*, No. 69.
10. Tsu-lung-t'ai-yieh-fu, "The Magnificent Service Rendered by the PLA in Sinkiang Cannot be Obliterated by Local Nationalists!" *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Urumchi, Jan. 19, 1958); in *SCMP*, No. 1750. The Resist America-Aid Korea movement was also carried out among the Kazakhs.
11. "The Kazakh Nationality," *Ta-kung pao* (Shanghai, Aug. 11, 1952); in *SCMP*, No. 403.
12. Saifudin, "Achievements in Economic Construction in the Sinkiang Region," *JMJP* (Sept. 30, 1955); in *CB*, No. 365. The adoption of this policy (in Inner Mongolia as well as Sinkiang) coincided with the party's swing against "great Hanism," the tendency of Chinese cadres to look down upon their Kazakh colleagues and, in general, to be overzealous.
13. *Ibid.* Under the Nationalist government, it had been illegal for the Kazakhs to possess firearms. Saifudin estimated

that between 100,000 and 200,000 head of livestock had been lost to wolves each year.

14. Burhan, chairman of the Sinkiang People's Government, reported in 1955 that "the prices of animal husbandry products have been increased by 64 per cent compared with the days before Liberation" (speech to National People's Congress, in *CB*, No. 355). Though this statistic may be somewhat unreal, other indications suggest that the lot of the average herder who cooperated with the regime had improved.
15. Autonomous areas are the chief institutional feature of the CCP's national minority policy. They are similar to the republics of the Soviet Union, but are not, as are the latter, granted the constitutional right to secede. The establishment of an autonomous area for a minority in China theoretically sprang from the desires of the people itself and signaled its political maturity; this was a turning point in the Marxist-Leninist evolution of the minority, which was always to proceed on a voluntary basis. However, the dominant role of the CCP is everywhere apparent.
16. "Preparatory Committee of Kazakh Autonomous Area in Sinkiang Set Up in Ining," NCNA (Urumchi, May 6, 1954); in *SCMP*, No. 805.
17. Kotov, p. 88.
18. The Ili chou was the last of the Kazakh autonomous regions to be established. All of them were created during 1954. Aside from the Mu-lei Kazakh Autonomous Hsien and the Pa-li-k'un Kazakh Autonomous Hsien in eastern Sinkiang, there were the A-k'o-sai Kazakh Autonomous Hsien in Kansu and the Hai-hsi Mongol, Tibetan, and Kazakh autonomous chou in Tsinghai, but the actual Kazakh population in these two areas was very small. Kazakhs are also found in the several Mongol autonomous areas in Sinkiang, in the city of Urumchi, and elsewhere, but the overwhelming majority of China's half-million Kazakhs live in the Ili chou. See "Guide to Minority Nationalities and Autonomous Areas of Communist China," JPRS, No. 19,670 (June 12, 1963); in *Communist China Digest*, No. 93, pp. 1-44.
19. Kotov, p. 88. The number of Kazakh representatives at the provincial and national level was about right--in fact, generous--in proportion to population.

20. The "Regulations for the establishment of people's congresses and people's councils in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou, SUAR " were promulgated only in 1958. *Ili jih-pao*, No. 19 (Ining, June 1958). The establishment of these local government organs was supposed to precede the establishment of the corresponding autonomous area.
21. Kotov, pp. 129, 138. Lamentations over this problem were frequently heard from the SUAR Sub-Bureau of the party.
22. This is the figure given for 1952 in *Geographical Survey of Northwest China* (Moscow, 1957), tr. in JPRS, 1025 N, p. 143. Presumably, the petroleum and ores being shipped to the Soviet Union under the joint-stock company agreements are not counted as exports. *China News Analysis*, No. 103 (Hong Kong, Oct. 1955), gives an average figure of 92 per cent for the proportion of animal husbandry products in Sinkiang's total exports to the Soviet Union during the years 1949-1954.
- Saifudin stated in 1959, "During the nine years from 1950 to 1958, the total value of animal husbandry products for export [from Sinkiang] amounted to 46.7 per cent of the total value of exports from the whole region." Saifudin, "Sinkiang's Great Achievements in Agriculture in the Past Ten Years," *Chung-kuo nung-pao* (Chinese agriculture), No. 19 (Oct. 8, 1959); in *ECMM*, No. 193. The figure given by Saifudin apparently includes oil and minerals exported to the Soviet Union and suggests the scale of these shipments.
23. *Geographical Survey*, p. 143.
24. This phrase (from Mao) was used by Saifudin in a speech to the National People's Congress Standing Committee in 1960. NCNA (Peking, Apr. 5, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2238.
25. Saifudin, "Work Report of the SUAR People's Council," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Jan. 30, 1959); in JPRS, No. 1804.
26. These arrangements were reported by Burhan to the State Council in 1950, probably in June. His report is summarized in *The New York Times* (Aug. 10, 1950), in a dispatch from Hong Kong by Henry R. Lieberman.

Another source speaks of the establishment in the province of "a network of trade cooperatives...thus opening for the pastoral people a broad outlet for animal products." Tien Kwang-yi, "Thriving Animal Husbandry in Sinkiang," *JMJP* (Sept. 25, 1955); in *CB*, No. 365.

27. *Ibid.* Since the Kazakhs are particularly identified with sheep raising (though they also keep cattle, horses, camels, and goats), it is interesting to note that wool constituted over 50 per cent of Sinkiang's exports of animal husbandry products to the Soviet Union during 1949-1954. See *China News Analysis*, No. 103.
28. Saifudin, "Achievements in Economic Construction," cited in n. 12.
29. "Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region Struggles to Develop Pastoral Industry, *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh* (June 1959); in JPRS, No. 951 D. Sinkiang is China's second most important stock-breeding area, the first being Inner Mongolia; eastern Tibet is another important area for the livestock industry, which is widespread in China.
30. Two joint-stock companies were agreed upon in March 1950, "one for the prospecting and mining of nonferrous and rare metals, and one for the prospecting, extraction, and refining of petroleum"; the Sino-Soviet Aviation Company agreement reached at the same time was for operation of the Peking-Lanchow-Hami-Urumchi-Alma Ata line which included Ining as a stop in the Urumchi-Alma Alta sector. Howard L. Boorman, "The Borderlands and the Sino-Soviet Alliance," in Boorman *et al.*, *Moscow-Peking Axis* (New York, 1957), p. 180.
31. Many foreign observers, including Secretary of State Dean Acheson, were led to believe that the Russians would actually detach Sinkiang from China. *The New York Times* (Apr. 1, 1950). See also Li Chang (pseud.), "The Soviet Grip on Sinkiang," *Foreign Affairs*, 32.3: 490-503 (April 1954).
32. Wang Yeh-hsing and Ling K'o-feng, "The Great Friendship and Disinterested Aid," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Feb. 14, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2233.
33. Li Tung-yen, "Open Up the Mosowan Wasteland," *JMJP* (Sept. 18, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2348. Remains of an extensive Han settlement were also discovered by the corps in the Taklamakan desert of southern Sinkiang. "Detailed General Survey Made of Taklamakan Desert," NCNA (Urumchi, Mar. 16, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 1976.

IV. The Production-Construction Corps

1. Wang Chi-lung 王季龙, "Wei chin i-pu chia-ch'iang ko min-tsu ti t'uan-chieh kung-t'ung chien-she hsin Hsin-chiang erh nu-li" 为进一步加强各民族
的团结共同建设新新疆
而努力 (To further strengthen nationalities
unity and together strive to build a new Sinkiang),
Min-tsu t'uan-chieh, No. 12:8-10 (1961). Wang was
Chairman of the Political Committee, Sinkiang Production-
Construction Corps. See also *China News Analysis*,
Nos. 103 (October 1955) and 112 (December 1955).
State farms were also built by the military in
Heilungchiang province, Manchuria, but rarely elsewhere
in China.
2. Ellis Joffe, "The Communist Party and the Army," in
E. Stuart Kirby, ed., *Contemporary China*, 4:57 (Hong
Kong, 1961).
3. "PLA Construction Corps Scores Brilliant Success in
Opening Up Remote Northwest Region," NCNA (Urumchi,
July 31, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2312.
4. *China News Analysis*, No. 103:6. The corps' tractors
were, of course, Russian.
5. The NCNA release cited above ("PLA Construction Corps
Scores Brilliant Success") gives the figure of 10,000
kilometers of *trunk* irrigation canals. Soviet
technicians participated in the planning of the Sinkiang
farms. Saifudin, "Sinkiang's Great Achievements in
Agriculture in the Past Ten Years," *Chung-kuo nung-pao*,
No. 19 (Oct. 8, 1959); in *ECMM*, No. 193.
6. "The Sweat of the People's Fighters is Sprinkled
Everywhere North and South of the T'ien-shan";
"The Production Organized by the Corps is a Great
Contribution"; "People of All Nationalities in Sinkiang
Show Their Friendship for the PLA by Giving Fish and
Water, Blood and Flesh," *JMJP* (June 25, 1958), p. 4.
7. Reference has already been made to corps sites in the
Ili and Altai districts. A corps cattle farm in the
Tacheng (Tarbagatai) district is mentioned in the
Sinkiang jih-pao (Oct. 28, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2155.
The large-scale expansion of the sown area in
Tacheng is discussed in *JMJP* (Aug. 21, 1960); in *SCMP*,

No. 2328. It is more than likely that the corps had long been engaged in these projects.

8. The first figure is given in "Great Development in Agricultural and Pastoral Production During the Past Year in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou," NCNA (Urumchi, Dec. 2, 1955); in *SCMP*, No. 1186; the second in "Life of Kazakh People Leaps into New Stage," *JMJP* (June 21, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2050. There may be an inaccuracy in these figures, which would indicate an increase of more than 200,000 in the total population of the chou (which stood at 775,000 in 1955) between 1955 and early 1959. This seems excessive. It is clear, nevertheless, that the Kazakhs dropped from a majority to a minority position shortly after the establishment of their autonomous area. We shall return to the question of Han colonization farther on.
9. In 1930, the year the Turksib Railway was completed through adjacent Kazakhstan, Sinkiang-Soviet trade amounted to 32,000,000 rubles. At this time, 82.5 per cent of Sinkiang's trade was with the USSR. Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia* (Boston, 1950), pp. 67 and 172. Both the value and the percentage figures increased in the years that followed, and animal husbandry products always made up the great bulk of Sinkiang's exports.
10. The total number of livestock (probably excluding hogs) doubled between 1949 and 1959, when it reached seven million head. "Life of Kazakh People Leaps into New Stage," cited in n. 8 above.
11. Basil Davidson, *Turkestan Alive* (London, 1956), pp. 235-236.
12. "Great Development in Agricultural and Pastoral Production During the Past Year in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou," cited in n. 8 above. In Sinkiang as a whole there were 43 such state livestock farms in 1958; they possessed over 500,000 animals, roughly 2.5 per cent of the province's livestock. "High Survival Rate of Young Livestock in Sinkiang," NCNA (Urumchi, Aug. 13, 1958); in *SCMP*, No. 1835. Corps-owned livestock increased at a faster rate than national minority-owned livestock in subsequent years. The situation in the Ili chou, for which data are lacking, was probably comparable.

13. "Life of Kazakh People Leaps into New Stage," cited in n. 8. Such movements generally began in Inner Mongolia and then rolled over China's other pastoral regions to the west and southwest.
14. As late as 1960 the party could claim only 9,000 Kazakh CCP members spread among 200 branch organizations in the grasslands. "Party Members of Various Nationalities Active on the Forefront of Production and Rallying the Broad Masses to Push the Continuous Leap Forward in Production," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (July 1, 1960). This is, approximately, only one party member per 500 inhabitants, and the poor ideological preparation of even this small force, as we are frequently reminded by complaints from the SUAR sub-bureau of the party, left much to be desired. In China as a whole there were about ten times as many party members, on a per-capita basis, as among the Kazakhs.
15. Probably the Kazakhs stand about midway between the Mongols and the Tibetans (the latter being the most recalcitrant) in the degree of their resistance to the Chinese Communists, but in a broader sense these three peoples stand together as a special problem for the CCP, for they are as unmanageable in terms of the theoretical contrivances of the party as they are in practice.
16. An NCNA (Lanchow) story of May 6, 1954 (*SCMP*, No. 805), entitled "Kazakhs on Kansu-Tsinghai-Sinkiang Border Happily Settle Down," provides an example of how the party was able, with gifts of daily necessities and promises of land and cattle, to persuade a group of Kazakhs displaced from the Altai district to return to Sinkiang's grasslands. The story suggests some of the hardships suffered by Kazakhs driven away from their native pastures (in this case, according to the story, by Osman Bator). It may be presumed that the party did not exhibit such patience and generosity very long.

V. Reform of the Kazakh Herders

1. Typically, party theoreticians say that the (Marxist-Leninist) characteristics of nomad society are "still under discussion" while nevertheless making a rather meaningless application to the nomads of the party's general line on the national question--that of "catching

up" with the Han Chinese. See, for instance, Chia Ching-yen 賈敬顏, "Yu-mu min-tsu tsung-fa feng-chien kuan-hsi ti pen-chih shih shen-mo?" 游牧民族宗法封建关系的本质是什么 (What is the basic nature of the feudal relationships of the nomadic people's kinship structure?), *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh*, No. 1:34-36 (1963). Generally, the party took a pragmatic approach to China's 3.5 million nomads, whose traditional domains cover 40 per cent of the total area of the country, but it gradually came to the view that pastoral people's communes, representing a new contribution to Marxism-Leninism, were the answer: Li Tsung-hai, "Several Opinions Concerning the Pastoral Industry in the Minority Nationality Areas of Our Country," *Min-tsu yen-chiu* (Nationalities research), No. 1 (January 1959); in JPRS, No. 871 D. Conferences on these questions have been held periodically in Peking and Huhehot, capital of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

2. Wang Chi-lung 王季龙, "Wei chin i-pu chia-ch'iang ko min-tsu ti t'uan-chieh kung-t'ung chien-she Hsin-chiang erh nu-li" 为进一步加强各民族的团结共同建设新疆而努力 (To further strengthen nationalities unity and together strive to build a new Sinkiang), *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh*, 12:8, 9.
3. The Kazakh term for such conditions, when the steppe was buried under snow and both stream and springs were deeply frozen, is "red stallion." Wang Chih-lai 王治来, "Shih-lun chieh-fang ch'ien wo-kuo Ha-sa-k'o tsu ti she-hui hsing-chih" 试论解放前我国哈萨克族的社会性质 (A preliminary essay on the nature of Kazakh society in China before Liberation), *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh*, No. 1:31 (Peking, 1963).
4. Lawrence Krader has collected a wealth of material, pertinent to the general problem, in *Peoples of Central Asia* (Indiana University Publications, Uralic and Altaic Series, Vol. 26; The Hague, 1963). Krader deals only with Russian Central Asia. Neither the Kazakhs in Sinkiang nor the Dzungarian basin have been seriously studied, and, in contrast to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, there is little material available for such studies. A pioneering work on the geography of Sinkiang is now being prepared by Professor Herold Wiens of Yale University.
5. "Settled Life Brings Prosperity to Kazakh Herdsmen in Northwest China," NCNA (Urumchi, July 29, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2312. This village was most likely situated in the

- Altai district. One hundred and forty households would constitute an *uru* of average size.
6. "Great Development in Agricultural and Pastoral Production During the Past year in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou," NCNA (Urumchi, Dec. 2, 1955); in *SCMP*, No. 1186.
 7. Tien Kwang-yi, "Thriving Animal Husbandry in Sinkiang," *JMJP* (Sept. 25, 1955); in *CB*, No. 365.
 8. K.F. Kotov, *Autonomy of Local Nationalities in the Chinese People's Republic: Citing as an Example the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region* (Moscow, 1959), tr. in U.S. Department of Commerce, JPRS (Washington, July 18, 1960), No. 3547:127.
 9. "Socialist Transformation of Animal Husbandry in Sinkiang," NCNA (Urumchi, Nov. 9, 1957); in *SCMP*, No. 1652. Over two-thirds of Sinkiang's herders are Kazakhs: thus the pertinence of such statistics in the absence of detailed information on the Ili chou, the home of most of Sinkiang's Kazakhs. The usual figure for Sinkiang's pastoral population during the 1950's is 600,000 (*ibid.*), and at least 400,000 of these were Kazakhs. Thus, the Mongol and Kirghiz populations of the province (60,000 and 70,000, respectively, according to the 1953 census), as well as the much less numerous Tadjiks, were of secondary importance in Sinkiang's herding economy as compared with the Kazakhs.
 10. "Most Sinkiang Herdsmen in Cooperatives," NCNA (Urumchi, June 16, 1958); in *SCMP*, No. 1796.
 11. "Over Two Million Nomads of Minority Nationalities in China Have Settled Down," NCNA (Peking, Dec. 13, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2159.
 12. "Life of Kazakh People Leaps Into New Stage," *JMJP* (June 21, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2050.
 13. "Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region Struggles to Develop Pastoral Industry," *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh* (June 1959); in JPRS, 951 D.
 14. "Minority Herdsmen in Northwest China," NCNA (Urumchi, Sept. 6, 1963); in *SCMP*, No. 3057.
 15. To demonstrate how tentative all such statements must remain, because of the spotty and unreliable information available, we have only to quote from a statement made by a vice-chairman of the SUAR in 1960 to the effect that, with the development of the people's *communes*,

"the herdsmen *in general began* to settle down." (My italics.) Yang Ho-t'ing, "Work Report of the SUAR People's Council," delivered at the second session of the second People's Congress of the SUAR on May 28, 1960; in *Sinkiang jih-pao* (May 29, 1960). My objective in this book is first of all to establish working hypotheses and to indicate certain trends rather than to provide verifiable answers to specific questions.

16. Chang Shih-kung and Chao Huai-pi (First Secretary and Secretary, respectively, of the Ili Chou CCP Committee), "March Forward Singing Aloud," *JMJP* (June 21, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2050.
17. The evidence suggests that this was the case with all of China's minorities, although in the early years of the regime Western-trained ethnologists had attempted to relate specific societal forms among the minorities to their "socialist transformation." A steady drift toward an undifferentiated policy dictated from Peking, and framed more and more exclusively in terms of *China's* needs, is indicated.
18. Tao Chih-yo, "PLA Units Engaged in Production and Construction in Sinkiang Struggle to Realize Total Task of Transition Period," *JMJP* (Sept. 27, 1955); in *CB*, No. 365.
19. See n. 10 above. This division of labor was credited with having brought about a 30-per-cent increase in the annual income of members of the cooperatives.
20. In one of the few explicit references to this process I have seen, the corps was said to have "handed over to a local people's commune, without charge, the big farm it had established in the Tarim basin. The men who built up this farm have now set out for other parts of the Tarim basin to open up new farms." The report notes that the farm was established in 1956 "on the model of modern Soviet state farms." NCNA (Urumchi, Feb. 21, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2205.
21. Saifudin, "Ten Years of Progress in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region," *JMJP* (Oct. 25, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2140. By the end of the year the soft and rather self-satisfied attitude manifested here was to change abruptly, as we shall see.
22. "Socialist Transformation of Animal Husbandry in Sinkiang," cited in n. 9 above.

23. Kotov, p. 128.
24. See previous two references.
25. We have neither the reliable statistics nor the geographic and social data to attempt any serious calculations. But, to suggest the comprehensiveness of these new enterprises, let us assume that all (600,000) Sinkiang's herders are Kazakhs (about one-third are not) and that they belong to *uru* each of which contains 100 families of four. This would make 400 persons per *uru* and 1500 *uru* for Sinkiang. This number would be almost completely accounted for by the 1200 cooperatives, not to mention the various kinds of state livestock farms.
26. For instance, see n. 7 above, and "Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou Calls Conference on Cooperative Production," NCNA (Ining, July 4, 1955); in *SCMP*, No. 1087.
27. See n. 14 above. New grazing areas could, however, be opened up by means of drilling wells to provide water for the herds. In the past, some grassy areas could not be utilized because they were too distant from available watering points.
28. Wang Chih-lai, in his study of Kazakh society already cited, has observed that the clan tended to disintegrate in areas (notably in parts of Ili and, to a lesser extent, Tacheng) where appreciable numbers of Kazakhs turned to agriculture, whereas it remained strong in the purer herding areas (Altai, Palikun, etc.).
29. "Most Sinkiang Herdsmen in Cooperatives," cited in n. 10 above.
30. "The Sweat of the People's Fighters...." *JMJP* (June 25, 1958).
31. Wang Chi-lung, p. 10.
32. "Socialist Transformation of Animal Husbandry in Sinkiang," cited in n. 9 above.
33. The pastoral people's communes were, of course, instituted because the communes had become an immediate requirement for all China rather than because the Kazakhs were considered particularly prepared for them at that time. In general, CCP policies do not take account of local differences; they are concerned less and less with these differences as time goes on. Tibet has been an exception not because it is different but because the party lacked power there.

34. Li Tsung-hai, "Several Opinions Concerning the Pastoral Industry in the Minority Nationality Areas of Our Country," cited in n. 1 above.

VI. Reform of the Kazakh Intellectuals

1. From the phrase, "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools [of thought] contend," used by Mao Tse-tung in February 1957. See Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals* (London and New York, 1960).
2. Here, as elsewhere in this book, the term "intellectual" is used broadly to denote an individual with formal education or technical skill. I believe that among the Kazakhs in the three districts a correspondence could be established, provided more data were available, between such intellectuals and those persons who were literate in Kazakh as written in the Cyrillic alphabet, or in Russian.

The number of Kazakh "intellectuals" may have been on the order of 10,000. This is suggested by data pertaining to membership in the Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy, the political party led by Akhmedjan which functioned during the era of the East Turkestan Republic. According to this data there were more than 20,000 Kazakh members of the League, and at least half of them were not cattlemen. See "The Uprising in Northwest Sinkiang, 1944-1949," *Central Asian Review*, 11.2:191 (1963).

3. This is not to deny that the differences between the positions of the CPSU and the CCP on the national question (the status of nationalities in a formerly multinational empire--as Russia or China--which had become a socialist state) were important; they were to become sharply focused in the rectification campaign in the Ili chou, as we shall see. But the Chinese innovations (especially "regional autonomy" as opposed to "federal republic") had been extensively rationalized by the CCP and tacitly accepted by the Russians; in any case, these theoretical positions were of scant importance in the formulation of actual policies. As John De Francis, writing in 1951, sagely observed, the content of "regional autonomy" would be determined by the way it was carried out in practice

("National and Minority Policies," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 277: 146-155). And it was in practice that the Chinese and Russians came to the parting of the ways in the Ili chou in 1956-1957. By contrast, the cooperatives and the drive toward industrialization which had characterized Chinese policy up until this time were nothing new to the Soviet experience.

4. It need not be assumed that the party foresaw the exact character of the rectification campaign in the Ili chou, but it had prepared itself as best it could for any possible contingency. Local party organizations had to be ready at any moment to implement any line which might suddenly capture the imagination of the party leadership in Peking, no matter how ill suited the particular policy might be to local conditions. The local committees had to exert themselves at all times to build power wherever the opportunity presented itself, with the long-range objective of maximizing their authority always in mind.
5. This is an extremely murky question. Saifudin is one of what must have been a considerable number of CPSU members who joined the CCP in 1949-1950. His gyrations at this time suggest that the change-over raised problems for Moscow and Peking as well as for himself, but there is no evidence that they were, in the strict sense of the word, ideological problems. Another curious matter is the position of Soviet nationals in the Ili chou.
6. Of course, this peculiarly *Chinese Communist* initiative which we see gaining momentum in the Ili chou is reinforced, if not indeed caused, by developments in Sino-Soviet relations at a level quite removed from local problems.
7. Among the Han Chinese (in Sinkiang, too), persons of bourgeois, or rightist ideology were the target of attack. An intriguing question which cannot be gone into here is the extent to which this upsurge of "nationalistic" sentiment among China's minorities represented an awareness of national distinctiveness directly stimulated by the (Communist) Han Chinese and the party's nationalities policy, inasmuch as a sense of national identity seems to have been rather uncommon among these peoples before 1949. From a theoretical point of view, of course, it was quite proper for the CCP to create sentiments of "bourgeois nationalism" in order that they could be "overcome."

8. "Saifudin Reports on Local Nationalism at Enlarged Meeting of CCP Sinkiang Committee," *JMJP* (Dec. 26, 1957); in *CB*, No. 512.
9. Hsia Fu-jen, "Marxism vs. Nationalism in Sinkiang--A Major Debate," *Kuang-ming jih-pao* (Peking, Apr. 10, 1958); in *SCMP*, No. 1764.
10. "Minority Students of Young Communist League Institute Refute Local Nationalism in Debate," *Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien pao* (China youth; Feb. 10, 1958); in *SCMP*, No. 1718.
11. "Why Is It Necessary to Oppose Local Nationalism?" *JMJP* (June 27, 1958); in *CB*, No. 512.
12. Wang En-mao (First Secretary, CCP Sinkiang Sub-Bureau), "Struggle to Implement the Party's Marxist-Leninist Line for the Solution of the Nationalities Question," *JMJP* (June 27, 1958); in *CB*, No. 512.
13. *Ibid.*
14. "Saifudin Counters Local Nationalist Tendencies," *NCNA* (Peking, Dec. 26, 1957); in *SCMP*, No. 1681.
15. "Judicial Work Conference in SUAR Brings Up Programs for this Winter and Next Spring," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Oct. 16, 1957); in *SCMP*, No. 1700, also summarized in *The New York Times* (Jan. 30, 1958). Indeed, there do seem to have been "major uprisings" at this time in Sinkiang, as Chiang Kai-shek asserted in May 1958 (*The New York Times*, July 5, 1958), for "counter-revolutionary uprisings" are mentioned in the *Sinkiang jih-pao* of Aug. 25, 1958 (*SCMP*, No. 1881) as having occurred in the past. However, we remain ignorant about just what took place. Probably the main culprits were Han and Uighur entrepreneurs and landlords, as well as persons undergoing "reform through labor"; the Kazakhs do not seem to have been involved to any important extent except, perhaps, in the towns.
16. Chang Shih-kung and Chao Huai-pi, "March Forward Singing Aloud," *JMJP* (June 21, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2050.
17. In *Ili jih-pao*, cited in n. 19 below. This anti-Uighur sentiment is notable for several reasons which we can mention here only in passing. It suggests a Kazakh nationalism embracing Kazakhs on both sides of the Sino-Soviet frontier as opposed to the pan-Turki, Dzungaria-oriented East Turkestan Republic. It would also seem to represent a rejection of the Uighurs as agents of the CCP: "The Uighur nationality occupies the same [leading] position in Sinkiang as the

Han in the whole country" (Burhan, in speech to National People's Congress, July 24, 1955; in *CB*, No. 355). Finally, it echoes the old antipathy of the nomads for agriculturalists, who now seem to be crowding onto their steppes on an unprecedented scale. All of these factors are consistent with a growing power of attraction for Sinkiang's Kazakhs of the Kazakhs in the Soviet Union. The labeling of the Han Chinese as "the distant enemy" would seem to support our contention that the CCP was weak in the Soviet-oriented, western portion of the Ili chou, and particularly in the city of Ining.

18. "Sinkiang Scores Big Victory in Fight Against Local Nationalism," *Kuang-ming jih-pao* (Sept. 11, 1958); in *SCMP*, No. 1873.
19. Li Hui-yu, "The Ili Autonomous Chou Has Very Extensive Powers; Why Do the Local Nationalists Say It Has No Powers?" *Ili jih-pao* (Ining, Aug. 30, 1958).
20. "Speedily Build Sinkiang into an Industrial and Cotton-Producing Base"; "Comrade Saifudin Transmits Momentous Call of Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region Party Committee to over 1,000 Party-Member Cadres in Ining," *Ili jih-pao* (June 21, 1958).
21. See, for instance, Wang En-mao, "Struggle to Implement the Party's Marxist-Leninist Line for the Solution of the Nationalities Question," *JMJP* (June 27, 1958); in *CB*, No. 512. These differences are dealt with in detail in Chang Chih-i 張執一, *Chung-kuo ko-ming ti min-tsu wen-t'i ho min-tsu cheng-ts'e chiang-hua* 中國革命的民族問題和民族政策講話(提綱) (The nationalities question in the Chinese revolution and nationalities policy discussed; Peking, 1956). A translation of Chang's book has been made by the author. See *The Party and the National Question in China*, ed. and tr. George Moseley (Cambridge, Mass., 1966).
22. Chia Ho-ta, "Report on the Question of Stamping Out All Counter-Revolutionaries in Sinkiang" (Report to the Third Plenary Session of the First CPPCC [Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference] Committee for the SUAR on May 23, 1956), *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Urumchi, May 26, 1956).
23. Kazakh denationalization, it must be said, was altogether a different proposition in poor, backward, and overcrowded China from what it was in the Soviet Union.

24. Looked at the other way, of course, the CCP's deviation, in the sense of its usurpation of legitimate Kazakh leadership, had been developing in the grasslands at the expense of the Soviet-oriented Kazakh intelligentsia.
25. We have already remarked upon the similarities between the herding economy of the Ili chou and that of Inner Mongolia and Tibet. Another set of parallels exists between the Ili chou (and all of Sinkiang) and Manchuria: both were the scene of protracted and heavy Soviet influence and of large-scale activity of the Production-Construction Corps. However, there was no significant nationalities problem in Han-Chinese-dominated Manchuria. This meant that Russian penetration in Manchuria could only be of a superficial, colonial character. This contrast points up the importance of the national minorities in China's border regions.
26. "People of All Nationalities in Ining Indignantly Refute Crimes of Chia-ho-ta Anti-Party Group," *Ili jih-pao* (Aug. 26, 1958). "Blooming and contending" had taken place between the nationalities--including, presumably, Kazakh herders--and the Production-Construction Corps during 1957. See, for instance, "Units of Production Corps in Urumchi Solve over 60 Questions to Improve Relations with Local Residents," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Sept. 5, 1957); in *SCMP*, No. 1661.
27. Pathan Sugurpaev, a Kazakh deputy to the National People's Congress, reported to that body in early 1958 that fifty to sixty thousand cadres in Sinkiang would be relegated to lower posts or to manual labor in the course of the rectification campaign. *China News Analysis*, No. 238 (July 25, 1958), citing *JMJP* (Feb. 14, 1958). At one point, however, Saifudin had suggested that it might not be feasible to re-educate "those who demand independence": "Saifudin Reports on Local Nationalism at Enlarged Meeting of CCP Sinkiang Committee," *JMJP* (Dec. 26, 1957); in *CB*, No. 512.
28. The party also struck vigorously at the Uighur Moslems: "Enlarged Conference of CPPCC Committee and Islamic Federation in Sinkiang Fight Local Nationalism," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Mar. 10, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 1998. The session opened in August 1958 and lasted six and a half months. This movement was echoed in the Ili chou: "Thoroughly Purge the Religious Circles of Hidden Counter-Revolutionaries," *Ili jih-pao* (Mar. 16, 1959). It is doubtful that the Kazakhs, who were immensely

less serious about Islam than were the Uighurs, were implicated; numerous Chinese Moslems (Tungans) were involved, however.

This issue is somewhat peripheral to our main theme, but the rivalry between Kazakhs and Uighurs was, in the populous southwestern sector of the Ili chou, a significant problem which has influenced, though in ways that are not altogether clear, the pattern of CCP control over the Ili chou. As a general hypothesis, it may be said that "big" Han colonialism in Sinkiang smothered the "local" colonialism of the Uighurs vis-à-vis the Kazakhs. However, the Uighurs, who constituted 70 per cent of the population of Ining in 1960, which then stood at over 100,000 (Wang Fu-tsun, "Ining--A Garden City," *China Reconstructs*, March 1960), remain an important factor in the affairs of the Ili chou.

29. The deviation here of Maoism from classical Marxism-Leninism lies in the fact that the Chinese intended that the minorities should skip over the stage of capitalism--precisely that stage in which the proletariat was supposed to emerge. Thus, there is no theoretical "truth" to be found behind all the verbal fog of the rectification campaign, which only served to disguise Han Chinese nationalism. The specific deviation from the practice of the CPSU, however, is in the communes.
30. In the case of the Ili chou, this meant a Kazakh Communist Party. Denying this demand for other reasons, the CCP made the valid point that "local nationalism"--for example, of the Mongols in the Ili chou vis-à-vis the Kazakhs--also existed.
31. As one local nationalist is supposed to have said, "Sinkiang does not need Han people....If we do not have enough people [to build socialism] we can call back the Uighurs and Kazakhs from the Soviet Union." See "News from Urumchi," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (May 28, 1958); in *CB*, No. 512.
32. However, because of opposition by the intelligentsia, the party's language reform had still not, by January 1965, been completely implemented. See Victor Zorza in *The Guardian* (Jan. 20, 1965), citing a broadcast from Urumchi; and two NCNA items (Urumchi, Jan. 23, 1965) on the new Uighur and Kazakh written languages, in *SCMP*, No. 3386. It had been anticipated by the Sinkiang authorities that

the adoption of the Latin alphabet for these languages would require several years.

33. There is a similarity between the position of the Cyrillic alphabet among the Kazakh intelligentsia and the position of the *uru* among the more traditional Kazakhs in the grasslands. Both were obstacles to the implementation of the party's program for the Kazakh people and both are ignored in the pertinent Chinese Communist literature.
34. If there had been an earlier popularization of the Latin alphabet (current for many years, it should be remembered, in Turkey itself), this would have simplified the transition to Cyrillic. See Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantai Quelquejay, *The Evolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the USSR and Their Linguistic Problems*, tr. Col. Geoffrey Wheeler (Central Asian Research Centre, London, 1961).
35. Cha-ke-lo-fu (Director of the Language Reform Committee for the SUAR), "Strive for the Successful Realization of the Leap Forward Language Reform Plan," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Mar. 23, 1960). The party was of course, using this example to overcome the resistance of the same nationalities to the change from Cyrillic back to Latin.
36. *The New York Times* (Oct. 20, 1963).
37. *Ili jih-pao* (Aug. 30, 1958), cited above. Resistance was obviously widespread. A Soviet report in the Kazakh-language *Sotsialistik Kazakhstan* (Alma Ata) of Oct. 10, 1963, said that within two years of the beginning of the antilocal nationalist drive in 1958 "about 80 per cent of the writers in the Union of Sinkiang Writers [which had been formed only in 1957] had been branded as 'nationalists.'" Presumably, these people (Uighurs and others as well as Kazakhs opposed the switch from Cyrillic to Latin. The report adds: "First they were taken to the camps for re-education through labor, but later they were sent to villages where they were put to hard menial labor under armed guards."
38. "State Council Resolution on Promulgation of Draft Han Language Phoneticization Plan" (as passed by the State Council on Nov. 1st), *JMJP* (Dec. 11, 1957); in *CB*, No. 486. Chou made it clear that no exceptions would be made in the application of the new plan to the minority languages. The party's policy on this question has been discussed by Henry G. Schwartz, "Communist Language Policies for China's Ethnic Minorities: The First Decade," *The China Quarterly*, No. 12:170-182 (October-December 1962).

39. "Sinkiang Government Passes Plan for Reform of the Uighur and Kazakh Written Languages," *JMJP* (Feb. 10, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2198.
40. "Language Reform for Sinkiang's Nationalities," NCNA (Urumchi, June 21, 1958); in *SCMP*, No. 1799.
41. "Adoption of New Uighur and Kazakh Languages on the Basis of Han Language Phoneticization Plan Suggested," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Dec. 17, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2182. Here, as elsewhere, the real issue was obscured: "The conference passed by a unanimous vote a suggestion on the replacement of the current Uighur and Kazakh languages *which were written by means of the Arabic alphabet* by new written languages based on the Han language phoneticization plan" (my italics).
42. Speech by Saifudin on Dec. 11, 1960, to the same forum referred to above. *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Mar. 21, 1960).
43. "A Good Start for the Fundamental Reform of the Languages of the Minority Nationalities in the SUAR," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Dec. 17, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2182. The distinction claimed here between reactionary and progressive assimilation is strictly metaphysical.

VII. The Communes and The Great Leap Forward

1. Wang En-mao, "Long Live the People's Commune," *JMJP* (Feb. 5, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2199. Wang's statement followed the appearance of serious resistance to the commune movement in Sinkiang.
2. "Directive of the CCP Sinkiang Committee on Conducting Publicity with Fanfare in Favor of the General Line for Socialist Construction," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (June 6, 1958); in *CB*, No. 521.
3. "CCP Committee of SUAR Issues a Directive Concerning Preparations for Achieving a Still Bigger Leap Forward in Agricultural and Pastoral Production Next Year," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (July 28, 1958); in *CB*, No. 521.
4. Saifudin, "Work Report of the SUAR People's Council," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Jan. 30, 1959); in *JPRS*, No. 1804.
5. There were some 10,000 nationality cadres, half of the total, in the chou administration (not party) at the time of the rectification campaign; they predominated at the lower levels. Li Hui-yu, "The Ili Autonomous Chou Has Very Extensive Powers; Why Do the Local Nationalists Say It Has

No Powers?" *Ili jih-pao* (Ining, Aug. 30, 1958). Compare this figure with the 17,000 "veteran cadres" of the East Turkestan Republic retained by the CCP (*JMJP*, June 6, 1952). Many of these, however, were scarcely touched by Marxism-Leninism, as the party itself admitted. We do not have any comprehensive figures for party membership in the chou, but the situation seems clear.

6. Hsia Fu-jen, "Marxism vs. Nationalism in Sinkiang--A Major Debate," *Kuang-ming jih-pao* (Peking, Apr. 10, 1958); in *SCMP*, No. 1764. At least as early as 1955, higher officials were being transferred from Peking to Sinkiang on a considerable scale, (*China News Analysis*, No. 103, October 1955), but this movement would seem to have been modest in comparison with what was to follow. In 1956 a major proportion of the nationality cadres in Sinkiang had, according to the *China News Analysis*, No. 238 (July 1958), been downgraded because of friction with the Han.
7. Not completely, for the Soviet consulates were to remain in the three districts for another four years, and Russian technicians for at least another two years, but the influence of the Soviet Union was waning irretrievably.
8. "Life of Kazakh People Leaps into New Stage," *JMJP* (June 21, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2050.
9. "Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region Struggles to Develop Pastoral Industry," *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh* (June 1959); in *JPRS*, No. 951 D.
10. "Work Report of the SUAR People's Council," delivered by Saifudin on Jan. 22, 1959: *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Jan. 30, 1959); in *JPRS*, No. 1804. In contrast to these claims, an NCNA dispatch from Urumchi of Dec. 30, 1959, said that sixty per cent of Sinkiang's herders had by that time "settled down in new homes or fixed encampments." Subsequent reports suggest that some of Sinkiang's nomads remained unsettled for several years following the introduction of communes.
11. "Enlarged Session Held by CCP Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region Committee to Carry Out Spirit of Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth CCP Central Committee," NCNA (Urumchi, Jan. 12, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 1938.
12. "Over Two Million Nomads of Minority Nationalities in China Have Settled Down," NCNA (Peking, Dec. 13, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2159.

13. "Like a Family," *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh*, No. 12 (December 1959); in JPRS, No. 3130.
14. "Red Banner on the Grasslands," *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh*, No. 12 (December 1959); in JPRS, No. 3130. This story of a model commune discusses the resistance of the herders and lamas to the formation of the cooperatives which preceded the commune. However inappropriately, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region has been consistently held up as a model for Sinkiang's pastoral areas.
15. Saifudin's "Work Report," cited in n. 4 above.
16. "Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region Struggles to Develop Pastoral Industry," cited in n. 9 above.
17. The Ili Area CCP Committee was the only one fully represented at the meeting. "Sinkiang Party Committee Calls Meeting on Socialist Education and Overhaul of Communes," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Nov. 25, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2167. It is our thesis that the formation of pastoral people's communes in the Ili chow really only began with this movement.
18. Fu Wen, "Unfold the Socialist Education Movement and Carry the Struggle Between the Two Roads to the End in the Rural Areas," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Nov. 26, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2167. Some of this criticism of the communes was apparently ideological in nature. It probably came from those "Marxist-Leninists" still infected with Soviet theory. "In giving explanations [to justify the communes]," this article observes, "it will be impermissible to cite verbatim the propaganda materials published by the upper levels without reference to the kinds of persons [being criticized]. Doing so will be a dogmatic method of propaganda which will not lead to any good result."
19. "The anti-rightist socialist struggle launched in the fall of 1959 was a continuation of the socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts." It "safeguarded the unity of the Party, the general line, the Great Leap Forward, and the people's communes": Lu Chien-jen, "Hold Higher the Three Red Banners of the General Line, the Great Leap Forward, and the People's Communes, and March Forward with Big Strides Cheerfully," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Oct. 3, 1960). It was the successor movement to the "rectification" campaign and, like it, was a nationwide undertaking.

20. In using the terms "unhistorical" and "de-historicize" my intention is to convey the idea of the minority transferring the historical identity it once had to the larger national entity. This does not mean that the minority ceases to have a history but only that it ceases to be a discrete maker of history. Indeed, the actual history of the minority might be glorified at the same time that the nationality became "de-historicized" and "unhistorical" in the sense I have assigned to these terms.

The forceful amalgamation of the Kazakhs implied by the multinational character of the communes marked an abrupt departure from the CCP's earlier conception of the minority nationalities as groups within the "united front" of the CPR. With this policy shift, the evolution of the Kazakhs entered a more intense phase of "struggle"; this latter phase, however, appears to have faded out by the end of 1962, giving way, in turn, to a renewed emphasis on united front work. See the summary of the results of a nationalities work conference in *JMJP* (June 1, 1962), p. 1. But the intermixing of nationalities in the communes continues to be praised.

21. "Sinkiang Party Committee Calls Meeting on Socialist Education and Overhaul of Communes," cited in n. 17 above.
22. In the case of a Uighur commune near Hami, the new economic institutions were explicitly credited with breaking down the patriarchal system because "wages are paid by the commune to the individuals." "Two Years of Progress...Has Brought Great Changes to the Hami Hungchuan People's Commune in Sinkiang," *JMJP* (Feb. 26, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2216.

In recent years (1963-1964), however, a process of devolution has been observable in the organization of communes in China as a whole, with the production brigade becoming once again the basic accounting unit. It would not be surprising to find, therefore, that elements of the *uru* social structure have survived in Dzungaria, just as they have in the Soviet Union.

23. Li Tsung-hai, "Several Opinions Concerning the Pastoral Industry in the Minority Nationality Areas of Our Country," *Min-tsu yen-chiu*, No. 1 (Jan. 12, 1959); in *JPRS*, No. 871 D.

24. "The method of calculating livestock in terms of shares and paying dividends should be changed into the method of fixing the price of the livestock and paying interest" (Saifudin in his "Work Report of the SUAR People's Council" of January 1959, cited in n. 4 above). He later said, without mention of interest payments, that the livestock had been simply "bought by the communes at a certain price." Saifudin, "Ten Years of Progress in the SUAR," *JMJP* (Oct. 25, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2140. In some cases, small, private herds were permitted. "Sum Up the Stock-Breeding Experiences and Bring About A Great Development," *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh*, No. 6 (June 1961); in *SCMM*, No. 273. Presumably, one of the "three levels" of ownership mentioned in the above quotation was private ownership, the other two being production-brigade and commune ownership.
25. During 1960, this work was concentrated in the Ili chou: "Ili, Tacheng, and Po-erh-t'a-la [a Mongol autonomous chou separate from the Ili chou] are the three principal areas to be exploited by the Production Corps this year." "Large Labor Force Organized to Exploit New Reclamation Areas in Sinkiang," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Jan. 13, 1960). The Altai district had long been the scene of corps activity.
26. "A Million Migrants Settle in Border Regions," *JMJP* (Dec. 2, 1958); in *SCMP*, No. 1920.
27. "Comrade Saifudin's Speech at Meeting to Welcome Kiangsu and Hupeh Comfort Delegations," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Nov. 1, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2155.
28. "Work Report of the SUAR People's Council," cited in n. 10 above.
29. "Text of Speech at Second Session, Second NPC, by Saifudin," *NCNA* (Peking, Apr. 5, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2238. This was a regular theme in official discussions of the Great Leap Forward in Sinkiang.
30. "Work Report of SUAR People's Council," delivered by Yang Ho-t'ing, SUAR Vice Chairman, to Second Session, Second NPC Congress, *Sinkiang jih-pao* (May 29, 1960).
31. Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia* (Boston, 1950), p. 95. For a discussion of the impact of railroads on China's borderlands, see Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1951), pp. 414ff.

32. This balancing act between economic dependence on the Soviet Union and political dependence (in a formal sense) on China was, as we have seen, especially noteworthy in the case of the three districts.

The rail line was, of course, being used for Lanchow-Sinkiang traffic before it reached Hami, with passengers and goods being trucked on westward from the last station reached by the railroad. For instance, traffic was opened as far as the Hungliu River on the Kansu-Sinkiang border in October 1958. "Big Progress of Capital Construction in Sinkiang," NCNA (Urumchi, Jan. 15, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 1937.

33. "Hami in Sinkiang Becomes an Industrial City," NCNA (Urumchi, Jan. 1, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2171.
34. "Booming Town on China's New Railway," NCNA (Hami, July 30, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2312.
35. An NCNA dispatch from Hami of Jan. 1, 1960, noted the presence of the Russian, G.S. Dobashin. "Railway Extended to New East Sinkiang Industrial City," *SCMP*, No. 2171.
36. Wang En-mao, "We Must Continue to Take a Big Leap Forward This Year," speech at the Second Session, Second SUAR People's Congress on June 2, 1960, *Sinkiang jih-pao* (June 20, 1960). "Native railways" and "light railways," in addition to principal branch lines, are mentioned in his report.

A black-top road connects Urumchi with Tushantze, 250 kilometers to the west, where a refinery processes oil piped in from Karamai. Karamai was within the Ili chou as originally constituted, but in 1958 it was detached from the chou and made into a separate municipality under SUAR administration. This "municipality" is 300 kilometers from north to south; with Karamai as its center, it embraces most of the oil wells of Dzungaria, as well as Tushantze, the refining center directly south of Karamai at the foot of the T'ien shan. The Karamai oil field had been discovered by a Kazakh nomad before Liberation. Shih Man, "Random Notes on Karamai," *Kung-jen jih-pao* (Peking, Apr. 28, 1961); in *SCMP*, No. 2505.

37. It was reported in 1960 that the roadbed on the 510-kilometer Urumchi-Aktogay sector had been completed, but it appears that track was never laid on the Chinese side of the frontier. "General Conditions in Northwest China

under Chinese Communist Rule," *Communist China, 1960* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute), 2:186. It is to be observed that 1960 was also the year of the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China.

38. "Text of Speech at Second Session of Second NPC by Saifudin," cited in n. 29 above. The population of Urumchi, which had risen from 80,000 to 200,000 between 1949 and April 1959, jumped to 700,000 by April 1961. In 1958 Urumchi "municipality" was enlarged nearly seven times to 640 square kilometers, mainly in a northwesterly direction along the base of the T'ien shan. In 1961 Urumchi was said to have over 200 factories, most important of which was a textile mill of 100,000 spindles.
39. In April 1961 a correspondent from Peking proudly described the vista of Urumchi as follows: "Looking toward the west from K'unlun Reception House, you can see that a new railway station has been built at the foot of the mountain and is waiting for the arrival of trains from the east. This is something that has been longed for by the people of Sinkiang for several decades....By the time all the track has been laid, the trains which will come from the capital will bring to the people of Sinkiang various kinds of assistance. But from here, farm crops produced in the Tarim and Dzungaria basins, the oil of the Karami oilfields, and sheep wool and mineral products of the T'ien Shan, Altai, and K'unlun mountains, the grapes of Turfan, the apples of Ili...will be shipped to various parts of the mother country in a continuous stream."
40. Li Ming-hao, "To Aid the Border Regions Is to Aid the Socialist Construction in the Entire Country," *JMJP* (Apr. 16, 1960); in *CB*, No. 626.
41. "Sinkiang Production Troops Go All Out to Build Sinkiang," *JMJP* (July 31, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2318. One may imagine that this project would not have won the favor of the Soviet citizens downstream.
42. See n. 40 above.
43. "The demand of every commune for truck transportation facilities and the demand of every production brigade for telephone service have basically been met." Lu Chien-jen, "Hold Higher the Three Red Flags," cited in n. 19 above. His remark was made with reference to the SUAR as a whole.

44. "Urban People's Communes Triumphantly Established in Ining Municipality," *Ili jih-pao* (Apr. 27, 1960).
45. "Eleventh and Twelfth Streets in Ining Municipality Embark on the Road to Collective, Happy Life," *Ili jih-pao* (Mar. 31, 1960).
46. "Speech by First Secretary of CCP Ili District Committee Chang Shih-kung Concerning Over-All Organization of Production and Livelihood of Urban Residents at an On-the-Spot Conference," *Ili jih-pao* (Mar. 31, 1960).
47. In the Altai district alone, 300,000 square meters of new buildings were erected during the five years between the establishment of pastoral people's communes in the fall of 1958 and September 1963. "People's Communes in Sinkiang Have More Livestock," NCNA (Urumchi, Sept. 9, 1963); in *SCMP*, No. 3059.
48. Wang En-mao, "Long Live the People's Commune," cited in n. 1 above.
49. "Mess Halls Are Better Run Than Ever in the Agricultural and Pastoral Areas of Sinkiang," *JMJP* (June 5, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2282. "Many mess halls not only are the places where the commune members take their meals, but also centers of political, economic, and cultural life of the commune members. There, meetings are held, study is conducted, and recreational activities are carried out. The mess halls are being gradually turned into strong fortresses for socialism, and will play a tremendous role in insuring the high-speed development of communal production and the consolidation and development of the commune system." "Communal Mess Halls Operated with Increasingly Better Results," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Apr. 21, 1960).
50. "Work Report of SUAR People's Council," delivered by Yang Ho-t'ing, cited in n. 30 above.
51. "Mess Halls Are Better Run Than Ever," cited in n. 49 above. By June 1960 over 400,000 children were being cared for in 26,503 nurseries and kindergartens throughout the SUAR. Pathan Sugurpaev, "Launch the Mass Movement on a Large Scale to Realize a Continuing Leap Forward in Political and Judicial Work," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (June 4, 1960).
52. "Communal Mess Halls in Sinkiang Operated with Increasingly Better Results," cited in n. 49 above.

53. "Mess Halls Are Better Run Than Ever," cited in n. 49 above.
54. "From the regional authorities down to the authorities of every commune, all departments should actively carry out the directive of operating multiple undertakings and making multiple use of material resources, and build large numbers of small..., mass-operated enterprises with local efforts." Yang Ho-t'ing, "Work Report of the SUAR People's Council," cited in n. 30 above.
55. Chao Huai-pi, "Agricultural Production Is Continuously Leaping Forward in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou," *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh*, No. 6 (June 1961); in *SCMM*, No. 273.
56. Chao Huai-pi, "March Forward Singing Aloud," *JMJP* (June 21, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2050. This statement pertained to the Ili chou specifically.
57. "Iron and Steel City on the Grasslands," *JMJP* (June 21, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2050. Backyard blast furnaces were a symbol of the Great Leap Forward in the CPR.
58. Chao Huai-pi, "March Forward Singing Aloud," cited in n. 56 above. Among the workers, in addition to Kazakh herdsmen and Uighur peasants, there were "Han cadres who have just been transferred from upper levels." Actually, Hsinyuan must have been fairly important, as a new rail line was projected to serve it.
59. "Many Factories in Northwest China," *NCNA* (Peking, Jan. 2, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 1929.
60. Speech by Ssu-ma-yi-ya-sheng-no-fu, Deputy to the People's Congress and Head of the Rural Work Department of the Party Committee for the Autonomous Region, at the Second Session of the Second SUAR People's Congress, *Sinkiang jih-pao* (June 4, 1960).
61. Chang Sheng-ts'ai, "Let the Young People Who Come to Aid and Support Sinkiang in Construction Develop Greater Strength in the Autonomous Region," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (July 28, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2121. Women made up a substantial part of these three million "units of labor power": by April 1960, 800,000 women from agricultural and pastoral areas had been "released to take part in production." "Communal Mess Halls in Sinkiang Operated with Increasingly Better Results," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Apr. 21, 1960).

Sinkiang's population in October 1960 was put at "nearly 7,000,000." "Love Sinkiang, Love Agriculture, Build Sinkiang Wholeheartedly," speech made "at conference

of activists among youths and middle-aged people in support of socialist construction in Sinkiang" by Hu K'o-shih, Secretary, Secretariat, Central Committee of Young Communist League, *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Oct. 20, 1960). This figure is 2,000,000 above that given by Chang only six months earlier: the discrepancy is probably due more to faulty statistics than to net immigration, but the influx of Han Chinese must have been continuing on a large scale. Saifudin gave what appears to be an accurate figure of 6,000,000 for Sinkiang's population in November 1959: "Comrade Saifudin's Speech at Meeting to Welcome Kiangsu and Hupeh Comfort Delegations," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Nov. 1, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2155. This would indicate a growth of 1,000,000, or 16.5 per cent, in a year. This rate of increase would seem to be confirmed by a report by Wang En-mao of June 1960 in which he put Sinkiang's population at 6,480,000: "Speech at Second Session, Second SUAR People's Congress on June 2, 1960," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (June 20, 1960).

62. Speech by Ssu-ma-yi-ya-sheng-no-fu, cited in n. 60 above.
63. Excluded from consideration here are the industrial workers drawn into the new enterprises of the SUAR. This was a more gradual process, for the new workers had to be trained. Nevertheless, there was a sharp rise in the recruitment of new workers during the Great Leap Forward. For instance, during the half-year period preceding August 1959, "newly recruited workers in industrial, transport, and capital construction systems in the autonomous region reached the number of more than 110,000," most of whom were "urban and rural laboring masses" from Sinkiang's "interior." "Sinkiang Greatly Strengthens Education of New Workers," *Kung-jen jih-pao* (Aug. 7, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2097.
64. Pathan Sugurpaev, "Launch the Mass Movement on a Large Scale to Realize a Continuing Leap Forward in Political and Judicial Work," cited in n. 51. The Han immigrants, too, required special indoctrination, since they did not manifest sufficient respect for the local people to satisfy the party command. It is doubtful, however, if they received much training in the party's nationalities policy, for their arrogant attitude remained to exacerbate frictions among the various nationalities in the region.
65. Ts'ai Shu-pin, Head of the Hupeh Provincial Comforting Mission to Support Socialist Construction in Sinkiang, "A Blissful Journey and Unforgettable Friendship," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Dec. 8, 1959). It was not unusual,

however, for the Han youths to live underground, an example of which is given by an NCNA correspondent: "250,000 *Mow* of Wasteland Opened Up in Sinkiang," *JMJP* (May 26, 1960). Early settlers in the American great plains frequently spent their first winter underground.

66. "Warm Welcome to the Anhwei Provincial Delegation for Comforting Frontier-Supporting Young and Middle-Aged People," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Sept. 23, 1960). Of course, they engaged in many kinds of work besides farming.
67. For instance, the director of the Personnel Bureau, SUAR People's Council, warned the local authorities against paying the "young volunteers" unless they had actually performed the prescribed amount of work. Chang Sheng-ts'ai, "Let the Young People Who Come to Aid and Support Sinkiang in Construction Develop Greater Strength," cited in n. 61 above.
68. On-the-spot, summary administration of the law was an acknowledged component of the "great leap forward in judicial work" which began in 1958. Thus, punishment could be meted out immediately by the party, the militia, and other organs so empowered. T'o-hu-ti Ai-li-mo-fu, "Report on Work of the SUAR Higher People's Court," delivered at the First Session of the Second SUAR People's Congress, *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Feb. 3, 1959); in *SCMP*, No. 2018.
69. Propaganda in the CPR means, of course, not simply talk in favor of something but force judiciously applied: those being propagandized must be made to accept--indeed, to express their enthusiastic desire for--whatever the omniscient party has determined is good for them.
70. Refugees reaching Hong Kong in 1960 reported that a situation "like that in Tibet" had developed in Sinkiang during 1959, but aside from a localized revolt in Hotien, on the southern rim of the Tarim basin and only 150 miles from the Tibetan frontier, open rebellion did not, apparently, break out in Sinkiang as it had in Tsinghai and Tibet at the same time. *The New York Times* (Apr. 25, 1959). That it did not is evidence of stronger party control in Sinkiang than in the other two areas. We shall shortly consider evidence provided by Kazakh refugees in the Soviet Union to the effect that dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the Ili chou mounted rapidly after 1958, when the communes were introduced.

71. "SUAR People's Militia Work Conference Maps Out Future Tasks," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Feb. 26, 1960). On the following day the *Sinkiang jih-pao* noted that "The militia is an armed organization of the masses without uniforms which is engaged in production on the one hand and in fighting battles on the other. It is a tool for safeguarding the interests of the people and for thoroughly carrying out the Party's political line."
72. Lu Chien-jen, "Hold Higher the Three Red Flags...," cited in n. 19 above.
73. "Text of Speech at Second Session, Second NPC, by Saifudin," cited in n. 29 above.
74. "Party School in Sinkiang Holds Commencement; Saifudin Makes an Important Speech," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Mar. 12, 1960).
75. "Continue to Intensify Labor Training and Promptly Raise the Communist Consciousness of Cadres," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Apr. 20, 1960), and "Strengthen Communist Education for Party Members," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (July 1, 1960). Both statements were prepared by the Organization Department, CCP Sinkiang Committee.
76. "Second Session of First Party Congress of Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region Held," *JMJP* (Mar. 28, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2238.
77. "Practice of Eating, Living, and Working with Commune Members Turned into System for Cadres at All Levels in Sinkiang," NCNA (Urumchi, June 22, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2287; and "Secretaries of Party Organizations at Various Levels in Sinkiang Eat Together With the Commune Members," NCNA (Urumchi, July 13, 1960); in *SCMP*, No. 2300.
78. Virtually all functionaries, and not party members alone, were involved. For instance: "The basic-level judicial functionaries...are going into the midst of farms and factories to share food, shelter, and labor with the peasants and workers. They will handle cases when there are cases to handle, and they will engage in production when there are no cases to handle." T'o-hu-ti Ai-li-mo-fu, "Report on Work of the SUAR Higher People's Court," cited in n. 68.
79. This is due in part to a general blackout of regional news from China beginning in 1960.

80. "Text of Speech at Second Session of Second National People's Congress by Saifudin," cited in n. 29 above.
81. Wang En-mao, "Long Live the People's Commune," cited in n. 1 above.
82. Li Tsung-hai, "Several Opinions Concerning the Pastoral Industry," cited in n. 23 above.
83. Kotov, *Autonomy of Local Nationalities in the CPR* (Moscow, 1959), tr. in U.S. Dept. of Commerce, JPRS, No. 3547. This statement is an oddity, as the Russians in general heaped opprobrium on the communes.
84. "Life of Kazakh People Leaps Into New Stage," cited in n. 8.
85. "Bring Animal Husbandry in Pastoral Areas to a New Stage," *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh*, No. 6 (June 1963); in *SCMM*, No. 381.
86. Saifudin, "Sinkiang's Great Achievements in Livestock in Ten Years," *Chung-kuo nung-pao*, No. 19 (Oct. 8, 1959); in *ECMM*, No. 193. According to this report, there were 22,230,000 head of livestock in the SUAR in 1958, of which "more than 2,000,000 head" were owned by the "state stock farms."
87. "Launch a Mass Campaign to Implement the Economic Use of Grain," *Sinkiang jih-pao* (Feb. 3, 1960), in *SCMP*, No. 2238.
88. Wang En-mao, "We Must Continue to Take a Big Leap Forward this Year," cited in n. 36.

VIII. Conclusion: The Exodus and Its Aftermath

1. The *Boston Herald* (Apr. 16, 1964), by the New York Times News Service (only a much abridged version of this story was carried in *The New York Times* of the same date). For other details concerning the exodus, see Daniel Tretiak, "China's New Frontier Trouble," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Oct. 10, 1963); and *Newsweek* (Nov. 25, 1963).
2. Zunun Taipov, "On the Other Side of the Barricade: An Eyewitness Account," *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (Sept. 29, 1963), tr. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 15, No. 38 (New York: Joint Committee on

Slavic Studies). Quite possibly it was this shooting which provoked the Russians into issuing passports.

3. According to Western sources, 50,000 to 70,000 "Moslem nomads" were involved. *The New York Times* (Sept. 7, 1963), report from Washington by Tad Szulc. Soviet officials in Alma Ata were reported to have used the figure of 62,000 in October 1962. *The New York Times* (Nov. 17, 1963).
4. *The New York Times* (Apr. 30, 1964), citing a China News Service report concerning a meeting of the SUAR People's Congress.
5. Usman Mametov, "I Cannot Be Silent," letter to *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (Sept. 22, 1963); in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 15, No. 38.
6. O. Matskevich, "Along the Border," *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (Sept. 24, 1963); in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 15, No. 38.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Professor Franz Schurmann has suggested that the relaxed economic policy of 1961-1963 may be coming to an end. "China's 'New Economic Policy': Transition or Beginning?" *China Quarterly*, No. 17 (January-March 1964), pp. 65-91.
9. "Vigorously Develop the Livestock Industry in Livestock Areas." *JMJP* editorial (July 18, 1963); in *JPRS*, No. 20,689. During the Great Leap Forward, in contrast, the emphasis had been heavily on grain production: see, for example, Chao Huai-pi, "Agricultural Production Is Continuously Leaping Forward in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou," *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh*, No. 6 (June 1961); in *SCMM*, No. 273. In the Altai district, the cultivated acreage was trebled between 1958 and 1963. "People's Communes in Sinkiang Have More Livestock," *NCNA* (Urumchi, Sept. 9, 1963); in *SCMP*, No. 3059. We have already observed that the anticipated increase in grain supplies was expected to raise livestock production by making fodder more abundant, but as it turned out there was not even enough grain to satisfy human requirements.
10. "Vigorously Develop the Livestock Industry," cited in n. 9 above. The party's high-handed treatment of the herders during the Great Leap Forward is indicated by these remarks; also of interest is the allusion to defense.

11. Hu Chao-heng, "The Development of Stock-Breeding in Inner Mongolian Pastoral Areas," *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh*, No. 6 (June 1963); in *SCMM*, No. 377. For Sinkiang's Kazakhs, this observation could probably be translated into a "spontaneous tendency to cling to the *uru*."
12. "Vigorously Develop the Livestock Industry," cited in n. 9 above.
13. In the fall of 1963 it was said that the "People's communes in the 27 stock-breeding *hsien* of Sinkiang have increased their livestock by 50 per cent since their establishment in 1958. Their stock of animals is now three times that of the time of Liberation." "People's Communes in Sinkiang Have More Livestock," *NCNA* (Urumchi, Sept. 9, 1963); in *SCMP*, No. 3059. This increase must have taken place after 1960. Several sources speak of 1963 as the "third consecutive year" of expansion in the livestock industry, suggesting that the trend prior to 1961-1963 had been different.
14. Farnsworth Fowle, "Red Rift Echoes in Central Asia," *The New York Times* (May 31, 1964). The Chinese replied in kind: "You listen to broadcasts from Urumchi and your ears ring: hardly a word but is a malicious slander of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and our [Soviet] people." Usman Mametov, "I Cannot Be Silent," cited in n. 5 above.
 The exclusion of Soviet books and periodicals from the Ili chou had begun in 1958. By 1961 there was a complete ban on printed matter from the Soviet Union. See Bukhara Tyshkanbayev and Estan Nusipbekov, "Criticism of Communist China's Attitude Towards Soviet Literature," in the Kazakh-language newspaper *Sotsialistik Kazakhstan* (Alma Ata, Oct. 10, 1963); in *JPRS*, No. 23,131. In 1963 a Kazakh refugee in the Soviet Union said that one of his kinsmen had been arrested for being in possession of a newspaper from the Kazakh SSR: "Suppression of Kazakhs and Other Minorities by Chinese Communists in Sinkiang," unsigned article in *Sotsialistik Kazakhstan* (Sept. 27, 1963); in *JPRS*, No. 21,735.
15. It should not be imagined, however, that the Soviet Union was a paradise for the Kazakhs: see the chapter entitled "The Tragedy of the Kazakhs" in *Communism and Colonialism* (London, 1964), pp. 42-52, by Walter Kolarz, an authority on the national minorities of the Soviet Union.

16. Much of the September 1964 issue of *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh* is devoted to the Ili chou's tenth anniversary; included is a statement by the Ili region party secretary, Chang Shih-kung 張世功, entitled "Yen-che she-hui chu-i tao-lu sheng-li ch'ien-chin" 沿着社会主义道路胜利前进 (Advance victoriously along the socialist road), pp. 2-4. Useful information can also be found in several NCNA dispatches from Urumchi (in *SCMP*, Nos. 3292, 3293, and 3294).
17. See especially Li Ping-ta 李秉达, "T'uan-chieh hua k'ai Ili-chou" 团结花开伊犁州 (Unity flowers in the opening up of the Ili chou), *Min-tsu t'uan-chieh* (September 1964), pp. 9-11. This article deals mainly with the mutual help said to have developed between the corps and the national minorities in the Ili river valley.
18. One indication of this influx is the growth of Ining municipality. An NCNA dispatch of Sept. 4, 1964 (*SCMP*, No. 3294), put the city's population at one million, whereas a *China Reconstructs* article of March 1960 put it at only "over 100,000." A ten-fold increase in population is typical of the post-1949 development of major centers in China's frontier regions, including Hami and Urumchi, and Han Chinese have made up the largest part of this increase. Also of interest is Saifudin's assertion in 1965 that "Han people are streaming uninterruptedly into Sinkiang" (*Jen-min jih-pao*, Sept. 30, 1965).
19. "Governor Irhali Talks about the Road of Prosperity Taken by Kazakh People on the Eve of the Tenth Anniversary of the Founding of Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou," NCNA, (Sept. 1, 1964); in *SCMP*, No. 3294.
20. The whole of *Current Background*, No. 775, is devoted to the SUAR's tenth anniversary. See also the September 1965 issue of *Min-tsu hua-pao* (Nationalities pictorial), the theme of which is Han-Uighur fraternization.
21. See *The Times* (London) of Oct. 5, 1965 and *Le Monde* of Oct. 6, 1965.
22. *Min-tsu hua-pao* editorial (September 1965), p. 7.

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